People v. Dorsey

208 N.Y.S.3d 365

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Johanna M. DORSEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 22, 2024

Decided and Entered: April 4, 2024

David K. Bertan, New York City, for appellant.

Karen A. Heggen, District Attorney, Ballston Spa (Jesse L. Ashdown of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Aarons, J.P., Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald, Fisher and McShan, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Aarons, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County (James A. Murphy III, J.), rendered June 25, 2020, convicting defendant upon her plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree.

A state trooper effectuated a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle, during which the trooper became suspicious of defendant’s answers to questions and requested to search the vehicle. Defendant consented, and a box containing cocaine was discovered in the vehicle. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with various crimes. A suppression hearing was held before a Judicial Hearing Officer (Doern, J.H.O.), who ultimately recommended denying defendant’s suppression motion. After County Court confirmed the Judicial Hearing Officer’s report, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment, to be followed by a period of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.

[1, 2] In challenging the suppression ruling,¹ defendant argues that the traffic stop was pretextual. The record reflects that the trooper observed defendant’s vehicle with tinted windows and making an abrupt lane change without signaling. Given the proof of a traffic violation, the trooper had probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop (see People v. Medina, 209 A.D.3d 1059, 1061–1062, 175 N.Y.S.3d 625 [3d Dept. 2022], affd 40 N.Y.3d 1022, 199 N.Y.S.3d 451, 222 N.E.3d 1115 [2023]; People v. Banks, 148 A.D.3d 1359, 1360, 50 N.Y.S.3d 583 [3d Dept. 2017]).

[3] Regarding the voluntariness of defendant’s consent to search the vehicle, the trooper testified that he asked defendant if she would consent to a search of the vehicle. He also advised her that she did not have to give her consent. According to the trooper, defendant verbally gave consent and agreed to sign a form reflecting her consent despite being told that she did not have to do so. Although defendant maintains that her consent was coerced, the Judicial Hearing Officer credited the testimony of the trooper and found that defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was voluntary. Deferring to the Judicial Hearing Officer’s findings and credibility determinations, the Judicial Hearing Officer did not err in concluding that defendant’s consent was voluntary (see People v. Cummings, 157 A.D.3d 982, 984–985, 69 N.Y.S.3d 394 [3d Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 982, 77 N.Y.S.3d 660, 102 N.E.3d 437 [2018]; People v. Williford, 124 A.D.3d 1076, 1078–1079, 1 N.Y.S.3d 551 [3d Dept. 2015], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 1209, 16 N.Y.S.3d 532, 37 N.E.3d 1175 [2015]; People v. Durgey, 186 A.D.2d 899, 901, 589 N.Y.S.2d 631 [3d Dept. 1992], lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 788, 594 N.Y.S.2d 734, 610 N.E.2d 407 [1993]).

[4] As to any incriminating statements made by defendant prior to her arrest and being administered Miranda warnings, the Judicial Hearing Officer found, and the record confirms, that, after defendant consented to the search, the trooper asked defendant to exit the vehicle with her child. Shortly thereafter, another trooper arrived, and defendant and her child were asked to sit in the back of that trooper’s car for their safety and to stay warm because it was cold. During this time, defendant was not handcuffed. The second trooper testified that she escorted defendant and her child to the back seat of her car and gave them the option of leaving the car door open or shut. Defendant opted to have the door shut. In view of the foregoing, a reasonable person would not have believed that he or she was not free to leave. Accordingly...