People v. Dyas

227 N.E.3d 780

2023 IL App (3d) 220112

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Robert D. DYAS, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal No. 3-22-0112

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Filed September 5, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit, Bureau County, Illinois, Circuit No. 17-CF-61, Honorable James A. Andreoni, Judge, Presiding.

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Stephen L. Gentry, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Thomas Briddick, State’s Attorney, of Princeton (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Stephanie L. Raymond, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Robert D. Dyas, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the trial court denied him his right to counsel for postplea proceedings. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider and, while that motion remained pending, filed a notice of appeal. He then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as premature, which this court granted, and the case was remanded. Upon remand, the trial court appointed counsel, and defendant filed an amended motion to reconsider denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea, which was denied. Defendant appealed. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged with unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 900 grams of methamphetamine, a Class X felony punishable by 15 to 60 years’ imprisonment at 75% (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1), (a)(2)(F) (West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(v) (West 2016)). He was originally represented by Bureau County Assistant Public Defender Michael Henneberry. At one point, defendant told the court he was unhappy with Henneberry and asked to represent himself. The court admonished defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). The court explained to defendant the disadvantages of representing himself and the benefits of having counsel. Defendant persisted in seeking to represent himself, and Henneberry was then appointed as standby counsel. At the following court date, defendant again complained that Henneberry was not assisting him. The court explained to defendant that he had chosen to represent himself and only have Henneberry as standby counsel.

¶ 4 Ultimately, defendant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment to be served at 75%. Henneberry represented defendant for the plea. Defendant stated that he would only agree to the plea if the court would marry him and his codefendant. The court admonished defendant and found the plea knowingly and voluntarily made. Judgment was entered on November 29, 2017.

¶ 5 On December 14, 2017, defendant sent a letter to the court stating he was "exercising [his] right to an appeal." In the letter, defendant contended that he was appealing his decision to plead guilty, as it was made on "the very poor and inadequate counseling" of Henneberry. The court treated this letter as a motion to withdraw guilty plea. As defendant had made claims against his appointed counsel and all attorneys at the Bureau County Public Defender’s Office had conflicts, defendant was appointed the La Salle County Public Defender’s Office.

¶ 6 At a later court date, defendant was represented by La Salle County Assistant Public Defender Timothy Cappellini. Cappellini had previously stepped in for Henneberry when Henneberry had a medical procedure during defendant’s arraignment. After a lengthy colloquy between the court and defendant, the court stated, "Well, Mr. Cappellini is discharged and the La Salle County PD is discharged in the cage and you can represent yourself, [defendant], because it’s pretty clear to me that that’s what you really want."

¶ 7 Defendant filed motions for change of venue and substitution of judge, which were denied. On May 7, 2018, defendant asked for counsel to be appointed, and the court again appointed the La Salle County Public Defender’s Office. Cappellini indicated that he would be handling the case.

¶ 8 On July 17, 2018, Cappellini stated that defendant refused to cooperate with him. Defendant said that Cappellini had a conflict of interest because he showed no interest in defendant’s cash. The court stated that that was not a "conflict of interest." Defendant said that he was in the law library every day and was not interested in hearing what anyone said other than what he read in the library. The court said, "Well, it’s one thing to read a law book and it’s another thing to go to law school for three years and maybe practice criminal law for about 30 years as defense counsel. There’s—that’s one thing. It’s another thing to just read some law books." The court again stated that, if defendant did not want Cappellini to represent him, then he could represent himself. The court asked defendant what he wanted to do, and defendant said, "I don’t want him." The court discharged the public defender’s office and told defendant he could represent himself or hire his own attorney. Defendant agreed.

¶ 9 The court then asked the State when it wanted to conduct the hearing on defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, After a brief colloquy, defendant agreed to conduct the hearing on August 29, 2018. The court also reminded defendant, "you’re free to hire your own attorney at any time."

¶ 10 At the next court date, the court acknowledged defendant’s confusion as to why he could not yet file a postconviction petition and stated, "[w]hlch is why you should be represented by counsel."

¶ 11 A hearing was held on defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea on October 18, 2018. Defendant appeared pro se. Defendant called and questioned Henneberry about the plea negotiations. After the hearing, the court denied the motion, Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, which was ultimately denied.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

[1, 2] ¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court denied him his right to counsel for his postplea proceedings and (2) the trial court erred by falling to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).¹

[3–8] ¶ 14 A defendant is entitled to the representation of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22, 234 Ill.Dec. 437, 703 N.E.2d 49 (1998). But a defendant may relinquish his right to counsel in three ways: (1) waiver, which is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; (2) forfeiture, which is the failure to make a timely assertion of that right; and (3) waiver by conduct, which combines elements of waiver and forfeiture. People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶¶ 36-38, 429 Ill.Dec. 1, 123 N.E.3d 1060. To be effective, waiver of the constitutional right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 39, 418 Ill.Dec. 866, 91 N.E.3d 826. Further, where applicable, the court must comply with Rule 401(a) before it can accept waiver of counsel. Id. ¶ 41. Rule 401(a) provides,

"The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:

(1) the nature of the charge;

(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and

(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court." Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).

Strict compliance is not always required, however; substantial compliance is sufficient if the record shows (1) the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily and (2) the admonishment given did not prejudice the defendant’s rights. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 41, 418 Ill.Dec. 866, 91 N.E.3d 826; see also People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 241, 220 Ill.Dec. 406, 673 N.E.2d 318 (1996) ("The purpose of Rule 401(a) is to ensure that a waiver of counsel is knowingly and intelligently made."). Importantly, "Rule 401(a) admonishments must be provided at the time the court learns that a defendant chooses to waive counsel, so that the defendant can consider the ramifications of such a decision." (Emphasis added.) People v. Jiles, 364 Ill. App. 3d 320, 329, 301 Ill.Dec. 79, 845 N.E.2d 944 (2006) (citing People v. Stoops, 313 Ill. App. 3d 269, 275, 245 Ill.Dec. 884, 728 N.E.2d 1241 (2000)).

¶ 15 Initially, we consider whether Rule 401(a) even applies in the present context, i.e., after the entry of a sentence. The Fourth District has held "[t]he plain language and logic of Rule 401(a) does not require admonishing a defendant who has been convicted and sentenced of the nature of the charge for which he was just convicted and the sentence he just received." People v. Young, 341 Ill. App. 3d 379, 387, 275 Ill.Dec. 237, 792 N.E.2d 468 (2003). In determining that Rule 401(a) was inapplicable to the postsentencing context, the Young majority concluded it would be "useless" to inform a defendant wishing to withdraw a guilty plea, postsentencing, of the nature of the charge and possible sentencing options, stating,

"The language of Rule 401(a) manifests only the intent to deal with defendants who are considering a waiver of counsel at the initial-appointment stage of the proceedings. The plain language of Rule 401(a) says that the admonishments are to be given to a defendant ‘accused’ of an offense ‘punishable’ by imprisonment. [Citation.] In this case, Young had already been convicted of the offense and sentenced, while being represented by counsel. Young already knew everything a Rule 401(a) admonishment would have told him." (Emphases

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