People v. Downing

Page 176

40 Cal.Rptr.2d 176

33 Cal.App.4th 1641

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Russell John DOWNING, Defendant and Respondent.

No. D020943.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

April 13, 1995.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1995.

Review Denied July 20, 1995.

Edwin L. Miller, Jr., and Paul J. Pfingst, Dist. Attys., Thomas F. McArdle and Patricia O'Mara, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.

Francis J. Bardsley, Public Defender, Terry Zimmerman and Gary R. Nichols, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and respondent.

HUFFMAN, Acting Presiding Justice.

In this case we have explored the difficult question of the extent to which a police officer may rely upon computer-generated data furnished by the judicial system in carrying out searches and seizures. We conclude, consistent with the recent announcement by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34, ¹ that where errors exist in such data based on mistakes made solely within the judicial system, the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule will not be served by suppressing evidence seized in a search based on the "objectively reasonable" good faith reliance of a police officer on the data generated by the judicial branch of our government, even though that data is later found to be in error and the search is determined to be unlawful.

PREFACE

Russell John Downing was charged with possession of a destructive device "in and near a private habitation" (PEN.CODE, § 12303.2)² with a prior probation allegation after a homemade pipe bomb was seized from his bedroom during a warrantless search of his apartment pursuant to a Fourth Amendment probation waiver. The trial court granted his section 1538.5 suppression motion, ruling the search invalid as based upon a nonexistent waiver due to the termination of Downing's probation and that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, as established by United States v. Leon (Leon ) (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, would not be applied to deny Downing his Fourth Amendment rights. Because the People were unable to proceed, the court dismissed the criminal information against Downing (§ 1385) and the People appealed. (§ 1238, subd. (a)(7).)

The People contend the rationale behind the holding of Leon 's "good faith" rule should apply to the invalid warrantless search conducted in this case based on the investigating police officer's "objectively reasonable" good faith reliance upon erroneous computer generated information developed solely within the judicial branch of the government. We agree and therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

The facts concerning the search of Downing's apartment on December 7, 1993, which produced the evidence in issue, are basically undisputed. The investigating officer received information Downing was engaged in narcotics activity. He then ran Downing's name on the police department "criminal history" computer log ³ which showed Downing was subject to a Fourth Amendment search waiver not due to expire until "12-21-95." The officer then double-checked with a "Fourth Amend[ment] Log" ⁴ (Log) to verify if Downing's waiver expired on the same date as in the police computer information and whether it was still valid. This procedure was in compliance with the San Diego Police Department's policy regarding verification of search waivers before conducting warrantless searches.

Finding the dates were the same, the officer believed the search waiver was still valid and that same day proceeded to Downing's apartment building. ⁵ Not finding Downing home, he proceeded to the manager's office and found Downing there and advised him he intended to conduct a search of his apartment in accordance with his waiver. ⁶ Downing was cooperative, opening the door to his apartment for the officer, accompanying him during the search, and telling him which bedroom in the apartment was his. A pipe bomb and various parts for making pipe bombs were found in Downing's bedroom.

After the information was filed charging Downing with illegal possession of the bomb, he filed the instant motion to suppress. In addition to the above evidence, it was stipulated at the hearing that the search was conducted without a warrant, ⁷ that Downing's probation had expired December 21, 1992, that the search waiver had also expired that date, and that the date of expiration of the Fourth Amendment waiver in the Log was incorrect. Conceding the search was invalid, the People presented evidence to support the position that the Leon good faith rule should apply in this case because the investigating officer conducted the search not based on the police department's own erroneous records, but rather on erroneous records prepared by and under the control of the San Diego Superior Court.

The director of criminal operations for San Diego Superior Court, who supervises the court clerks and has responsibility for updating the "D.A. 29" ⁸ screen of the JURIS computer system, testified about the procedures for inputting information on that screen concerning the disposition of criminal cases in superior court. ⁹ As "D.A. 29" is now set up, according to oral agreement between the district attorney and the executive committee of the superior court, it is the exclusive responsibility of superior court, specifically its clerks who work directly for the judges in San Diego County, to enter case disposition information into JURIS. If probation has been granted in a criminal case and a condition of such is a Fourth Amendment search waiver, that information is inputted for "D.A. 29" by the number of years or duration of probation and the closing or sentencing date. From this information, the computer, programmed by the San Diego County Department of Information Services (DIS) at the court's direction, automatically calculates the date that probation and a Fourth Amendment waiver expire. DIS then prints out a Search and Seizure Index (the Log) monthly, showing alphabetically the defendants who have waived Fourth Amendment rights and their respective expiration dates of probation. ¹⁰

The senior systems analyst for DIS, the legal support services dimensions manager of DIS, and the project manager in the law and justice area of the Department of Justice of DIS each testified about the JURIS system in general, about the "D.A. 29" screen in particular, and agreed with the superior court supervisor's testimony that the court was responsible for the information contained in "D.A. 29." If any errors in the information contained in "D.A. 29" are brought to the attention of DIS by any agency, DIS must first check with the superior court to determine whether something should be changed in the screen. By agreement, only the superior court can direct DIS to change any data on "D.A. 29."

Specifically concerning the error in the "D.A. 29" screen concerning this case, the court clerk who made the input error after Downing was granted probation on December 21, 1989, testified that after two and a half days of training she began inputting information in the "D.A. 29" screen after sentencing hearings had concluded. However, because she was not advised as to what date was to be put in the screen for the "closing date," she put in the date that probation would expire by making her own calculations based on the minute order information. She continued with this procedure until March 1990, when she learned from other clerks that the proper closing date was the date of sentencing in any particular case. ¹¹ She thus mistakenly put in "12-21-92" for the closing date in Downing's case instead of "12-21-89." By doing so, Downing's probation expiration date was extended automatically by the computer programming for "D.A. 29" to "12-21-95," which was then displayed monthly in the Log distributed to law enforcement agencies countywide. ¹²

Throughout the People's presentation of evidence, the hearing judge continually asked who had the ultimate responsibility for the integrity of the system. In response, the witnesses from DIS attempted to explain that although the system was originally owned by the district attorney, it had become a "shared" system in which more than one county department used the information contained on the various JURIS screens and that the input for different screens was limited to different agencies. It further explained that just because an agency could have "access" to the system did not mean that it could "input" information in the system. Although the district attorney's office is the entity that generally gives permission to "access" or view the JURIS system, only the superior court could "input" information on the "D.A. 29" screen. ¹³

As to the integrity of "D.A. 29," the superior court supervisor testified the court relies heavily on that screen to produce court calendars, to download information for reports to the Departments of Justice and Corrections and to the Administrative Office of the Courts. Since the court often uses the screen in lieu of pulling the actual court file to obtain information quickly, it intends the information inputted in the screen by its clerk/keypunch operators to be accurate. In fact the court clerks are authorized to give law enforcement officers information over the telephone that they pull up on the "D.A. 29" screen. In addition, the marshal's, sheriff's and probation offices, as well as the district attorney's office, the municipal courts and police department, have access to view JURIS screen "D.A. 29" and rely on the information contained in it.

In opposition to the motion, Downing testified he told the officer who came to search his apartment that he was no longer on probation. His probation officer and a person from the Probation Department records section also testified that if the investigating officer in this case had telephoned them, as many police officers do, he could...