People v. Daniels

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JASON MONROE DANIELS, Defendant and Appellant.

B301038

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Second Division

July 26, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Order Filed 7/29/21

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. NA106266, Judith Levey Meyer, Judge. Modified and affirmed with directions.

Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, and Rob Bonta Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Blythe J. Leszkay and David W. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on July 26, 2021, be modified as follows:

1. On page 29, the paragraph under the heading “Additional Presentence Custody Credits” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its place:

The sentencing hearing transcript shows the trial court miscalculated Daniels's presentence custody credits as 832 days. Daniels contends, and the People acknowledge, that he was entitled to 847 days, having spent 847 days in actual custody. (See People v. Heard (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1027-1028.) A sentence that fails to award legally mandated custody credit is unauthorized and may be corrected whenever discovered. (People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647.) Daniels's presentence custody credits award, and the abstract of judgment reflecting the award, shall be modified to award him 15 additional days, for a total award of 847 days of presentence custody credits.

2. On page 30, the text of the Disposition is deleted and the following disposition is inserted in its place:

We modify the judgment by striking the three one-year Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) sentencing enhancements and adding 15 days of presentence custody credits for a total of 847 days of presentence custody credits. As modified the judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

This modification changes the judgment.

Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.

LUI P. J.

Defendant and appellant Jason Monroe Daniels was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, felony child abuse, and possession of firearm by a felon. The jury found true firearm-use and prior conviction enhancements. On appeal, Daniels contends the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to appoint advisory counsel and in revoking his pro se status, and made instructional errors requiring reversal. We modify the judgment to strike prior prison term enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) and to reflect additional presentence custody credits. We affirm the judgment as modified.

FACTS

On April 19, 2017, William Hayes suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his chest. The shooting occurred outside the home of Daniels's girlfriend Shawntee Falconer (Shawntee) and her family. Daniels had been residing with Shawntee until the afternoon of that day, when she kicked him out following an argument. Shawntee then went to work, and Daniels reentered the home in her absence. That night, Hayes showed up at the home unexpectedly to see Shawntee's two children, a 12-year-old daughter and a six-year-old son. Hayes had been their stepfather. He and the children visited outside. Shawntee was still at work.

Shawntee's brother and mother testified Daniels was visibly upset by Hayes's appearance. After Hayes arrived, Daniels told Shawntee over the phone, “I'm about to pop cuz.” Daniels threw down the phone and walked outside to confront Hayes. Daniels produced a gun and shot Hayes once in the chest, narrowly missing Shawntee's son. The bullet struck Hayes in the heart, and he collapsed to the ground where he was found by police.^[1] Daniels immediately fled. He was later arrested in Las Vegas.

Daniels testified he was unarmed when he confronted Hayes outside. The children and other adults were inside the home. Daniels realized Hayes was armed. The two men struggled over Hayes's gun, and the weapon fired once and fell to the ground. Hayes grabbed his arm or shoulder and entered the home. Daniels picked up the gun, hid it in the garage, and drove away.

PROCEDURE

Daniels made three unsuccessful attempts to replace his appointed counsel before trial (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118). Thereafter, his request to represent himself was granted (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta)). The trial court relieved the public defender's office and appointed standby counsel, who was present during trial.

In pretrial proceedings, Daniels was verbally combative with the trial court. On one occasion, he refused to leave his holding cell, prompting the trial court to admonish Daniels that his pro se status could be revoked if he refused to comply with court orders. During voir dire, the court made a point of giving Daniels a general advisement that if he refused to leave the holding cell “or anything like that” during trial, his pro se status could be revoked.

When trial was under way, Daniels accused the trial court of “side-track[ing]” him “disrespect[ing]” him, or infringing his constitutional rights. He also berated the court when rulings were not in his favor. Daniels engaged in two separate outbursts in front of the jury. Each time, the court warned Daniels that his pro se status could be terminated. Daniels's third outburst happened during his closing argument. The court revoked his pro se status, and standby counsel completed Daniels's closing argument.

A jury convicted Daniels of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)^[2]), felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)), and possession of a firearm by a felon^[3] (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true enhancement allegations that Daniels had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm when committing the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and had personally used a firearm when committing the child abuse (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special allegations that Daniels had suffered two prior violent or serious felony convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12) and two prior serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a), and had served four separate prison terms for felonies (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Daniels was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 122 years to life. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

1. Denial of Advisory Counsel

A. Additional Facts

In his written motion, Daniels's stated grounds for appointment of advisory counsel were: (1) “the law library in the facility in which the defendant is being held has limited resources”; (2) the “defendant does not have access to the witnesses and the evidence in this case”; and (3) the assistance of advisory counsel “will aid the defendant in preparing his case for trial.”

Before ruling on Daniels's request, the trial court and Daniels engaged in the following discussion:

“The Court: You're asking for advisory counsel?

“[Daniels]: Yes.

“The Court: Thank you. [¶] Your request is denied. You don't get advisory counsel. [Kieran Brown is] just what we call back-up counsel. So that's the deal. Let me just be clear. You can ask for your pro per status to be revoked-or you can give it up, and I give you an attorney.

“[Daniels]: I understand that.

“The Court: But you don't get both.

“[Daniels]: Well, the state's Constitution says otherwise.

“The Court: I disagree. I'm denying it.

“[Daniels]: Okay.

“The Court: I disagree that that's what the Constitution says.

“[Daniels]: But it's in there.

“The Court: But my feeling is you're interpreting it wrong. We don't do that, and you're not ‘entitled' under the Constitution to advisory counsel. You're not even entitled to back-up counsel. Yet, we do that more as a convenience for the court, that if in the middle of trial, and you feel that you get in over your head, then I will revoke your pro per status and let a completely unprepared attorney continue your case.

“[Daniels]: Well, that's not-

“The Court: That's how it works.

“[Daniels]: That's-

“The Court: Or you can stop being pro per and get an attorney, which I will appoint the public defender's office to continue to help you again. [¶] Is that what you want?

“[Daniels]: No, ma'am.

“The Court: Okay. Then your request is denied.

“[Daniels]: Once again, the state's Constitution has awarded me that because of limited access to certain law material.

“The Court: I disagree with that interpretation. Okay.... [T]he court is denying this motion.”

Jury trial commenced about a month later. Daniels represented himself through most of the trial, and standby counsel was present during the proceedings.

B. Relevant Legal Principles

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to represent themselves at trial. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 817-818.) But criminal defendants do not have a constitutional right to advisory counsel. (People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777, 795, overruled on another ground in People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 871; People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1119-1120 (Moore); accord, McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 183 [104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122] (McKaskle).)

Daniels argues the California Supreme Court, particularly in Moore, improperly relied on dicta in McKaskle, which does not support that conclusion. We are, however, compelled to follow our Supreme Court's repeated holdings that the Sixth Amendment does...