People v. Donley

29 N.E.3d 683

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Robert V. DONLEY, Defendant–Appellant.

The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Robert V. Donley, Defendant–Appellant.

Nos. 4–13–0223

4–13–0617.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

March 26, 2015.

Michael J. Pelletier, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, and Peter A. Carusona and Mark D. Fisher, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Seth Uphoff, State's Attorney, of Pontiac (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Luke McNeill, all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a May 1997 bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Robert V. Donley, guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a) (1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) and later sentenced him to 45 years in prison. Defendant has since filed numerous pleadings unsuccessfully challenging his conviction and sentence. Two such pleadings are at issue in these appeals, which this court has sua sponte consolidated.

¶ 2 In January 2013, defendant pro se filed a petition for relief from judgment under section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2012) ), challenging his three-year mandatory-supervised-release (MSR) term. In March 2013, the trial court sua sponte dismissed defendant's petition with prejudice.

¶ 3 In June 2013, defendant pro se filed a second petition for relief from judgment, averring that “his conviction and sentence was obtained by fraud, ignorance, and deprivation of a defense.” Later that month, the trial court struck defendant's petition as untimely and “previously dismissed with prejudice.”

¶ 4 Defendant appeals, urging this court to vacate the trial court's sua sponte rulings on his January and June 2013 petitions for relief from judgment. Defendant contends that (1) because he did not properly serve the State as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 105 (eff. Jan. 1, 1989), his petitions were not ripe for adjudication; and (2) the court erred by striking his June 2013 petition prior to the 30–day minimum time limit imposed by the supreme court in People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill.2d 318, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802 (2009). We disagree and affirm.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 A. Defendant's Murder Conviction

¶ 7 The evidence presented at defendant's May 1997 bench trial showed that despite an order of protection that barred defendant from contacting his wife, Carol Donley, defendant, in November 1996, disabled the telephone line to Carol's residence, argued with her, broke a window, and entered her home. Defendant then stabbed Carol 21 times with a knife, killing her. Testimony provided by several witnesses, including Carol's 10–year–old son, identified defendant as the person outside of Carol's residence just before the murder who ran away immediately thereafter. Defendant later surrendered to police and provided a videotaped statement admitting his culpability. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing revealed that blood police recovered from defendant's person matched Carol's DNA profile. Various items of physical evidence also supported the State's case.

¶ 8 Defendant testified that he arrived at his wife's home hoping to resolve their differences and did not plan the events that ensued. Defendant stated that the circumstances surrounding the argument he had with his wife provoked him and he reacted in anger. Defendant's counsel argued that the stabbing had been an act of rage.

¶ 9 The trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder, noting that it could not “imagine a more conclusive case where the evidence is so overwhelming as to a defendant's guilt.” The court later sentenced defendant to 45 years in prison.

¶ 10 B. Defendant's Filings Subsequent to His Incarceration

¶ 11 Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction and sentence but remanded with directions that the trial court (1) correct defendant's sentencing order and (2) award 235 days' credit toward defendant's sentence for time served. People v. Donley, No. 4–97–0564, 303 Ill.App.3d 1119, 254 Ill.Dec. 703, 747 N.E.2d 1115 (May 14, 1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 12 In November 1998, defendant pro se filed his first petition for relief under the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 to 122–8 (West 1998)), which the trial court later dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit under section 122–2.1(a)(2) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a)(2) (West 1998)). Defendant appealed, and this court concluded that defendant stated the gist of a constitutional claim when he alleged that the trial judge was asleep during part of his bench trial. People v. Donley, 314 Ill.App.3d 671, 674, 247 Ill.Dec. 252, 731 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (2000). We reversed and remanded for further proceedings, noting that “despite the strength of the State's case against defendant, an allegation that the trial judge was asleep during a portion of defendant's bench trial for first degree murder is sufficiently troubling that the matter should proceed to see what, if any, evidence defendant can muster in support of that claim at the second or (possibly) the third stage of proceedings under the Act.” Id. at 674, 247 Ill.Dec. 252, 731 N.E.2d at 1263.

