People v. Correa

1

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES MITCHELL CORREA, Defendant and Appellant.

H050915

California Court of Appeals, Sixth District

March 20, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. C2006043, C1909378.

BROMBERG, J.

James Mitchell Correa appeals a restitution order following a judgment in which he pleaded no contest to charges of carjacking and assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court ordered restitution, among other things, of $2,106 plus 10 percent annual interest payable to the California Victim Compensation Board (VCB). Correa argues that he should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing concerning the amount of restitution pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4^[1] and that the VCB was not entitled to interest on the restitution. Correa also contends that the abstracts of judgment in his case do not accurately reflect that other restitution ordered by the court was stayed. We conclude that the trial court was authorized to order interest, but that Correa should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing on restitution, and we remand for such a hearing. In addition, we direct that the abstracts of judgment be corrected.

I. Background

Because the underlying facts are not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, we do not address them and only recount the procedural background.

In case number C2006043, the district attorney charged Correa with seven counts: (1) oral copulation by force, violence, duress menace, or fear (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)); (2) sexual battery of a victim (§ 243, subd. (a)); (3) carjacking where the victim was the driver of the vehicle (§ 215, subd. (a)); (4) kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)); (5) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); (6) exhibiting a deadly weapon other than a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)); and (7) reckless driving (§ 23103, subd. (a)). The district attorney also alleged a prior conviction for carjacking (§ 215), constituting both a strike prior (§ 1170.12) and a five-year prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).

In case number C1909378, the district attorney charged Correa with three counts: (1) taking or unauthorized use of a vehicle with intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); (2) involvement in a hit and run accident resulting in injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)); and (3) resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The district attorney also alleged a prior conviction for carjacking constituting a strike prior (§ 1170.12).

In January 2022, Correa entered into a plea agreement for both cases, as well as a third involving misdemeanors. He pleaded no contest to carjacking and assault with a deadly weapon in case number C2006043 and to car theft in case number C1909378, as well as admitting the prior conviction for carjacking.

In March 2023, the trial court sentenced Correa to 12 years in prison in case number C2006043 and two years in prison in number C1909378, for a total prison term of 14 years. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court also considered an amount of restitution to award to the victim in case number C2006043. The VCB sought $3,109 it had paid to the victim, and the victim requested an additional $400. Correa objected to the amounts of restitution and "ask[ed] that this hearing be continued to a date where we can have an in-person hearing." Following additional discussion, however, the trial court ordered restitution of $2,106 to VCB for mental health benefits paid by it without holding an evidentiary hearing. The trial court also ordered Correa to pay 10 percent annual interest on this amount. Finally, in each case, the court ordered the generally applicable restitution fine of $300 under section 1202.4, subd. (b), which it stayed, and a parole revocation fine of $300, which it suspended.

Correa filed a timely appeal.

II. Discussion

A. Evidentiary Hearing

Correa argues that under section 1202.4 he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the restitution requested by the VCB on behalf of the victim. The Attorney General does not dispute that Correa had a right to a hearing under section 1202.4; instead he contends that Correa forfeited that right. We disagree with the Attorney General and conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Correa a hearing on the amount of restitution. (See People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663 (Giordano) [restitution orders reviewed for abuse of discretion].)

Under section 1202.4, "a victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that crime." (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) In some instances, a crime victim may obtain compensation from California's Restitution Fund. When that happens," 'the amounts a defendant is ordered to pay as direct victim restitution are instead paid to the Restitution Fund.'" (People v. Evans (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 771, 778 (Evans).) In addition, "the amount of assistance provided shall be presumed to be a direct result of the defendant's criminal conduct" (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(4)(A); Gov. Code, § 13950) and "shall be established by copies of bills submitted to the California Victim Compensation Board."

(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(4)(B).) Nevertheless, section 1202.4 expressly provides that a "defendant has the right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the determination of the amount of restitution." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).)

Correa plainly was entitled to hearing concerning the amount of restitution claimed by the VCB on behalf of the victim in case number C2006043. As just noted, section 1202.4 confers an unqualified right to a hearing to dispute the determination of the amount of restitution (see, e.g., Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 654), and Correa invoked that right by requesting an in-person hearing on the amount of restitution.

In addition, contrary to the Attorney General's assertion, Correa did not later forfeit this right. The right to challenge a restitution order may be forfeited where a "defendant neither raised an objection to the amount of the order nor requested a hearing to determine it." (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075; see also People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26, fn. 6 ["Defendant . . . waived a claim of error as to the amount of restitution by failing to object on that ground in the trial court."].) But, as the Attorney General here acknowledges, Correa's counsel both objected to the amounts sought and requested a restitution hearing.

The Attorney General asserts that, because the trial court awarded restitution only for mental health benefits, Correa essentially prevailed in his objection and should have renewed the objection if he still disagreed with the final restitution order. The Attorney General, however, fails to cite any case imposing such a requirement. The Attorney General relies on People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 813, but Braxton holds only that a party forfeits a challenge to a procedural error or omission if it "acquiesced by failing to object or protest under circumstances indicating that the error or omission probably was inadvertent." There were no such circumstances here. Correa objected to all the "California Victim Compensation Board amounts," and the trial court awarded a portion of those amounts: the counseling expenses. Consequently, it cannot be stated that the trial court's order fully addressed Correa's objection, or that Correa acquiesced in the trial court's implicit denial of a hearing on the counseling expenses by failing to make a second request for a hearing.

We therefore conclude that Correa did not forfeit his right under section 1202.4, subd. (f)(1) to a hearing to determine the amount of restitution and that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold such a hearing.

B. Interest

In addition to challenging the denial of an evidentiary hearing on the amount of restitution awarded, Correa argues that section 1202.4 did not permit the trial court to award interest on the restitution payable to the VCB. Because this argument concerns the interpretation of a statute, we review it de novo. (See, e.g., People v. Williams (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 146.) We conclude that section 1202.4 permits interest on restitution awards payable to the VCB.

Section 1202.4 lists various items that must be included in a restitution order under that section. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) One item is "[i]nterest, at the rate of 10 percent per annum, that accrues as of the date of sentencing or loss, as determined by the court." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(G).)

Noting that restitution is intended "to fully reimburse the victim" (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3), italics added), Correa argues that such interest may be awarded only when the restitution is payable to the victim, not to the VCB. But when the VCB compensates crime victims, it is "subrogated to the rights of the recipient . . . against the perpetrator." (Gov. Code, § 13963, subd. (a).) As a result, when the VCB seeks restitution for payments made to victims, it is not exercising its own right to compensation; it is standing in the victim's shoes and exercising the victim's rights. (Ace American Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 159, 181 [defining subrogation as" 'the substitution of another person in place of the creditor or claimant to whose rights he or she succeeds in relation to the debt or claim' "]; see also id. at p. 167 [a subrogated party "is said to' "stand in the shoes"' "of the party whose rights are being exercised].)

Moreover far from limiting the application of this general principle, section 1202.4 expressly states that "[d]etermination of the amount of restitution . . . shall...