People v. Doe

1

2024 IL App (1st) 220811-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN DOE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-22-0811

Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division

July 18, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 11 CR 5844 Honorable Stanley J. Sacks, Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Martin concur in the judgment.

ORDER

ROCHFORD, PRESIDING JUSTICE.

¶ 1 Held: Defendant's 48-year prison sentence is affirmed, where upon resentencing the trial court did not sentence defendant to a de facto life sentence, did not violate this court's mandate, and did not impose an excessive sentence.

¶ 2 Defendant-appellant, John Doe, appeals from the 48-year prison sentence imposed upon him at resentencing.^[1] For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 The trial proceedings, the evidence presented at trial, and circumstances surrounding defendant's original sentencing hearing were fully set out in our prior orders, entered upon defendant's prior direct appeal, and need not be fully restated here. See People v. [Doe] 2016 IL App (1st) 132163-U, appeal denied, judgment vacated, No. 120821 (Ill. March 25, 2020) (supervisory order); People v. [Doe], 2020 IL App (1st) 132163-UB. We therefore restate only those facts necessary to resolve this appeal, with portions of this order taken from our prior decisions.

¶ 4 Defendant was charged by indictment with multiple counts of first degree murder, unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. A jury trial was held in January of 2013, at which the State elected to proceed solely on two of the first degree murder counts. Each of those counts generally alleged that, on or about December 20, 2009, defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death of the victim.

¶ 5 The evidence at trial generally established that, on December 20, 2009, defendant was with a group of friends at defendant's home, located in Chicago. The group eventually left defendant's home to walk to a store a few blocks away, at which time the group was confronted by the victim and an altercation ensued. The incident ended with defendant shooting the victim multiple times, including in the victim's back. At the conclusion of the jury trial defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, with the jury also finding that defendant personally discharged a firearm resulting in the death of another person. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and a sentencing hearing commenced in April 2013.

¶ 6 In preparation for that hearing, a presentence investigation report was prepared. That report reflected-inter alia-that defendant was 17 years old at the time of the shooting, was the father of a young daughter, had begun using marijuana and alcohol as a minor, and had previously been identified as a gang member. In aggravation, the State introduced additional evidence of defendant's prior arrests for possession of a stolen vehicle, burglary, and robbery, his prior adult conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, a juvenile finding of delinquency for defendant's participation in an armed robbery, and a victim impact statement from the victim's aunt. In mitigation, defendant introduced a letter from his family and evidence that he had previously received special education services for a diagnosed learning disability. Defendant made a statement in allocution, in which he maintained his innocence and asked the court for "mercy" considering his young age and the fact that he had a young daughter. The State asked the trial court to impose a "significant period" of incarceration, while defendant asked the trial court to impose the statutory minimum sentence.

¶ 7 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court specifically reviewed defendant's juvenile and adult criminal history, the mitigating circumstances outlined by defense counsel, the defendant's relative youth, the fact that defendant was the father of a young daughter, and the circumstances of defendant's actions in this case. The trial court then noted that that defendant was subject to a statutorily-mandated sentence ranging from 45 years' imprisonment to a term of natural life, which would be comprised of a 20 to 60-year sentence for the murder conviction and a mandatory 25-year-to-natural life sentencing enhancement due to defendant's use of a firearm. Defendant was ultimately sentenced to a term of 55 years' imprisonment, with the trial court specifically indicating that-considering all the sentencing factors-this was not a case where a minimum sentence was appropriate. Defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence was denied.

¶ 8 Defendant filed a timely appeal raising claims of various trial errors, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and unconstitutional sentencing. In an order modified upon denial of defendant's petition for rehearing, this court rejected defendant's arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. [Doe ], 2016 IL App (1st) 132163-U.

¶ 9 Defendant thereafter filed a petition for leave to appeal with our supreme court. In a supervisory order entered on March 25, 2020, our supreme court denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal, but also directed this court to vacate our prior judgment and to consider the effect of its opinions in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, and People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, on the issue of whether defendant's sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and to determine if a different result is warranted. [Doe], No. 120821 (Ill. March 25, 2020) (supervisory order). In May 2020, this court entered an order vacating our original decision, and thereafter we entered a subsequent order in compliance with the supreme court's supervisory order. [Doe ], 2020 IL App (1st) 132163-UB.

¶ 10 In that subsequent order, we initially concluded that with respect to defendant's "claims of trial errors and ineffective assistance of counsel, and relying upon the analysis set out in our prior order, we once again reject those contentions." Id. ¶ 10. Turning to the propriety of defendant's sentence, we noted that: (1) in Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-89, the United States Supreme Court concluded that "the eighth amendment 'forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders' convicted of homicide" and that "before a life sentence could be properly imposed, 'mitigating circumstances' such as 'an offender's youth and attendant characteristics' must be considered," (2) in Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42, our supreme court concluded that "any sentence exceeding 40 years is a de facto life sentence, requiring the sentencing court to consider' [the] defendant's youth and its attendant circumstances, '" and (3) in Holman, 2017 IL 120655, our supreme court concluded that before imposing such a sentence on a juvenile defendant, a court must determine that" 'the defendant's conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.'" Id. ¶¶ 11-14.

¶ 11 Applying these cases to the sentence imposed upon defendant, we previously concluded that the minimum 45-year sentence defendant faced and the 55-year sentence he received constituted de facto life sentences. However, "while the record indicates that the trial court did consider defendant's youth and some of the attendant characteristics ***, the trial court did not consider all those characteristics. Nor did the trial court explicitly determine from its consideration of those characteristics that the defendant's conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation." Id. ¶ 17. As such, we found that defendant's sentence violated the eighth amendment, vacated that sentence, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶18. We noted that upon remand, defendant was entitled to elect to be sentenced under the then relatively new scheme prescribed by section 5-4.5105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2018)). Id.

¶ 12 Upon remand, an updated presentencing report was prepared, and the parties presented sentencing memoranda to the trial court. In defendant's memorandum, he noted Buffer's holding that any sentence exceeding 40 years is a de facto life sentence, requiring the sentencing court to consider a defendant's youth and its attendant circumstances, and Holman's requirement that before imposing such a sentence on a juvenile defendant a court must determine that the defendant's conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. Contending that no such finding could be made in this case, defendant asserted that "the only applicable sentencing range for [defendant] is a term of 20 to 40 years."

¶ 13 In its memorandum, the State acknowledged the Buffer and Holman decisions, but noted that other more recent decisions were relevant to defendant's resentencing. The State noted that in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 111-13 (2021), the Supreme Court considered a discretionary sentence of life without parole imposed upon a juvenile offender where the sentencer nevertheless had discretion to "consider the mitigating qualities of youth" and impose a lesser punishment. The Supreme Court concluded that in such...