People v. Deroo

2022 IL 126120

215 N.E.3d 46

465 Ill.Dec. 250

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Ryan James DEROO, Appellant.

Docket No. 126120

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed March 24, 2022.

Rehearing denied May 23, 2022.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, and Thomas A. Karalis, Deputy Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa (Terry D. Slaw, of Rolling Meadows, of counsel), for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Joshua M. Schneider, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.People v. Deroo, 2022 IL 126120

CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Rock Island County, defendant Ryan James Deroo was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) and aggravated driving while his license was revoked and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of nine and three years, respectively. During his trial, the results of a chemical blood test establishing defendant's blood alcohol content were admitted into evidence pursuant to section 11-501.4(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a) (West 2016)). This provision allows the admission of chemical tests of blood conducted in the course of emergency medical treatment "as a business record exception to the hearsay rule." Id.

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant maintained that section 11-501.4(a) conflicts with Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012), which expressly excludes "medical records in criminal cases" from the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant further contended that Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) should control over section 11-501.4(a) and, therefore, that the results of the chemical blood test should have been deemed inadmissible hearsay. The appellate court found no conflict between the statute and the rule of evidence and affirmed. 2020 IL App (3d) 170163, 441 Ill.Dec. 679, 157 N.E.3d 1036. We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court, although we do so on different grounds.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged in the circuit court of Rock Island County with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol following four prior DUI convictions ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(2)(D) (West 2016)), aggravated DUI with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater following four prior DUI convictions (id. § 11-501(a)(1), (d)(2)(D)), and aggravated driving while his license was revoked (id. § 6-303(d)). At trial, evidence introduced by the State showed that on the evening of March 13, 2016, defendant was drinking with some of his friends in his grandmother's garage at her home in Aledo, Illinois. After the friends left, defendant got into his grandmother's car, alone, and drove away. Defendant headed north on Turkey Hollow Road, a two-lane, rural road in Rock Island County. Defendant was speeding, and as he approached a curve, he lost control of his grandmother's car. The car went off the road, flipped several times, and crashed into a ditch along the east side of the road. Carrie Olsen, a witness to the accident, testified that she stayed near the crash site until emergency personnel arrived. Olsen saw only one person in the car.

¶ 5 Bruce Retherford, a paramedic, testified that he was called to the scene of defendant's accident. When he arrived, he saw a car in the ditch on the side of the road and defendant hanging from the waist up out of the driver's side window. No one else was in the car. Retherford helped remove defendant and get him into an ambulance. While examining defendant, Retherford noticed that he had a "very strong odor of beer" on his breath and that his pupils’ reaction to light was consistent with intoxication. Further, defendant's mood was unstable, alternating between hostility and friendship toward Retherford. In Retherford's opinion, defendant was intoxicated. Retherford stated that defendant suffered several lacerations, including a severe laceration to his face, and was transported to the emergency room at Trinity Hospital in Rock Island.

¶ 6 Jennifer Wilkinson was the emergency room nurse on duty when defendant arrived at the hospital. She testified that defendant was uncooperative, "kept trying to leave," and was "very rude [and] disrespectful" to the hospital staff. Defendant admitted to Wilkinson that he had been drinking, and Wilkinson believed that he was intoxicated.

¶ 7 Dr. Douglas Gaither treated defendant at the hospital and testified that he ordered defendant's blood drawn as a regular part of his emergency room treatment. Gaither stated that defendant's blood was analyzed at the laboratory in the hospital, which was the laboratory routinely used by the emergency room for blood testing. According to Gaither, defendant's blood alcohol test showed a serum concentration of 247 milligrams of alcohol per deciliter. Gaither further stated that defendant's speech was slurred and that he asked defendant if he had been drinking. Defendant admitted that he had. Based on this response, as well as defendant's slurred speech, his slow reaction time when he was asked questions, and the results of the blood alcohol test, Gaither believed that defendant was intoxicated.

¶ 8 Rock Island County sheriff's deputy Claire Woodthorp testified that she spoke with defendant in the emergency room. According to Woodthorp, defendant's speech was very slow and slurred, and he smelled strongly of alcohol. Defendant admitted to Woodthorp that he had "totaled the car" but was unwilling to answer any other questions or make any eye contact. Woodthorp asked defendant to consent to a blood draw, but he refused. Woodthorp stated that she did not direct any of the hospital staff to conduct a blood draw. Given the circumstances of defendant's accident and his condition in the emergency room, Woodthorp believed defendant was intoxicated. She therefore issued him a citation for driving under the influence of alcohol.

¶ 9 John Wetstein, toxicology training coordinator for the Illinois State Police forensic science service, testified regarding the conversion of serum blood alcohol concentration results to whole blood alcohol concentration results. Wetstein explained that the term "blood serum" refers to only that portion of blood that is left when all clotting factors, proteins, and fats are removed. The statutory standard for the offense of driving under the influence, which is set at 0.08 grams of alcohol or greater per deciliter, is expressed in terms of whole blood, not serum blood. Wetstein stated that serum blood alcohol results can be converted to whole blood results by dividing by 1.18. Applying this formula, Wetstein concluded that defendant's serum blood alcohol concentration of 247 milligrams of alcohol per deciliter converted to 0.209 grams of alcohol per deciliter of whole blood, or more than twice the legal limit.

¶ 10 The State sought admission of the results of defendant's blood alcohol test pursuant to section 11-501.4(a) of the Vehicle Code (id. § 11-501.4(a)). Under section 11-501.4(a), the results of chemical tests of blood conducted in the course of emergency medical treatment may be admitted into evidence in prosecutions for DUI "as a business record exception to the hearsay rule" so long as certain foundational requirements are met. Id. Specifically, it must be shown that the blood test was ordered in the regular course of providing emergency medical treatment and not at the request of law enforcement authorities and that the test was performed by the laboratory routinely used by the hospital. The trial court concluded these requirements had been met and admitted the results of defendant's blood alcohol test as a business record exception to the hearsay rule. The results were published to the jury.

¶ 11 Defendant testified in his own defense. Defendant admitted that he had been drinking on the night of March 13, 2016, but maintained that he had not been driving his grandmother's car when it crashed. According to defendant, another individual who he knew only as "T" had been driving. Defendant was unable to provide any further information about this person, other than that he was a "short guy" with dark hair and a beard who had shown up at his grandmother's garage earlier in the day with defendant's friends. Defendant stated that his friends knew nothing about "T" either, as they had simply encountered him when walking around town and had brought him to the garage. Defendant also could not remember what had happened to "T" after the crash.

¶ 12 The jury found defendant guilty on all three charged counts. The trial court merged defendant's conviction for aggravated DUI with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater into his conviction for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol. The court then entered judgments of conviction for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and aggravated driving with a revoked license and sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of nine and three years. Defendant appealed.

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argued, in part, that his aggravated DUI conviction should be reversed because the results of the hospital blood test were improperly admitted into evidence under section 11-501.4(a) of the Vehicle Code. In support, defendant pointed to Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012). This rule sets forth a hearsay exception for records of "regularly conducted business activity" (commonly referred to as the business records exception to hearsay) but expressly excludes "in criminal cases medical records." Id. According to defendant, the plain language of Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) conflicts with section 11-501.4(a). Further, defendant noted that, when a statute conflicts with a rule of evidence promulgated by this court, the supreme court rule prevails. Ill. R. Evid. 101 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) ("A...