People v. Dupuis

1

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRANDON MICHAEL DUPUIS, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEVON JOVELL KNIGHTS, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 361117, 361119

Court of Appeals of Michigan

December 28, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Bay Circuit Court LC Nos. 19-010443-FC, 19-010461-FC

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SWARTZLE and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM

In Docket No. 361117, defendant Brandon Michael Dupuis appeals as of right his convictions by a jury of first-degree murder under theories of premeditation and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a) and (b); first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion MCL 750.110a(2) and MCL 750.157a; armed robbery, MCL 750.529; conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.529 and MCL 750.157a; felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f; and four counts^[1] of commission of a felony while in possession of a firearm (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced him as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole for murder; two terms of 200 to 360 months in prison for first-degree home invasion and the accompanying conspiracy; 468 to 720 months in prison for armed robbery; to 468 to 750 months in prison for conspiracy to commit armed robbery; to 47 to 90 months in prison for felonin-possession; and four terms of 24 months in prison for the felony-firearm convictions. In Docket No. 361119 defendant Devon Jovell Knights appeals as of right his convictions by a separate jury of felony murder, first-degree home invasion, conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, and armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him also as a second-offense habitual offender, to life in prison without the possibility of parole for murder; two terms of 200 to 360 months in prison for first-degree home invasion and the accompanying conspiracy; and 360 to 720 months in prison for armed robbery.

On appeal, Dupuis contends that the trial court erred by disallowing jury instructions on certain lesser offenses and by admitting certain video footage and telephone records into evidence. Knights contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with plea discussions and that the trial court erred by admitting other-acts evidence. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in both cases.

I. BACKGROUND

The convictions arose from a home invasion by Dupuis, Knights, and a man named Brandon Miller. The prosecutor produced evidence, including surveillance-camera video footage, that Dupuis entered a home in Bay City through a window, let Knights and Miller inside, took a gun and money from a kitchen drawer, and shot and killed Tyler Gruber (Tyler), who lived in the home, when Tyler confronted Miller. Miller was also hit by a bullet. The residence housed a marijuana grow operation. Knights' jury was given instructions on aiding and abetting. Defendants were convicted and sentenced as previously stated, and they now appeal as of right. Their appeals were consolidated in this Court.^[2]

II. DOCKET NO. 361117

A. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Dupuis argues that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the necessarily included lesser offenses of (1) voluntary manslaughter for the open-murder and felony-murder charges, (2) breaking and entering without permission for the charge of first-degree home invasion, and (3) larceny from a person in connection with the armed-robbery charge.^[3] Questions of law presented by claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo on appeal, but "a circuit court's decision as to whether a requested lesser-included-offense instruction is applicable under the facts of a particular case will only be reversed upon a finding of an abuse of discretion." People v Jones, 497 Mich. 155, 161; 860 N.W.2d 112 (2014). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes." Id.

An "inferior-offense instruction is appropriate only if the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense, meaning, all the elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, and a rational view of the evidence would support such an instruction." People v Mendoza, 468 Mich. 527, 533; 664 N.W.2d 685 (2003). A defendant is not entitled to an instruction on a necessarily lesser included offense unless "a rational view of the evidence supports a conviction for the lesser offense." Id. at 545. As specifically relevant to this case, our Supreme Court has held that voluntary manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder and that a defendant charged with murder is therefore entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter if a rational view of the evidence supports it. People v Yeager, 511 Mich. 478, 490; ____N.W.2d____ (2023), citing Mendoza, 468 Mich. at 541. Thus, the question here becomes whether a rational view of the evidence at trial would have supported a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. See Mendoza, 468 Mich. at 533.

"Both murder and voluntary manslaughter 'require a death, caused by defendant, with either an intent to kill, an intent to commit great bodily harm, or an intent to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result.'" Yeager, 511 Mich. at 489, quoting Mendoza, 468 Mich. at 540. Murder, however, requires "malice," which is the only distinguishing element between murder and manslaughter. Mendoza, 468 Mich. at 533-535, 540. Voluntary manslaughter "differs from murder because it is provoked." People v Reese, 491 Mich. 127, 143; 815 N.W.2d 85 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although it "is not justifiable to take life under provocation," the provocation nonetheless "may be serious enough to deprive the intentional killing of its malicious character, so that it is neither murder on the one hand nor justifiable or excusable on the other." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained the elements of voluntary manslaughter as follows:

Thus, to show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions. Significantly, provocation is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. Rather, provocation is the circumstance that negates the presence of malice. [Mendoza, 468 Mich. at 535-536 (citations omitted).]

"The provocation necessary to mitigate a homicide from murder to manslaughter is that which causes the defendant to act out of passion rather than reason." People v Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 389; 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991). In Pouncey, the Court explained:

In addition, the provocation must be adequate, namely, that which would cause the reasonable person to lose control. Not every hot-tempered individual who flies into a rage at the slightest insult can claim manslaughter. The law cannot countenance the loss of self-control; rather, it must encourage people to control their passions.

The determination of what is reasonable provocation is a question of fact for the factfinder. However, the judge does play a substantial role. The judge furnishes the standard of what constitutes adequate provocation, i.e., that provocation which would cause a reasonable person to act out of passion rather than reason. When, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could find that the provocation was adequate, the judge may exclude evidence of the provocation. [Id. at 389-390 (citations omitted).]

Here, Dupuis argues that a rational view of the evidence provided support for a voluntary manslaughter instruction because the fatal gunshots were fired in response to observing the victim struggling with Miller in the house. Dupuis appears to argue that observing the struggle between the victim and Miller necessarily caused the homicide to have been committed under the heat of passion to defend Miller. The argument advanced by Dupuis on appeal ignores his trial testimony during which he denied being present in the home that night and denied that he was the person shown on the video firing the gun.^[4]

Evidence that a homicide was committed in response to a prolonged physical and verbal assault may justify a voluntary manslaughter instruction. In Yeager, the Supreme Court reasoned:

[A] review of the facts of this case demonstrates that the voluntary manslaughter instruction would have been supported by the evidence presented. The testimony presented at trial reflected that defendant's shooting of Brooks was the culmination of a series of events during which Brooks physically assaulted defendant, took her car and used it to attempt to run her over, and repeatedly threatened to kill defendant and Borom, the neighbor who assisted her. Defendant testified that she feared for her life. At the . . . hearing [regarding ineffective assistance of counsel], when asked about the moments leading up to the shooting, she explained, "I just remembered bein' scared. I don't remember details, like, walkin' towards him, or anything like that. And when I seen the video, I didn't even see myself, or remember shootin' as many times as they say I did." Borom also testified that defendant was hysterical and crying when she returned to his vehicle after the shooting. A jury could reasonably conclude that the combination of physical and verbal threats from Brooks throughout this unbroken chain of events stoked defendant's passions so that she acted out of heightened emotion rather than reason in shooting Brooks. [Yeager,

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