People v. Deleon

2020 IL 124744

181 N.E.3d 172

450 Ill.Dec. 172

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Miguel DELEON, Appellee.

Docket No. 124744

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed September 24, 2020.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Curtis L. Blood, of Collinsville, for appellee.

Sarah L. Beuning, of Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault, of Springfield, amicus curiae.

OPINION

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue in this case is whether section 112a-11.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) ( 725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5 (West 2018) ), which permits the issuance of a protective order in a crime involving domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to defendant. The circuit court of Cook County held the statute unconstitutional, as violative of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV ) and of article I, section 2, and article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10 ). The circuit court also held that the statute shifted the burden to defendant, in conflict with the Civil No Contact Order Act ( 740 ILCS 22/204, 215.5 (West 2018)). We now reverse the circuit court's judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant Miguel Deleon was charged by indictment with four counts of criminal sexual assault ( 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018)). The conditions of defendant's bond release included a prohibition against contacting the victim or visiting her home, school, or workplace. Pursuant to section 112A-11.5 of the Code ( 725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5 (West 2018) ), the State's Attorney filed a petition for a plenary civil no-contact order mandating defendant refrain from contacting the victim, harassing or stalking her, and entering her place of employment. Defense counsel filed a memorandum opposing the no-contact order, asserting that section 112A-11.5 was unconstitutional.

¶ 4 At a hearing in March 2019, the circuit court orally pronounced that section 112A-11.5 was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied, although an evidentiary hearing was never held nor evidence proffered by counsel as to the section's unconstitutionality as applied to defendant. The court found that the statute allows the State to make a prima facie case for the issuance of a protective order by producing the indictment without requiring the alleged victim to testify and be subject to cross-examination, in violation of due process. The court also found the statute's requirement that the defendant present evidence of a meritorious defense to rebut the prima facie evidence violative of defendant's constitutional protections against self-incrimination (id. § 112A-11.5(a)(1)). Additionally, the court found that the statute improperly shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant. The State appealed directly to this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). We allowed the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 5 ANALYSIS

¶ 6 All statutes are presumed to be constitutionally valid. People v. Hollins , 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 13, 361 Ill.Dec. 402, 971 N.E.2d 504. It is the court's duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds the statute's constitutionality, if such a construction is reasonably possible. Id. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo . Id. This court has previously advised circuit courts that " ‘cases should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible,’ " reaching constitutional grounds only if necessary to decide the case. Vasquez Gonzalez v. Union Health Service, Inc. , 2018 IL 123025, ¶ 19, 429 Ill.Dec. 32, 123 N.E.3d 1091 (quoting In re E.H. , 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178, 309 Ill.Dec. 1, 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006) ).

¶ 7 The due process clause protects fundamental justice and fairness. People v. Lindsey , 199 Ill. 2d 460, 472, 264 Ill.Dec. 695, 771 N.E.2d 399 (2002). Procedural due process claims challenge the constitutionality of procedures used to deprive a person of their life, liberty, or property. People v. Cardona , 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15, 369 Ill.Dec. 117, 986 N.E.2d 66. The fundamental requirements of due process are notice of the procedure and the opportunity to present any objection or rebuttal. Id.

¶ 8 What due process consists of, however, is a flexible concept, as "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Therefore, what procedures due process requires depends upon " ‘the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action’ " in each particular situation. Id. (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy , 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961) ).

¶ 9 At issue here is the constitutionality of section 112A-11.5 of the Code, which allows for a protective order to be issued in conjunction with a criminal prosecution and provides:

"(a) Except as provided in subsection (a-5) of this Section, the court shall grant the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime involving domestic violence, a sexual offense, or a crime involving stalking has been committed. The following shall be considered prima facie evidence of the crime:

(1) an information, complaint, indictment, or delinquency petition, charging a crime of domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking or charging an attempt to commit a crime of domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking;

(2) an adjudication of delinquency, a finding of guilt based upon a plea, or a finding of guilt after a trial for a crime of domestic battery, a sexual crime, or stalking or an attempt to commit a crime of domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking;

(3) any dispositional order issued under Section 5-710 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the imposition of supervision, conditional discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment, parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release for a crime of domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking or an attempt to commit a crime of domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking, or imprisonment in conjunction with a bond forfeiture warrant; or

(4) the entry of a protective order in a separate civil case brought by the petitioner against the respondent.

(a-5) The respondent may rebut prima facie evidence of the crime under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Section by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense. The respondent shall file a written notice alleging a meritorious defense which shall be verified and supported by affidavit. The verified notice and affidavit shall set forth the evidence that will be presented at a hearing. If the court finds that the evidence presented at the hearing establishes a meritorious defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide not to issue a protective order.

(b) The petitioner shall not be denied a protective order because the petitioner or the respondent is a minor.

(c) The court, when determining whether or not to issue a protective order, may not require physical injury on the person of the victim.

(d) If the court issues a final protective order under this Section, the court shall afford the petitioner and respondent an opportunity to be heard on the remedies requested in the petition." 725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5 (West 2018).

¶ 10 As stated, statutory enactments are presumed constitutional. To overcome that presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish a constitutional violation. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski , 233 Ill. 2d 185, 200, 330 Ill.Dec. 761, 909 N.E.2d 783 (2009).

¶ 11 Under article 112A, the circuit court must grant a protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that the defendant committed "a crime involving domestic violence, a sexual offense, or a crime involving stalking." 725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5(a) (West 2018). For the statute's purposes, prima facie evidence includes the indictment charging defendant with a qualifying crime. Id. § 112A-11.5(a)(1).

¶ 12 The State's Attorney, or alternatively the victim, may petition for a protective order at any time following the filing of the charge and issue of summons. Id. § 112A-5.5(a), (c). The defendant must receive at least 10 days' notice prior to the court's consideration of the petition. Id. § 112A-5.5(f).

¶ 13 Medina v. California Due Process Analysis

¶ 14 The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that, in criminal proceedings, " ‘it is normally "within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out," ’ " generally declining to find a due process violation unless the procedure in question " ‘ "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." ’ " Medina v. California , 505 U.S. 437, 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (quoting Patterson v. New York , 432 U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), quoting Speiser v. Randall , 357 U.S. 513, 523, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) ).

¶ 15 We first evaluate whether allowing the State to make a prima facie case for the issuance on a protective order via indictment, without requiring the complaining witness be subject to cross-examination, is a denial of due process. In Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Florida procedures allowing a person arrested without a warrant and charged by...