People v. Curtis

498 P.3d 677

2021 COA 103

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Steven CURTIS, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0480

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division VII.

Announced August 5, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE DUNN

¶ 1 Defendant Steven Curtis tried to vote twice in the November 2016 general election. In addition to his mail ballot, Curtis also filled out his ex-wife's mail ballot, forged her signature on the ballot envelope, and mailed it to the Weld County Clerk and Recorder. For this, a jury convicted Curtis of felony forgery, section 18-5-102(1)(d), C.R.S. 2020, and a misdemeanor mail ballot offense, section 1-13-112, C.R.S. 2020.

¶ 2 Curtis appeals his forgery conviction, contending that the prosecution lacked the discretion to charge him under the general forgery statute and, instead, could charge him only under "the more specific" mail ballot offense statute. Because we disagree, we reject Curtis's contention that we must vacate his forgery conviction. And because we are unpersuaded by Curtis's other challenges, we affirm.

I. Background

¶ 3 Curtis and his wife Kelly ended their marriage in May 2016. Kelly later moved to South Carolina. Before the November 2016 general election, the Weld County Clerk and Recorder's office sent Kelly's mail ballot to the home she once shared with Curtis. Soon after, Curtis filled out, signed, and mailed both his and Kelly's ballots to the Weld County Clerk.¹

¶ 4 Meanwhile, Kelly contacted the Weld County Clerk's office to obtain an absentee ballot but was told that she "had already voted" and that her ballot "was sitting right there." Kelly explained that she hadn't filled out a ballot or given anyone permission to do so on her behalf. She later confirmed that the signature on the ballot envelope wasn't hers.

¶ 5 When asked, Curtis denied signing Kelly's ballot. Unconvinced, the prosecution obtained a court order requiring Curtis to provide DNA and handwriting samples. DNA testing showed that Curtis had sealed Kelly's ballot return envelope, and a handwriting expert concluded that Curtis had filled out the return address on the envelope and signed Kelly's name.

¶ 6 The prosecution charged Curtis with forgery and a mail ballot offense. At trial, Curtis implicitly acknowledged that he filled out and signed Kelly's ballot but asserted an involuntary intoxication affirmative defense. He argued that his chronic diabetes resulted in blood sugar "blackouts" that made him confused and unable to remember most of October 2016. As a result, he argued that he "did not possess the mental state [necessary] to commit or complete" the charged offenses.

¶ 7 The jury rejected the involuntary intoxication defense and convicted Curtis as charged. The trial court sentenced Curtis to probation and community service.

II. The Bagby Challenge

¶ 8 Relying on People v. Bagby , 734 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Colo. 1987), Curtis first contends that the prosecution lacked authority to charge him under the general forgery statute because the legislature intended to limit prosecution for conduct related to mail ballots to the more specific mail ballot offense statute. We disagree.

A. Waiver and Preservation

¶ 9 We first reject the People's contention that Curtis waived his Bagby challenge because it is a challenge to the information that must be raised before trial under Crim. P. 12(b)(2).

¶ 10 An information may be defective in either form or substance. See People v. Williams , 984 P.2d 56, 63 (Colo. 1999). Objections based on defects to the form of the information must be made before trial or they are waived. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). But a defect in substance is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time. See Williams , 984 P.2d at 63-64. A substantive defect requires "dismissal of the charge" or renders "void any conviction entered on such charge." Id.

¶ 11 Although the People contend that Curtis's claim "raise[s] an alleged defect in the charging information," they don't point to any specific form defect in the information. See People v. Davis , 2017 COA 40M, ¶ 9, 488 P.3d 186 (concluding Crim. P. 12(b) doesn't apply where the defendant's claim didn't involve a defect in the charging document).

¶ 12 Nor is any form defect self-evident. The information charged Curtis with two crimes based on the same set of facts. That's entirely proper. See § 18-1-408(7), C.R.S. 2020. So we see "[n]othing on the face of the charging document" that "revealed a defect to which [Curtis] could have properly objected." People v. Wester-Gravelle , 2020 CO 64, ¶ 23, 465 P.3d 570 ; see also People v. Zadra , 2013 COA 140, ¶¶ 65-66, 396 P.3d 34 (recognizing that federal appellate courts uniformly apply Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) "where the defect is apparent from the face of the charges") (citations omitted), aff'd on other grounds , 2017 CO 18, ¶ 18, 389 P.3d 885.

