People v. Davis

2014 IL 115595

6 N.E.3d 709

379 Ill.Dec. 381

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Addolfo DAVIS, Appellee.

No. 115595.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 20, 2014.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

Marcella L. Lape, Brittany D. Parling and Shauna R. Prewitt, Chicago, and Patricia Soung, Los Angeles, California, for appellee.

Jocelyn D. Francoeur, Crystal L. Leighton and James P. Durkin, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Chicago, for amici curiae Xavier McElrath-Bey et al.

Timothy P. O'Neill, Chicago, for amici curiae Law Professors et al.

Tyrone Fahner, Marc Kadish, Daniel Storino and Michael Morrill (law intern), Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, for amici curiae Retired Judges et al.

Megan Rodgers and Colleen E. Roh (pro hac vice pending), Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, D.C., for amici curiae American Correctional Chaplains Association et al.

Lawrence A. Wojcik and Eric M. Roberts, DLA Piper LLP (US), Chicago, for amici curiae Illinois Coalition for the Fair Sentencing of Children et al.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The circuit court of Cook County denied defendant, Addolfo Davis, leave to file a successive petition for relief pursuant to the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2010)). The appellate court affirmed the order of the circuit court in part and vacated in part. Relying on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the appellate court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the cause to the circuit court for resentencing. 2012 IL App (1st) 112577–U, 2012 WL 6863262. This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)). We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The appellate court has previously recited the details of defendant's convictions and sentences. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 388 Ill.App.3d 869, 328 Ill.Dec. 387, 904 N.E.2d 149 (2009); People v. Davis, No. 1–93–1821, 275 Ill.App.3d 1128, 229 Ill.Dec. 884, 692 N.E.2d 873 (1995) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We need not repeat those details here. Rather, we summarize the pertinent facts for purposes of the issues raised in this appeal.

¶ 4 On October 9, 1990, Bryant Johnson and Keith Whitfield were fatally shot. On October 11, defendant was arrested and questioned regarding his role in the shootings. Born on August 4, 1976, defendant was 14 years old when he was arrested. In January 1991, following a discretionary transfer hearing under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 37, ¶ 805–4(3)(a)), the juvenile division of the circuit court of Cook County entered an order permitting defendant to be prosecuted under the criminal laws.

¶ 5 In February 1991, defendant was charged in a 31–count indictment for crimes relating to the shootings.¹ In March 1993, defendant was convicted of the first degree murders of Johnson and Whitfield, the attempted first degree murders of Melvin Harvey and Keith McGee, and home invasion. Defendant was sentenced in April 1993. Because defendant was found guilty of murdering more than one victim, section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections ( 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c) (West 1992)) required the trial court to sentence defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment, for which parole is not available ( 730 ILCS 5/3–3–3(d) (West 1992)). Defendant was also sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment for each count of attempted first degree murder and home invasion, all sentences to run concurrently. On direct review, the appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. People v. Davis, No. 1–93–1821, 275 Ill.App.3d 1128, 229 Ill.Dec. 884, 692 N.E.2d 873 (1995) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), appeal denied,165 Ill.2d 556, 214 Ill.Dec. 861, 662 N.E.2d 427 (1996) (table).

¶ 6 In October 1996, defendant filed his first pro se postconviction petition, which the circuit court summarily dismissed in November 1996. In December 1996, defendant filed a second pro se postconviction petition with a motion for substitution of judge. In March 1997, the circuit court dismissed this petition. Defendant appealed from the dismissal of both the first and second postconviction petitions. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's rulings. People v. Davis, No. 1–98–2277, 302 Ill.App.3d 1090, 254 Ill.Dec. 152, 746 N.E.2d 909 (1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), appeal denied,185 Ill.2d 639, 242 Ill.Dec. 142, 720 N.E.2d 1097 (1999) (table). In November 1998, defendant filed his third pro se postconviction petition, which the circuit court dismissed. Defendant appealed and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. People v. Davis, 1–99–0159, 307 Ill.App.3d 1067, 260 Ill.Dec. 286, 760 N.E.2d 1059 (1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), appeal denied,187 Ill.2d 576, 244 Ill.Dec. 187, 724 N.E.2d 1271 (2000) (table).

¶ 7 In September 2002, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2002)). The circuit court treated this petition as another postconviction petition and appointed counsel, who filed a supplemental petition. Relying on People v. Miller, 202 Ill.2d 328, 269 Ill.Dec. 503, 781 N.E.2d 300 (2002) (hereinafter in text Leon Miller ), defendant argued that his natural life sentence was unconstitutional because he did not actually participate in the act of killing. Defendant obtained new counsel, who filed a second supplemental postconviction petition. Defendant argued that his sentence violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and, further, that the statute requiring a mandatory life sentence violated the Illinois Constitution as applied to a 14–year–old defendant.

¶ 8 Following a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition in January 2007. The court found this case distinguishable from Leon Miller, where that defendant only acted as a lookout and did not enter the building where the actual murder occurred. In this case, the court found that defendant significantly participated in the murders: he actually went to the crime scene with his codefendants; he carried a weapon to the crime scene, which he perhaps dropped; and defendant actually entered the abode where the murders occurred. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. People v. Davis, 388 Ill.App.3d 869, 328 Ill.Dec. 387, 904 N.E.2d 149 (2009), appeal denied,233 Ill.2d 571, 335 Ill.Dec. 638, 919 N.E.2d 357 (2009) (table), cert. denied,559 U.S. 980, 130 S.Ct. 1707, 176 L.Ed.2d 195 (2010).

¶ 9 The instant appeal comes to us from defendant's “Motion For Leave To File A Verified Successive Post–Conviction Petition,” which he filed in April 2011. Defendant made two claims: (1) his mandatory life sentence without parole violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant to Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010); and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his juvenile transfer hearing because his counsel failed to interview an eyewitness prior to the hearing. In August 2011, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file the successive petition. First, the court noted Graham 's holding that a mandatory life sentence without parole could not be imposed on juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide. The court found that Graham did not apply to the instant case because defendant was convicted of two first degree murders, as well as two attempted murders and home invasion. Second, the court found that defendant received effective assistance of counsel at his juvenile transfer hearing.

¶ 10 While defendant's appeal was pending in the appellate court, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), in which the Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2460. Defendant filed a substitute brief in the appellate court incorporating Miller. The appellate court concluded that Miller applies retroactively on postconviction review. Consequently, the appellate court vacated in part the circuit court's order denying leave to file a successive petition, vacated defendant's sentence, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. However, the appellate court upheld the circuit court's denial of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2012 IL App (1st) 112577–U, 2012 WL 6863262.

¶ 11 The State appeals to this court. We granted leave to the following groups to file amici curiae briefs in support of defendant: Retired Judges et al.; Law Professors; Illinois Coalition for the Fair Sentencing of Children et al.; American Correctional Chaplains Association et al.; Amnesty International et al.; and Former Youthful Offenders. Ill. S.Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). Additional pertinent background will be discussed in the context of our analysis of the issues.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The Post–Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism through which a criminal defendant can assert that his federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in his original trial or sentencing hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122–1(a) (West 2012); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 455, 275 Ill.Dec. 838, 793 N.E.2d 609 (2002). A postconviction proceeding is not a substitute for a direct appeal, but rather is a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21, 360 Ill.Dec. 784, 969 N.E.2d 829;People v. Tenner, 206 Ill.2d 381, 392, 276 Ill.Dec. 343, 794 N.E.2d 238 (2002)....