People v. Cotton

1

2024 IL App (4th) 230002-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LANCE LAMMAR COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-23-0002

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District

April 29, 2024

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County No. 21CF737 Honorable John Casey Costigan, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Turner concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

DOHERTY JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and 25-year sentence for aggravated battery of a child under the age of 13 years, concluding that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting other-crimes evidence to show defendant's propensity to commit domestic violence, (2) the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, (3) the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into defendant's posttrial claim that his counsel was ineffective, and (4) the trial court did not err at sentencing by considering the nonstatutory aggravating factor that defendant held a position of trust in relation to the minor victim.

¶ 2 Defendant Lance Lammar Cotton was living in an apartment with his girlfriend Treshana Hosea and her two children by another father, 21-month-old boy L.E. and 3-year-old girl T.H., when, on February 19, 2020, an investigator for the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) accompanied by a police officer, entered the apartment and observed that L.E. was small, malnourished, and lethargic. L.E. was taken from the apartment for medical treatment; imaging showed that he had subdural hematomas and multiple fractured bones. The evidence showed that L.E. was healthy and developmentally normal as of December 26, 2019. It is undisputed that (1) no one had access to L.E. during this two-month period except for defendant, Hosea, and T.H., (2) T.H. was not capable of inflicting L.E.'s injuries, and (3) L.E.'s injuries were not accidental or self-inflicted.

¶ 3 In July 2021, the State charged defendant with one count of aggravated battery of a child under the age of 13 years (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(1) (West 2020)) and one count of aggravated domestic battery (id. § 12-3.3(a)) for causing L.E.'s injuries. The trial court held a bench trial on the aggravated battery charge in September 2022, at which defendant and Hosea each testified that they had not caused L.E.'s injuries. The court convicted defendant and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections.

¶ 4 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in several respects. We find no error and affirm.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 Defendant began dating Hosea in 2010, and the two had an on-and-off relationship until April 2021. In September 2015, defendant repeatedly struck Hosea on the face, causing injuries, including a laceration and a severely swollen eye. In 2016, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1) (West 2014)) and one count of domestic battery (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)) based on this incident.

¶ 7 Hosea gave birth to T.H. in 2017 and L.E. in 2018; defendant moved into Hosea's apartment in early 2019. T.H. and L.E. spent Christmas Eve in 2019 with Hosea's mother Salina Grismore. After T.H. and L.E. returned to Hosea's apartment on December 26, 2019, Grismore was no longer allowed into the apartment. In January 2020, Grismore called DCFS with concerns about her grandchildren's safety, asking DCFS to check on the family, especially L.E. A DCFS investigator made several unsuccessful attempts to visit the family before involving the police on February 19, 2020. L.E. was taken from the apartment for treatment; the medical evidence showed malnutrition, facial bruises, bilateral subdural hemorrhages, and multiple humerus and rib fractures, some of which were several weeks old. DCFS placed L.E. and T.H. in Grismore's custody immediately; L.E. eventually made a strong recovery.

¶ 8 When the police interviewed Hosea in February 2020, she stated that she did not think defendant had hit or injured L.E. because at the time, she "didn't think he was capable of doing that." When defendant was questioned, he told the police emphatically that he had never seen Hosea "[y]ank [the kids], hit them, snatch them, [or] do any foul action." He also said that he did not think Hosea had anything to do with L.E.'s injuries, that she was gentle with the children, and that she handled frustration well.

¶ 9 Hosea gave birth to defendant's first daughter Ri. C. on April 17, 2020; DCFS took protective custody of Ri. C. on April 19, 2020. Hosea gave birth to defendant's second daughter Ry. C. on April 2, 2021; DCFS took protective custody of Ry. C. on April 6, 2021. After leaving the hospital, Hosea broke up with defendant, contacted the police, and informed them that defendant had in fact caused L.E.'s injuries. She also alleged that defendant had repeatedly abused her while she was pregnant with Ry. C.

¶ 10 For his alleged abuse of Hosea, defendant was charged in April 2021 with aggravated domestic battery and domestic battery in McLean County case No. 21-CF-426. We take judicial notice of the McLean County court docket showing that the State entered a nolle prosequi in case No. 21-CF-426 on the same day that defendant was sentenced in the present case. In July 2021, defendant was indicted for aggravated battery and aggravated domestic battery for his abuse of L.E.; Hosea was charged with child endangerment for failing to protect L.E.

¶ 11 Before defendant's trial, the State moved to introduce evidence of his prior abuse of Hosea pursuant to section 115-7.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 (West 2022)), which provides that "evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." Before admitting this other-crimes evidence, the court must "weigh[ ] the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant" and in doing so, "may consider: (1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense; (2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or (3) other relevant facts and circumstances." Id. The State sought to introduce certified copies of defendant's 2016 convictions, Hosea's testimony regarding the incidents, and photographs of Hosea's injuries from 2015 and 2021.

¶ 12 The State argued that the probative value of the other-crimes evidence outweighed the risk of undue prejudice to defendant, even though five years had elapsed between the prior offenses and the charged offense and the victims had different relationships with defendant. The State asserted that the offenses nevertheless had sufficiently similar facts because the victims "are all still in the same family and their injuries were caused, the [S]tate is alleging, by this defendant using his hands or objects to cause blunt force to either [L.E.] or [Hosea]."

¶ 13 The trial court granted the State's motion in part, finding that defendant's abuse of Hosea in 2015 was sufficiently recent and bore "a high degree of factual similarity" to the charged offense. The court denied the State's motion to the extent the State sought to admit evidence of defendant's alleged abuse of Hosea in 2021, finding that the evidence would be cumulative and that the absence of a prior finding of guilt might result in an improper "trial within a trial" on these allegations. The court therefore allowed the State to introduce evidence relating to the 2016 convictions, including the 2015 photographs of Hosea's injuries. The court informed defendant that he could raise a further objection at trial if he believed that the State had "presented sufficient evidence to establish propensity without the piling on that the court has indicated will not be allowed."

¶ 14 In September 2022, the trial court dismissed the aggravated domestic battery charge on the State's motion and proceeded to a bench trial on the aggravated battery charge. Hosea and defendant both testified; there is no dispute that the evidence apart from their testimony shows that one or both of them caused L.E.'s injuries. The other-crimes evidence was admitted without any further objection by defendant.

¶ 15 Hosea testified that she only saw defendant yell at L.E. once and never personally saw him physically abuse L.E. However, she believed that defendant had abused L.E. when she left the apartment to go shopping on January 21, 2020. Hosea acknowledged that she had previously denied that defendant was responsible for abusing L.E. "[b]ecause [she] didn't think he was capable of doing that and c[ame] to find out he was capable of doing that." She also testified that based on her conversations with her attorney, she believed her prosecution for child endangerment would be dismissed, but she was uncertain whether her attorney had been negotiating an agreement with the State and knew that there was no decision yet.

¶ 16 Defendant took the stand and accused Hosea of committing L.E.'s injuries. He testified that his prior statements to the police were false and that he had made them to protect Hosea. Although he acknowledged his past abuse of Hosea, he said, "I don't chastise kids. Me and [Hosea] might have got into it; but I don't touch kids, period."

¶ 17 In its closing argument, the State admitted that it could not establish how exactly L.E.'s injuries had been caused but cited defendant's prior abuse of Hosea, stating that "the Co...