People v. Day

544 P.3d 1242

2023 COA 115

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Maria Laida DAY, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1717

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

Announced December 7, 2023

Lake County District Court No. 15CR26, Honorable Catherine J. Cheroutes, Judge

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE FOX

¶ 1 Defendant, Maria Laida Day, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding her guilty of second degree murder, vehicular homicide, leaving the scene of an accident, and careless driving resulting in death. Day challenges the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence of her mental condition, which she argued was relevant to rebut the prosecution’s theory that her calm demeanor in the aftermath of the incident was suggestive of her culpable mental state. Applying our supreme court’s framework in People v. Moore, 2021 CO 26, 485 P.3d 1088, we conclude that the court erred in excluding some, but not all, of Day’s proffered expert testimony. Further concluding that the evidentiary error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and remand for a new trial on all counts for which Day’s culpability was at issue. Accordingly, we also reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶ 2 This appeal concerns an incident in which Day (a driver) ran over her boyfriend, J.M. (a pedestrian), with her car. Trial testimony established that Day drove her mother and J.M. from their hometown of Leadville to go shopping in Frisco. When they returned to Leadville, Day pulled over to let J.M. out of the car a few blocks before her mother’s house. She pulled off on a narrow and unpaved Leadville street that ran directly in front of a small business. The business was situated about a foot above ground level, and an elevated concrete sidewalk with a metal handrail separated the business’s front door from the street level. J.M. exited the car, and the parties agree that Day ran over J.M. with her car as she pulled away. The evidence suggested that J.M.’s head hit the concrete barrier during the collision. J.M. was eventually taken to the hospital, where he later died. The parties dispute whether the incident was an accident.

¶ 3 The prosecution charged Day with second degree murder, vehicular homicide, and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death.¹ Day was tried approximately five years later. The delay was largely due to communication difficulties with the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo (CMHHIP) and Day’s deteriorating mental condition while in custody. Day was found incompetent by a state examiner and later restored to competency. Day’s trial was also transferred to another venue after a jury could not be impaneled in Leadville, further delaying the trial.

¶ 4 The parties presented conflicting theories at trial. The prosecution asserted that Day intended to hit J.M. with her car. Prosecutors presented evidence that Day left the scene of the incident and waited approximately thirty minutes before calling 911. During those thirty minutes, surveillance video showed Day pulling up to her mother’s residence, bringing her mother into the house, and then going back outside to inspect the damage to her car. Day apparently then drove around the vicinity of the incident before returning to her mother’s house, where she called 911. When Day called 911, she admitted running over J.M. with her car.

¶ 5 Regarding Day’s culpable mental state, the prosecution presented evidence that Day had physically abused J.M. in the past and threatened to kill him three days before the incident. Prosecutors also elicited testimony from several witnesses that Day exhibited a calm and detached affect after the incident.

¶ 6 Day alleged that the incident was an accident, and that she initially did not realize she had run over J.M., primarily because she was preoccupied with getting her mother home. Instead, she theorized that a defect in her car caused it to lurch forward, run over what she believed was a rock (or a cement brick), and hit the concrete barrier. Day’s theory was that she only realized she had hit J.M. when he did not get up as first responders arrived at the scene. Day also presented evidence that J.M. was severely intoxicated, and that his level of intoxication could have caused him to fall to the ground before Day ran over him.

¶ 7 The jury found Day guilty of second degree murder, vehicular homicide—and the lesser nonincluded offense of careless driving resulting in death—and leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court sentenced Day to thirty-five years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

¶ 8 On appeal, Day asserts that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of her mental condition that she claims was relevant to explain her post-incident conduct. Day also challenges the court’s authority to order restitution after the ninety-one-day statutory deadline, and she asserts that insufficient evidence supported the award.

II. Mental Condition Evidence

¶ 9 Day first asserts that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that her mental illness could have caused her to experience disorganized thoughts and problem-solving difficulties, which she offered to explain her detached affect and her failure to call 911 immediately after the incident.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 Section 16-8-107(3)(a), C.R.S. 2023, prohibits admission of evidence "relevant to the issue of insanity" unless the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Section 16-8-101.5(1), C.R.S. 2023, extends the legal status of "insanity" to

(a) A person who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong … ; or

(b) A person who suffered from a condition of mind caused by mental disease or defect that prevented the person from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of a crime charged ….

Only those "severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person’s perception or understanding of reality" qualify as a "mental disease or defect" within the meaning of the insanity statute. § 16-8-101.5(1)(b), (2)(c). Thus, both of the above forms of insanity "require that, at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant suffered from a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impaired [her] perception or understanding of reality." Moore, ¶ 27.

[1] ¶ 11 Relevant evidence is that which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to … the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." CRE 401. Thus, evidence that is relevant to the issue of insanity tends to prove or disprove (i.e., is probative of) the issue of insanity, and is inadmissible absent an NGRI plea. Moore, ¶ 33.

[2] ¶ 12 But section 16-8-107(3)(b) provides that

[r]egardless of whether a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity … the defendant shall not be permitted to introduce evidence in the nature of expert opinion concerning his or her mental condition without having first given notice to the court and the prosecution of his or her intent to introduce such evidence and without having undergone a court-ordered examination.

Thus, evidence of "less-severe mental illness" that is not relevant to insanity "remains admissible, absent an insanity plea, if it otherwise conforms to the statutory requirements and the rules of evidence." Moore, ¶ 5; see also People v. Wilburn, 2012 CO 21, ¶ 20, 272 P.3d 1078; People v. Vanrees, 125 P.3d 403, 409 (Colo. 2005). Section 16-8-107(3) distinguishes between expert testimony offered to show that the defendant could not form the requisite mental state and expert testimony offered to show that, on the occasion in question, she did not form the requisite mental state. People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22, ¶ 8, 459 P.3d 540 (citing Wilburn, ¶ 21); see also Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982); Crim. P. 11(e)(1).

[3] ¶ 13 "Under the plain language of the insanity statutes, the probative effect of the mental condition evidence is what governs, not the purpose for which it is offered." Moore, ¶ 34. Thus, trial courts must determine whether the proffered testimony relating to a mental condition is probative of, or tends to prove, insanity as statutorily defined. See id. at ¶¶ 38, 44. "The court must parse any proffered mental condition evidence, line by line if necessary, to distinguish what is probative of insanity under this exacting definition from what is not." Id. at ¶ 5.

[4, 5] ¶ 14 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 44 n.5. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an erroneous understanding of the law. Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 463 (Colo. 2009); People v. Dominguez, 2019 COA 78, ¶ 13, 454 P.3d 364. "[W]e review trial errors of consti- tutional dimension that were preserved by objection for constitutional harmless error." Hugos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116. Thus, we reverse unless the People can prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

B. Additional Background

¶ 15 Forgoing an NGRI defense, Day pleaded not guilty. The defense nevertheless hired an expert, Dr. Karen Fukutaki, to assess Day’s mental state. Dr. Fukutaki’s report concluded that, while Day was competent to proceed, her failure to take her prescribed antipsychotic medication in the two days before the incident could have caused her to experience disorganized thoughts and impaired judgment.

¶ 16 Shortly thereafter, Day gave notice of...