People v. Dotson

1

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COREY ALLEN DOTSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 362945

Court of Appeals of Michigan

November 30, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 06-011003-02-FC

Before: O'BRIEN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and M. J. KELLY JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Corey Dotson, appeals by delayed leave granted^[1] the order denying his successive motion for relief from judgment. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BASIC FACTS

On July 29, 2006, Denetrice Self was shot dead while sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle. Bennie Robinson, a childhood friend of Self's, had been sitting in the passenger seat. Robinson testified at trial that he heard gunshots and saw a man named David Williams firing a gun into the driver's side of the vehicle at close range. Robinson got out of the vehicle and saw Dotson, who was also holding a gun, near the back of the vehicle. Both Williams and Dotson fired shots at Robinson as he ran away. At trial, Robinson explained that he had known Williams and Dotson since childhood and that, although he had once been on cordial terms with both, they had blamed an associate of his for killing three friends and relatives of Williams.

Following a jury trial, Dotson was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. He appealed to this Court, and, while that appeal was pending, moved to remand to the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing. He argued that after the trial, Robinson executed an affidavit admitting that he had lied when he testified that Dotson was one of the shooters. This Court denied the motion to remand^[2] and affirmed his convictions in an unpublished per curiam opinion.^[3] Thereafter, Dotson, in propria persona, moved for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508(D)(3), claiming that Robinson's affidavit constituted new evidence justifying a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, finding Robinson's affidavit was invalid and was "particularly suspect and untrustworthy because Defendant fails to explain the circumstances around which he came to possess the document." Additionally, the court found "the purported affidavit does not make sense when taken into consideration with the other evidence in the case."

Relevant to this appeal, in October 2017, Dotson, in propria persona, filed a successive motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(G)(2) and MCL 770.1, claiming that he was entitled to a new trial. According to Dotson, after the trial court denied his initial motion for relief from judgment, he obtained new affidavit evidence from Robinson, Paul Smith (Robinson's cousin), and Antonio Payton (an eyewitness). Because Dotson obtained this evidence after filing his initial motion for relief from judgment, he believed that he met the threshold requirements of MCR 6.502(G)(2). Dotson argued that he established good cause for not presenting the evidence in his prior motion because he did not know this evidence existed until after his conviction and initial motion for relief from judgment. Alternatively, he argued that because the new evidence exonerated him and implicated a different perpetrator, and because there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime, the trial court could waive the good cause requirement. Further, Dotson claimed he suffered actual prejudice because he likely would have had a chance of acquittal if he had known that another individual could be identified as the shooter and if he had known that Robinson and another individual had conspired to falsely blame him for the shooting.^[4]

The court denied the successive motion for relief from judgment, finding that Dotson failed to show he had good cause for not presenting the evidence in his prior motion and that he failed to "demonstrate that the claim of new evidence could not be discovered before the first such motion." Dotson sought delayed leave to appeal in this Court and, in lieu of granting Dotson's application for leave to appeal, this Court vacated in part the order denying the successive motion for relief from judgment. People v Dotson, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 14, 2018 (Docket No. 342914). This Court explained:

To survive the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G)(1), defendant was not required to demonstrate that he could not have discovered the new evidence on which his motion is based prior to filing his first motion for relief from judgment. Cf. People v Watkins, 500 Mich. 851; 883 N.W.2d 758 (2016) (explaining that the Cress four-factor test does not apply to the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G), because the plain text of the court rule does not so require). The affidavit authored by Antonio Payton does present "new evidence that was not discovered before" defendant's first motion for relief from judgment. MCR 6.502(G)(2). From the present record, we are unable to determine whether the affidavits authored by Paul Smith and Bennie Robinson are new evidence. The trial court also erred by finding that defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for failing to raise his claims of newly discovered evidence previously. People v Swain, 288 Mich.App. 609, 631632, 635; 794 N.W.2d 92 (2010). On remand, the trial court is directed to first determine whether the affidavits from Paul Smith and Bennie Robinson amount to new evidence under MCR 6.502(G)(2). The trial court shall then evaluate the new evidence presented by defendant to determine whether he can demonstrate actual prejudice under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b), holding an evidentiary hearing if necessary, see MCR 6.508(B) and (C). In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED because defendant has failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying the motion for relief from judgment.[Id.]

Approximately four years after this Court issued the remand order,^[5] the trial court again denied Dotson's successive motion for relief from judgment. Dotson now appeals that decision by leave granted.

II. SCOPE OF REMAND

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Dotson argues the trial court improperly denied his successive motion for relief from judgment because it exceeded the scope of this Court's September 2018 remand order. We review a trial court's decision on a motion for relief from judgment "for an abuse of discretion and its findings of facts supporting its decision for clear error." Swain, 288 Mich.App. at 628. "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." People v Grant, 329 Mich.App. 626, 634; 944 N.W.2d 172 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." People v Everett, 318 Mich.App. 511, 516; 899 N.W.2d 94 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Whether a trial court followed an appellate court's ruling on remand is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." People v Lampe, 327 Mich.App. 104, 111; 933 N.W.2d 314 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

"Following a remand from this Court, the power of the lower court on remand is to take such action as law and justice may require so long as it is not inconsistent with the judgment of the appellate court." Lampe, 327 Mich.App. at 111 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). "When an appellate court remands a case with specific instructions, it is improper for a lower court to exceed the scope of the order." People v Russell, 297 Mich.App. 707, 714; 825 N.W.2d 623 (2012). Further, the law-of-the-case doctrine "provides that an appellate court's decision regarding a particular issue is binding on courts of equal or subordinate jurisdiction during subsequent proceedings in the same case." People v Herrera, 204 Mich.App. 333, 340; 514 N.W.2d 543 (1994).

Generally, "one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction." MCR 6.502(G)(1). However, a defendant may file a successive motion based on "retroactive change in law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment was filed," or "a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion." MCR 6.502(G)(2). "A defendant has the burden to establish entitlement to relief." Swain, 288 Mich.App. at 630, citing MCR 6.508(D). A court may not grant relief unless defendant shows "good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion," and "actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief." MCR 6.508(D)(3). As relevant to this case, Dotson can demonstrate actual prejudice by showing either (1) "but for the alleged error, [he] would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal," or (2) "the irregularity was so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that the conviction should not be allowed to stand regardless of its effect on the outcome of the case." See MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(i) and (iii). "Because a successive motion for relief from judgment may only be filed if, after the first motion, there is a retroactive change in the law or new evidence is discovered, the "good cause" and "actual prejudice" requirements of MCR 6.508(D)(3) are not relevant until, and are only relevant if, the trial court determines that the successive motion falls within one of the two exceptions of MCR 6.502(G)(2)." Swain, 288 Mich.App. at 632-633.

We conclude that, in this case, the trial court made several errors on remand. First, in the remand order, this Court concluded that Payton's affidavit presented "new evidence" under MCR 6.502(G)(2). Seco...