People v. Daniel K. (In re Daniel K.)

2013 IL App (2d) 111251

990 N.E.2d 230

371 Ill.Dec. 330

In re DANIEL K., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Daniel K., Respondent–Appellee).

No. 2–11–1251.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

March 29, 2013.

Rehearing Denied May 17, 2013.

Joseph P. Bruscato, State's Attorney, Rockford (Lawrence M. Bauer, Sally A. Swiss, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

Veronique Baker, Teresa L. Berge, Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, Rockford, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HUDSON entered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[371 Ill.Dec. 333]¶ 1 The State appeals the trial court's order granting respondent Daniel K.'s petition for discharge from involuntary admission under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1–100 et seq. (West 2010)). Respondent argues that the matter is moot, as he has already been discharged. We determine that two issues are reviewable. We hold that the court erred in disallowing evidence from the State about the reasons for respondent's admission and the potential effect of his failing to take medication. We also determine that the court improperly denied the State's request to call respondent as a witness. Accordingly, we reverse.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On September 20, 2011, respondent was involuntarily admitted for a period not to exceed 90 days, and the court granted the State's request to administer psychotropic medication. On October 20, 2011, respondent filed a petition for discharge. The court ordered an examination and legal representation.

¶ 4 On October 25, 2011, a report was filed from Dr. William Welch, who wrote, based on a 15–minute interview and a review of respondent's medical records, that respondent was not reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. Welch also wrote that, although respondent was mentally ill, he would be able to provide for his basic physical needs and guard himself from harm without assistance. Welch noted that respondent was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was refusing to attend treatment groups, that respondent denied any current suicide or homicide ideation, and that he received disability payments, had a home to go to, and worked part time at various businesses.

¶ 5 On November 8, 2011, another report from Welch was filed, in which he stated his opinion that respondent was not subject to involuntary admission or continued hospitalization. Under the section for respondent's symptoms, Welch reported that respondent exhibited rational thoughts and a willingness to talk freely. His behavior was not problematic and he was generally calm and quiet, but he did not plan to follow up with medication upon discharge.

¶ 6 On November 11, 2011, a hearing was held. Welch testified consistently with his reports and stated his opinion that respondent had stabilized due to his treatment and was suitable for discharge. Welch stated on cross-examination, without objection, that respondent did not plan to continue his medication when he was discharged and that taking the medication was critical to stabilizing his condition. Welch also testified that he did not have access to the petition that resulted in the admission, did not speak with respondent's treating psychiatrist or social worker, and did not know that respondent's mother, who was also his guardian, did not want respondent released and was fearful for his safety. However, Welch stated that this information would not impact his opinion, as he was evaluating respondent's current status and not what might happen in the future. Welch testified that respondent was taking haloperidol to control irrational thoughts and behavior and agreed that a person with irrational thoughts and behavior might be a danger to himself or others.

¶ 7 When Welch was asked on two occasions during cross-examination if he agreed that stopping the medication would result in a return to the behavior that caused respondent to be admitted in the first place, respondent's objections based on speculation were sustained. After hearing argument about the scope of the testimony, the court stated that it would allow testimony about respondent's medication, the symptoms it controlled, and respondent's intention not to take the medication, because Welch reached his opinion based on his interview of respondent and the information in his chart. But the court said that it would not allow speculation as to what would happen if respondent did not take his medication in the future. The court also sustained an objection, as beyond the scope, to the question of whether respondent could be placed in a less restrictive location.

¶ 8 The court determined that respondent made a prima facie case for discharge, and the State called respondent's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Howard Paul. Paul testified that he was board certified and had testified as an expert hundreds of times. He said that his specialty was in addiction medicine. The State sought to qualify Paul as an expert, and respondent objected on the basis that Paul was being called to testify as an occurrence witness, not as an expert. Other than providing notes about respondent in his medical chart, Paul had not provided a written opinion about the proceedings. The court found that Paul could testify about his contact with respondent and the opinions he had formed as a result, but that he had not been qualified as an expert in the field of psychiatry for any other purpose.

¶ 9 Paul testified about his interactions with respondent and the medications respondent was receiving, and he said that respondent did not think he was ill and would not continue treatment when discharged. However, when the State sought to elicit testimony about respondent's medical history or behavior before he was admitted, objections as to relevance were sustained on the basis that the issue before the court was his current condition. Objections as to speculation were also sustained in regard to questions about what would happen if respondent stopped taking his medication. The court stated that it was limited to looking at respondent's current condition. Another objection was sustained to questions about a less restrictive treatment alternative. When asked if relatives would help respondent if he were released, Paul began to say something about respondent's mother that was based on statements that she had made to social workers, and a hearsay objection was sustained. The State did not make any argument that a hearsay exception applied. During the course of the testimony, there were also various objections sustained based on lack of foundation or because a question called for an expert opinion.

¶ 10 After Paul's testimony, the State requested to call respondent as a witness. Respondent's objection, that the State did not have a right to require him to testify, was sustained. The trial court, noting a lack of evidence that respondent was currently a danger to himself or others, granted the petition for discharge. The State appeals.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 The State contends that the trial court's evidentiary rulings and denial of its request to call respondent as a witness prevented it from showing that the petition for discharge should have been denied. Specifically, the State argues that the trial court erred by (1) disallowing evidence about why respondent was admitted and what would happen if he stopped taking medication, (2) not allowing the State to call respondent as a witness, (3) refusing to qualify Paul as an expert, (4) sustaining a hearsay objection, and (5) granting the petition for discharge. The State acknowledges that the issues are moot but argues that exceptions apply.

¶ 13 A. Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine

¶ 14 The parties agree that the matter is moot because respondent has already been discharged. However, the State contends that we should review the issues under either the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine or the exception for issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.

¶ 15 “An appeal is considered moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party.” In re J.T., 221 Ill.2d 338, 349–50, 303 Ill.Dec. 103, 851 N.E.2d 1 (2006). Generally, courts of review do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 482, 491, 234 Ill.Dec. 215, 702 N.E.2d 555 (1998).

¶ 16 Reviewing courts, however, recognize exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the public-interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, applicable to cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) the collateral-consequences exception, applicable where the order could have consequences for a party in some future proceedings. See In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 355–62, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74 (2009); In re J.T., 221 Ill.2d at 350, 303 Ill.Dec. 103, 851 N.E.2d 1. There is no per se exception to mootness that universally applies to mental health cases; however, most appeals in mental health cases will fall within one of the established exceptions to the mootness doctrine. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d at 355, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74. Whether a case falls within an established exception is a case-by-case determination. Id.

¶ 17 The public-interest exception allows a court to consider an otherwise moot issue when (1) the question...