¶ 13 To the extent Curtis's claim can be characterized as an objection to the information at all, it appears to be a substantive one. Indeed, if Curtis is correct that the mail ballot offense statute abrogates the general forgery statute, then the prosecution "lacked authority" to charge him with forgery. Thus, should he prevail, we'd have to vacate the forgery conviction. See Williams , 984 P.2d at 64 (substantive defect renders void any conviction entered on such charge); People v. Moore , 200 Colo. 481, 485, 615 P.2d 726, 729 (1980) ("[W]hen an information fails to charge a crime, the court acquires no jurisdiction."). Such an objection doesn't need to be brought before trial. See Williams , 984 P.2d at 63-64.

¶ 14 Even if we assume Curtis's objection could be classified as a form objection, we see nothing in the record — and the People point to nothing — suggesting Curtis's failure to raise the challenge under Crim. P. 12(b) was intentional, rather than an oversight. See People v. Rediger , 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39, 416 P.3d 893 (waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right). Because our supreme court construes waivers under Crim. P. 12(b) as it does other waivers, see Wester-Gravelle , ¶ 26, and "indulge[s] every reasonable presumption against waiver," Rediger , ¶ 39 (citation omitted), absent any "evidence that [Curtis] intended to relinquish the right in question," Phillips v. People , 2019 CO 72, ¶ 33, 443 P.3d 1016, we can't conclude that Curtis waived his claim that the prosecution lacked authority to charge him with forgery. See Wester-Gravelle , ¶ 26 (concluding the defendant's failure to demand a prosecutorial election or request a modified unanimity instruction under Crim. P. 12(b) constituted a forfeiture); see also Zadra , ¶¶ 68, 70 (reviewing multiplicity challenge for plain error where the failure to bring the motion under Crim. P. 12(b) "was a result of oversight").

¶ 15 All this said, we agree with the People that Curtis didn't preserve his Bagby challenge. Thus, if we agree error occurred, we won't reverse unless the error is plain. See Rediger, ¶ 47.

B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 16 When a defendant's actions violate more than one criminal statute, the prosecution ordinarily may charge the defendant under each statute. See § 18-1-408(7) ; see also People v. Clanton , 2015 COA 8, ¶ 10, 361 P.3d 1056. In that scenario, it's for the prosecution "to determine what charges to file." People v. Stewart , 55 P.3d 107, 118 (Colo. 2002) ; see also People v. Smith , 938 P.2d 111, 115 (Colo. 1997) ("Ordinarily, a prosecutor has discretion to charge any applicable offense.").

¶ 17 But in rare circumstances the prosecution may be barred from charging a defendant under a general criminal statute when the legislature evinces a "clear" intent to limit prosecution to a more specific statute. Smith , 938 P.2d at 115-16 ; accord Bagby , 734 P.2d at 1061 ; Clanton , ¶ 11.

¶ 18 To determine whether the legislature clearly intended to limit prosecution to a more specific statute, courts consider whether (1) the specific statute invokes the full extent of the state's police powers; (2) the specific statute is part of an act creating a comprehensive and thorough regulatory scheme to control all aspects of a substantive area; and (3) that act carefully defines different types of offenses in detail. See Bagby , 734 P.2d at 1062 ; Smith , 938 P.2d at 116 ; People v. Warner , 930 P.2d 564, 568 (Colo. 1996).

¶ 19 Applying the Bagby factors, our supreme court has found only two instances where the legislature "intended the specific provisions" of a statute "to supplant the more general provisions" of the criminal code. Warner , 930 P.2d at 568. First, in Bagby , the supreme court concluded that the legislature intended to require the offense of falsely completing a liquor license application to be prosecuted under the Liquor Code and not the general criminal code. Bagby , 734 P.2d at 1062. And later, in Warner , the court reached a similar conclusion regarding the Limited Gaming Act of 1991, holding that the legislature intended that the use of a device to remove tokens from a slot machine be prosecuted exclusively under the Limited Gaming Act. See Warner , 930 P.2d at 568.

¶ 20 Bagby and Warner reached their conclusions, in part, by finding that the Liquor Code and the Limited Gaming Act were comprehensive regulatory schemes. Beyond that, however, the supreme court relied significantly on the legislative declarations in the Liquor Code and the Limited Gaming Act. Those respective declarations each invoked the "full extent" of the state's police powers. See Bagby , 734 P.2d at 1062 (holding the Liquor Code's legislative declaration expressly invoked the full extent of the police powers); Warner , 930 P.2d at 568 (concluding that the...