¶ 13 In March 2002, following remand, defendant's appointed postconviction counsel filed an amended postconviction petition. The State later filed a motion to dismiss defendant's amended postconviction petition. Following hearings in August 2002 and March 2003, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed. People v. Donley, No. 4–03–0436, 353 Ill.App.3d 1113, 317 Ill.Dec. 497, 881 N.E.2d 983 (Dec. 23, 2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ). In March 2005, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal. People v. Donley, 214 Ill.2d 539, 294 Ill.Dec. 5, 830 N.E.2d 5 (2005) (table).

¶ 14 In June 2006, defendant pro se filed a successive postconviction petition under the Act, which the trial court dismissed upon finding that it was frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, and the court appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to serve as his counsel. In March 2007, OSAD moved to withdraw as counsel, contending that defendant's appeal presented no meritorious issues. In April 2007, defendant filed additional points and authorities, opposing OSAD's motion to withdraw. This court declined to consider the merits of defendant's claim that the trial court erred by dismissing his June 2006 petition at the first stage of the postconviction proceedings because defendant failed to comply with section 122–1(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1(f) (West 2006)), in that he did not obtain leave of court before filing a successive postconviction petition. People v. Donley, No. 4–06–0623, 376 Ill.App.3d 1163, 351 Ill.Dec. 947, 952 N.E.2d 739 (Dec. 14, 2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ). In so concluding, we granted OSAD's motion to withdraw and affirmed the court's judgment. Id.

¶ 15 We note that in addition to the two petitions at issue in this case, this court has recently considered and rejected two additional appeals, which were based on the trial court's denial of defendant's pro se (1) April 2013 motion for DNA testing (People v. Donley, No. 4–130531 (Mar. 11, 2015) (unpublished summary order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2) )) and (2) September 2013 motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition (People v. Donley, No. 4–14–0153 (Mar. 11, 2015) (unpublished summary order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2) )). See People v. Eubanks, 283 Ill.App.3d 12, 24, 218 Ill.Dec. 535, 669 N.E.2d 678, 686 (1996) (the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records).

¶ 16 C. The Petitions at Issue in This Appeal

¶ 17 1. Defendant's January 2013 Petition for Relief From Judgment

¶ 18 On January 16, 2013, defendant pro se filed an amended petition for relief from judgment under section 2–1401 of the Code, challenging his three-year MSR term. Included with defendant's petition was a notice of filing in which defendant certified that one day earlier he mailed the original and one copy of his petition to the Livingston County circuit clerk.

¶ 19 On March 14, 2013, the trial court entered the following order on defendant's January 2013 amended petition for relief from judgment:

“The State has not filed a responsive pleading. Therefore, all well pleaded facts in the petition are deemed admitted. Initially, the court notes that defendant's [section] 2–1401 petition has not been timely filed, nor has defendant alleged any statutory basis for extending the two-year statute of limitations. In fact, no affidavit is attached to the amended petition or the original petition. Furthermore, the petition itself is insufficient as a matter of law[,] and therefore judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff and against defendant is appropriate. * * * [Defendant's] petition is dismissed with prejudice.”

¶ 20 2. Defendant's June 2013 Petition for Relief From Judgment

¶ 21 On June 6, 2013, defendant pro se filed a second petition for relief from judgment, averring that “his conviction and sentence was obtained by fraud, ignorance, and deprivation of a defense.” Specifically, defendant contended that the trial court should vacate his conviction and sentence because (1) the grand jury that returned the true bill of indictment in this case was not properly convened; (2) his arrest was not followed by a “ prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause”; (3) the police search of his person, home, and vehicle was unreasonable under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.IV); and (4) the State withheld “fraudulent” grand jury transcripts in violation of Brady v. Maryland,...