People v. Darguzis

2022 IL App (3d) 200325

205 N.E.3d 902

461 Ill.Dec. 814

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.David A. DARGUZIS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3-20-0325

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Filed March 16, 2022

James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Justin A. Nicolosi, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

No brief filed for appellee.

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal arises from the State's refusal to respond to a request to admit certain facts pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 (eff. July 1, 2014) in a statutory summary suspension proceeding. The circuit court found that the State's failure to respond to the request to admit facts rendered the facts sought therein admitted. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of defendant, David A. Darguzis, rescinding the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license. The State appeals, arguing that, as a matter of law, the Will County State's Attorney's Office could not respond to a request to admit in this case. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Officer Michael Michienzi of the Romeoville Police Department arrested defendant in 2019 for driving under the influence ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)). The citation for driving under the influence states that the traffic stop took place at "Resurrection Cemetery." Defendant refused Michienzi's request to submit to chemical testing. Officers notified defendant that as a result of his refusal to submit to testing, the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license would become effective on August 27, 2019, lasting for a minimum of 12 months.

¶ 4 In August 2019, counsel for defendant moved to rescind the statutory summary suspension. Shortly thereafter, counsel filed a motion requesting leave to serve a request to admit facts under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 (eff. July 1, 2014) upon the State.

¶ 5 The circuit court held a hearing on the request for leave to serve the State with a request to admit facts. Defendant's counsel clarified why he was seeking leave to file the motion: "Judge, this happened before and, when I filed the request to admit, [the State] implied that I needed leave of [c]ourt." The State replied, "I am the opposing party, you can serve [the request to admit] on our office ***." The court commented, "All right. I mean, it is civil rules of discovery, local rules." The court granted counsel's request for leave to file the request to admit. Counsel served the request to admit facts on the Will County State's Attorney's Office the same day.

¶ 6 The request to admit sought the State's admission that (1) at the time of defendant's arrest, he was located within Resurrection Cemetery, (2) neither Michienzi nor any other officers observed defendant driving or in actual physical control over a motor vehicle upon a public highway, and (3) all of Michienzi's prearrest observations of defendant occurred on the abovementioned private property.

¶ 7 Within 28 days of the receipt of the request to admit, the Will County State's Attorney's Office filed a motion to strike the request to admit, arguing that it was legally unable to respond to the motion under case law interpreting Rule 216, finding that the signature of an attorney was insufficient, and maintaining that a party or a nonlegal representative of that party must sign. The motion to strike further alleged that the state's attorney represents the State of Illinois but is not the People of the State of Illinois; ergo, the state's attorney is not a party. Rather, the motion contends, the People of the State of Illinois are represented by the Illinois Governor or his designated staff. Accordingly, the state's attorney could not respond. Defendant's counsel argued that the State acquiesced to the service of the request to admit at the hearing on the motion for leave to issue the request to admit.

¶ 8 Following additional motion practice, counsel served an identical request to admit upon Michienzi and the attorney for the Village of Romeoville (Village). The state's attorney filed a motion to strike the request to admit facts upon Michienzi and the attorney for the Village.

¶ 9 A hearing ensued in March 2020. The State argued that case law established that the state's attorney could not sign the request to admit facts, as the state's attorney was not the People of the State of Illinois. Instead, the state's attorney was only its attorney. The State opined that no matter what it did, either fail to respond or provide a legally insufficient signature, the facts contained in the request to admit would be admitted. While the state's attorney has the power to represent the People of the State of Illinois, the state's attorney is not the People of the State of Illinois. The state's attorney did not know how to have "the People of the State of Illinois" sign the request to admit facts, stating that the governor of the state may be required to sign every request to admit issued in statutory summary suspension proceedings. In further support of its argument, the State noted that federal courts permit attorneys to sign requests to admit, but that Illinois courts do not. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.

¶ 10 Defendant's counsel, again, argued that the State acquiesced to service of the request to admit. Noting that the State filed to strike his service upon the officer and the attorney for the Village, counsel rhetorically exclaimed, "[w]ho do I serve?" Counsel argued that the state's attorney is placed in the position of a civil defendant in statutory summary suspension proceedings and, accordingly, was a party.

¶ 11 The trial court noted that in dicta in Skotticelli v. Club Misty, Inc. , 406 Ill. App. 3d 958, 964, 346 Ill.Dec. 646, 941 N.E.2d 204 (2010), the appellate court found that a response to a Rule 216 request to admit could be certified by a person with knowledge of the facts sought to be admitted, including the party's attorney. The court further commented that if the request to admit was directed at the State, "I think it has to be answered." The circuit court found that neither Michienzi nor the Village attorney was a party to the proceedings and denied the State's motion to strike the request to admit served upon the Will County State's Attorney's Office. The court provided the State seven days in which to respond to defendant's request to admit facts. The State failed to respond.

¶ 12 The matter proceeded on defendant's motion for summary judgment. At a subsequent hearing, the circuit court deemed admitted the facts sought in the request to admit. As a result, the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, rescinding the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license.

¶ 13 The State appeals.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, the State contends that a state's attorney does not have the legal ability to sign on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois in response to requests to admit. The State asserts that the state's attorney does not have a "tangible physical client," leaving no one to sign a response to a request to admit. Essentially, the State asks that we abolish the use of requests to admit pursuant to Rule 216 by defendant motorists as the defendant in statutory summary suspension proceedings. This appeal presents a question of law that we review de novo. See People v. Gaines , 2020 IL 125165, ¶ 24, 450 Ill.Dec. 349, 181 N.E.3d 701.

¶ 16 Initially, we note that defendant declined to file an appellee's brief in this matter. Nevertheless, we decide the merits of this appeal under the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. , 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976) (noting that "if the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief, the court of review should decide the merits of the appeal").

¶ 17 " ‘A statutory summary suspension hearing is a civil action where the defendant motorist, as the petitioner, requests the judicial rescission of a suspension, and the State is placed in the position of a civil defendant.’ " People v. Araiza , 2020 IL App (3d) 170735, ¶ 15, 445 Ill.Dec. 141, 166 N.E.3d 170 (quoting People v. Tibbetts , 351 Ill. App. 3d 921, 926, 287 Ill.Dec. 6, 815 N.E.2d 409 (2004) ). In a civil proceeding, "[a] party may serve on any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the truth of any specified relevant fact set forth in the request. A copy of the request for admission shall be served on all parties entitled to notice." Ill. S. Ct. R. 216(a) (eff. July 1, 2014). Section (c) of Rule 216 provides:

"Each of the matters of fact and the genuineness of each document of which admission is requested is admitted unless, within 28 days after service thereof, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why the party cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or (2) written objections on the ground that some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part." Ill. S. Ct. R. 216(c) (eff. July 1, 2014).

¶ 18 Courts have liberally construed the term "party" within Rule 216, allowing requests to admit to be served upon varying governmental entities. See, e.g. , People v. Mindham , 253 Ill. App. 3d 792, 797-801, 192 Ill.Dec. 680, 625 N.E.2d 835 (1993) (Du Page County State's Attorney's Office); People v. Strasbaugh , 194 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1017, 141 Ill.Dec. 752, 551 N.E.2d 1095 (1990) (Sangamon County State's Attorney's Office); Thomas v. Village of Westchester , 132 Ill. App. 3d 190, 192, 87 Ill.Dec. 448, 477 N.E.2d 49 (1985) (the Village of Westchester and...