People v. David C. (In re David C.)

47 Cal.App.5th 657

261 Cal.Rptr.3d 144

IN RE DAVID C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.David C., Defendant and Appellant.

A157151

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Filed April 8, 2020

As Modified April 8, 2020

Nathaniel Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Jonathan Soglin and James Donnelly-Saalfield for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, Seth K. Schalit and Lisa Ashley Ott, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jackson, J. Minor appeals from a juvenile court order placing him on probation after the court found true allegations of indecent exposure ( Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1 ) and simple battery ( Pen. Code, § 242 ). He challenges multiple conditions of probation. We strike the electronics search condition and modify several other probation conditions.

BACKGROUND

A. Prosecution Case

In March 2018, when minor and his 14-year-old female classmate C.S. were seated next to each other in the back row of their high school English class, minor asked C.S. if he could "finger" her and have sex with her after school. C.S. said no. She then heard minor unzip his pants and saw him hold his penis up with his hand. Minor asked C.S. if she would please do it; she said "no, that’s not happening," and minor zipped up his pants. C.S. reported the incident to school authorities later the same day.

Several days prior to minor’s incident with C.S., minor touched M.I., another 14-year-old female classmate, during English class. Minor touched M.I.’s thigh and put his hand through a hole in her jeans, touching the top of her underpants. M.I. told minor to stop and pushed his hand away. Minor continued to touch M.I. on her side and put his hand on her back and in her "bra area ...." Again, M.I. pushed his hand away. She reported the incident to school authorities a few days later.

B. Defense Case

Minor denied exposing himself to C.S. He testified that after C.S. jokingly said "fuck you" to minor, he jokingly replied, "[W]hen?" and he gestured toward pulling his pants down but did not actually do so.

Minor testified he and M.I. had been "talking" for several months and M.I. had told him she wanted to have a relationship with him. Minor and M.I. sometimes walked to class together and held hands. On the day of the incident, minor put his hand on M.I.’s thigh, and she initially smiled but then pushed his hand away. He asked her what was wrong and grabbed her hand, and again she pulled her hand away. Then he placed his hand on her "waist area" and again asked her what was wrong. M.I. hit his hand away. Minor did not try to touch her any further. He denied touching her in the groin, buttocks, or breasts or on top of her underwear.

C. Disposition

On February 14, 2019, the juvenile court sustained a petition filed by the Napa County District Attorney under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,¹ finding minor had committed indecent exposure ( Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1 ) and simple battery ( Pen. Code, § 242 ). On April 8, 2019, the court held a disposition hearing at which it declared minor to be a ward of the juvenile court, ordered him to remain in the home of his mother, placed him under the supervision of the probation department, and imposed multiple probation conditions.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Principles

When a juvenile court places a minor on probation, it " ‘may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ [Citations.] ‘ "In fashioning the conditions of probation, the ... court should consider the minor’s entire social history in addition to the circumstances of the crime." ’ [Citation.] The court has ‘broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation’ [citation], although ‘every juvenile probation condition must be made to fit the circumstances and the minor.’ " ( In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 293–294, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.) "We review the juvenile court’s probation conditions for abuse of discretion, and such discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse." ( In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 912, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919.) However, "[w]hether a term of probation is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad presents a question of law, which we review de novo." ( People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 993, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 534.)

B. Condition 21: Electronics Search Condition

The probation department’s dispositional report recommended that minor be subject to an electronics search condition requiring him to disclose passwords and access codes to his accounts and devices. Minor objected that the electronics search condition failed the reasonableness test under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 ( Lent ) because it was not reasonably related to minor’s future criminality. The juvenile court initially agreed and struck the recommended electronics search condition, stating "because there was no electronic [sic ] use from these allegations I don’t think it will survive [under Lent ]."² The People argued that if minor needed sex offender treatment (which was also recommended in the dispositional report), the probation officer would need to be able to access what minor views online. The district attorney stated: "I don’t know that we have any sex offenders that are currently being supervised ... where we don’t have the ability to see what they’re looking at on the Internet."

The juvenile court then incorporated the electronics search condition into condition 21, as follows: "The minor attend, actively participate in, and complete individual or group sex offender counseling if recommended by a treatment provider after a psychological/psychiatric evaluation is completed and at the direction of the probation officer. The minor and or the minor parents [sic ] shall pay program fees. The minor shall be required to produce a doctor’s note for any missed treatment unless absence is pre-approved by the probation officer.. [Sic. ] If the treatment provider recommends a safety plan, the minor, his parents, [and] probation will work with the provider to develop a safety plan. If the treatment provider determines it’s therapeutically necessary for probation to monitor the minor’s internet accounts or means of accessing online accounts the minor shall disclose to his probation officer all passwords and access codes. Furthermore, the minor submit [sic ] all electronic devices under his or her control to search and seizure at any time of the day or night with or without a search warrant, arrest warrant, or reasonable suspicion. This search shall be confined to areas of the electronic devices where evidence likely to reveal criminal activity or where probation violations may be found. Contraband seized by the probation officer shall be disposed of, stored or returned at the discretion of the probation officer [.]" (Italics added.) Minor argues the italicized portion of condition 21 does not satisfy the reasonableness test under Lent and impermissibly delegates the court’s discretion to a treatment provider. We agree the electronics search condition is unreasonable under the Lent test and In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 446 P.3d 747 ( Ricardo P . ).

"A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality ....’ " ( Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.) Under the Lent test, "all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term." ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1.) The Lent test governs juvenile and adult probation cases. ( Ricardo P. , supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 446 P.3d 747.)

Here the parties do not dispute that the first two prongs of Lent are satisfied; they argue only about the third prong, that is, whether the condition is reasonably related to future criminality. Ricardo P. addressed the same issue in the case of a minor who admitted to a felony burglary that did not involve any electronics use and then challenged a probation condition allowing warrantless searches of his electronic devices and accounts. ( Ricardo P. , supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 1115, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 446 P.3d 747.)

In Ricardo P. , the juvenile court justified the condition as useful to monitor Ricardo’s compliance with other conditions prohibiting drug use and possession, the theory being that juveniles use their phones to buy drugs and brag about drug use online. ( Ricardo P. , supra , 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1115–1117, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 446 P.3d 747.) Our high court clarified that " Lent ’s requirement that a probation condition must be ‘ "reasonably related to future criminality" ’ contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition." ( Id. at p. 1122, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 446 P.3d 747.) It struck the electronics search condition as not reasonably related to Ricardo’s future criminality, finding that the condition imposed "a very heavy burden on privacy with a very limited justification." ( Id. at pp. 1124, 1129, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 446 P.3d 747.) The burden imposed on Ricardo’s privacy was "substantially disproportionate to the condition’s goal of monitoring and deterring drug use," and, thus, the court held the condition invalid under Lent . ( Id. at p. 1120, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 104, 446 P.3d 747.) In rejecting the People’s argument that the condition was justified because it would aid in monitoring...