People v. Curiel

15 Cal.5th 433

538 P.3d 993

315 Cal.Rptr.3d 495

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Freddy Alfredo CURIEL, Defendant and Appellant.

S272238

Supreme Court of California.

November 27, 2023

Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Michelle May Peterson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, AJ Kutchins and Craig Buckser, Deputy State Public Defenders, for the Office of the State Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Michael Pulos, Seth M. Freidman, A. Natasha Cortina, Alan L. Amann and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In 2006, a jury convicted Freddy Alfredo Curiel of first degree murder ( Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) )¹ and found true the gang-murder special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and the criminal street gang sentencing enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found true two firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)) and convicted Curiel of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Curiel to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, consecutive to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison.

Twelve years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which narrowed or eliminated certain forms of accomplice liability for murder. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) Among other things, Senate Bill 1437 barred the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine to obtain a murder conviction. ( People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 851, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 477 P.3d 539 ( Gentile ).) Senate Bill 1437 also created "a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief." ( People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309 ( Lewis ).)

Curiel petitioned for relief and resentencing under this new procedure. (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a) ; now § 1172.6, subd. (a).) He alleged, among other things, that he had been convicted of first degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and could not currently be convicted of murder because of changes to the murder statutes enacted by Senate Bill 1437. After appointing counsel and receiving briefing, the trial court denied Curiel's petition for failure to state a prima facie case. The court believed the jury's finding that Curiel "inten[ded] to kill," which was required for the gang-murder special circumstance, refuted Curiel's allegation that he could not be convicted of murder under current law and therefore precluded relief under Senate Bill 1437. Curiel appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed. It held that the jury's intent to kill finding was insufficient, by itself, to establish that Curiel was liable for murder under current law. For example, to be convicted as a direct aider and abettor, the prosecution would have to prove Curiel harbored a culpable mental state (mens rea) and he committed a culpable act (actus reus). The Court of Appeal held the jury's intent to kill finding did not demonstrate the latter as a matter of law.

We granted review to consider the effect of the jury's true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance, specifically its finding that Curiel intended to kill, on his ability to state a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437. As a threshold matter, we conclude that the jury's intent to kill finding was properly given preclusive effect in the resentencing proceedings below, i.e., Curiel was bound by the jury's finding for purposes of assessing his petition. The jury's finding satisfied the traditional elements of the doctrine of issue preclusion, and Curiel has not established any applicable exception. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715–716, 296 Cal.Rptr.3d 686, 514 P.3d 265 ( Strong ).) The trial court was therefore correct to consider whether Curiel could state a prima facie case for relief notwithstanding the jury's finding of intent to kill.

The trial court erred, however, in denying Curiel's petition at the prima facie stage based on this finding. The jury's finding of intent to kill does not, itself, conclusively establish that Curiel is ineligible for relief. Curiel's allegation that he could not currently be convicted of murder because of the changes in substantive law enacted by Senate Bill 1437 put at issue all the elements of murder under current law. Murder liability as an aider and abettor requires both a sufficient mens rea and a sufficient actus reus. A finding of intent to kill, viewed in isolation, establishes neither.

But that conclusion does not end the prima facie inquiry. The jury necessarily made other findings, which bear on Curiel's liability for murder. We discuss those findings below and conclude that they too are insufficient to rebut Curiel's allegation of nonliability and conclusively establish that he is ineligible for relief. For example, the mens rea required of a direct aider and abettor includes knowledge of the perpetrator's intent to commit an unlawful act constituting the offense and the intent to aid the perpetrator in its commission. ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 423, 113 P.3d 100 ( Perez ).) The jury's verdicts, viewed in light of the court's jury instructions, do not show the jury necessarily made factual findings covering these elements. Thus, the trial court could not reject Curiel's prima facie showing on this basis, and it should have proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on Curiel's resentencing petition. Because the Court of Appeal likewise found that the trial court erred, albeit on different grounds, we affirm its judgment, which reversed the trial court's order denying relief.²

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial Evidence

A group of friends, including Cesar Tejada, were socializing outside of Tejada's apartment late one night in August 2002. Two men, later identified as Curiel and Abraham Hernandez, walked past the group toward a convenience store. One person in Tejada's group, Raul R., testified at trial that Curiel and Hernandez looked at the group "in a bad manner." Curiel stipulated that he was a member of O.T.H., a criminal street gang, at the time. A prosecution gang expert testified that Hernandez was an O.T.H. member as well.

After visiting the convenience store, Curiel and Hernandez approached the group. According to recorded statements that witness Lupe O. made to police, Hernandez confronted Tejada, asked him "where he was from," and started shoving him. Raul came to Tejada's aid, but Curiel got mad and said, "this is my neighborhood." Lupe responded, "it's not your neighborhood," and Curiel became angrier. He started screaming that it was "his neighborhood" and "OTH." Hernandez and Tejada started pushing each other. At some point, Tejada grabbed Hernandez's shirt and shoved him over a shopping cart. Hernandez got up, took out a gun, and shot Tejada. Curiel and Hernandez ran away.

At trial, Lupe claimed she did not remember the events leading up to the shooting. She eventually agreed that Hernandez started an argument with Tejada, but Curiel tried to get them to calm down. Lupe said she had known Curiel for a long time, Curiel did not have anything to do with the shooting, and "he didn't want [the shooting] to happen."

Raul testified that he remembered Curiel arguing with the group of friends, telling Tejada "something about gangs or the barrio," and asking Tejada where he was from. Tejada responded, "I am from nowhere." Raul told Curiel and Hernandez to leave, and Curiel responded it was none of Raul's business, that he should "[s]hut the fuck up" and "get the hell out of here." Lupe and Curiel argued and traded insults. Hernandez pulled out a gun and chased one of the other friends. The friend ran behind Tejada, and Hernandez shot Tejada in the chest at close range. On cross-examination, Raul was confronted with earlier testimony where he stated that Hernandez, not Curiel, asked Tejada where he was from.

Tejada suffered a single gunshot wound to his upper left chest. Residue or "stippling" around the wound indicated that Tejada was shot from approximately 12 to 18 inches away. The wound was fatal.

The prosecution's gang expert testified that he had been a police officer for 24 years and specialized in gang-related crimes. He had spoken to many gang members over the years about gang culture, the expectations of gang members, and concepts like "backup and payback and respect and loyalty" in a gang. The gang expert testified that gangs can be organized around a race or ethnicity and they can be "turf-oriented" or "non[-]turf-oriented." In his experience, most Hispanic gangs were "turf-oriented," meaning that they held a particular neighborhood or claimed a particular area. The gang expert explained that asking "where are you from" is a serious challenge or "hit-up." He said, "If it is in your particular gang neighborhood and you see somebody else there, you are trying to identify them to see what they are doing ...." The gang expert testified that he had investigated fatal stabbings and shootings that resulted from statements like "where are you from."

The gang expert further testified about the importance of "respect" in gang culture, which in reality means "fear and intimidation." For example, "[t]he more violent an individual is, the more respect he has within the gang and the more fear that he produces in the community." If a community member tells a gang member to leave or says "you don't live here," the gang member will probably react violently. The gang expert explained that a...