People v. Faranso

240 Cal.App.4th 456

192 Cal.Rptr.3d 737

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.George Joe FARANSO, Defendant and Respondent.

E061840

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed September 11, 2015

Paul E. Zellerbach and Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorneys, and Natalie M. Pitre, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

RAMIREZ, P.J.

The People appeal from an order granting defendant, George Faranso, a certificate of rehabilitation respecting a sex crime committed in the State of Michigan for which defendant had been convicted under Michigan law, placed on probation, and ordered to register as a sex offender. On appeal, the People argue that the Superior Court of the State of California (a) lacked jurisdiction to issue a certificate of rehabilitation pertaining to a conviction from another state; (b) acted in excess of its authority by striking the words “and pardon” from the certificate of rehabilitation and pardon in recognition of the fact it could not issue a pardon; and (c) erred in granting the certificate of rehabilitation where defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief. We reverse.

Background

On June 1, 1995, defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty in the State of Michigan of two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, in violation of the Michigan Penal Code, section 750.520c(1)(b)(ii). Defendant was placed on probation on condition that he serve one year in county jail, and register as a sex offender. Defendant was discharged from probation on January 27, 1998.

In 2001, defendant relocated in California where he has resided continuously since then. On June 6, 2014, defendant filed a Petition for Certificate of Rehabilitation and Pardon pursuant to sections 4852.01 and 4852.06.¹ The People filed a report pursuant to section 4852.12, recommending denial of the petition.

On July 10, 2014, the trial court found defendant was rehabilitated. The court recognized it could not grant the petition to pardon defendant because the conviction was from a different state, so it denied the petition to pardon and granted the certificate of rehabilitation. The People appealed.

Discussion

On appeal, the People argue that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to order a certificate of rehabilitation respecting a Michigan conviction because only Michigan holds the authority to pardon persons convicted of crimes within its jurisdiction, and because defendant was statutorily ineligible for a certificate under California law due to the nature of his crimes which require registration as a sex offender. We agree.

a. Standard of Review

The grant or denial of a certificate of rehabilitation is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Schoop (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 457, 476, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ; see also, People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) However, the construction of a statute is purely a question of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal. (People v. Zeigler (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 638, 650, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 786.) The question whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a certificate of rehabilitation is also a question of law subject to independent review on appeal. (See Zuniga v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Comm. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 863.)

b. Statutory Construction of Section 4852.01

The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927.) The first step is to examine the statutory language and give it a plain and commonsense meaning. (People v. Verduzco (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 200.) We do not examine the language in isolation, but consider it in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine the purpose of the statute and harmonize various parts of the enactment. (Id. at p. 1414, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 200.) If the language is clear, we follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. (Ibid. citing Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563.)

If the plain language of the statute does not resolve the inquiry, we may turn to maxims of construction, or consider other aids, including the statute's legislative history and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, as well as the public policy underlying the law. (Absher v. AutoZone (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 332, 340, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 817.) The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. (People v. Mohammed (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 920, 928, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 372.)

Section 4852.01 subdivision (a) permits any person convicted of a felony who has been released from a state prison or other state penal institution or agency in California, who has not been reincarcerated since his or her release and who presents satisfactory evidence of a three-year residence in this state immediately prior to the filing of the petition, to file a petition for rehabilitation and pardon. This section makes it appear that the relief was intended for persons who serve prison terms in California, pursuant to a California conviction.

Subdivision (c) of section 4582.01, provides that any person convicted of a felony or any person who is convicted of a misdemeanor violation of any sex offense specified in section 290, the accusatory pleading of which has been dismissed pursuant to section 1203.4, may file a petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon if the petitioner has not been incarcerated in any prison, jail, detention facility, or other penal institution since the dismissal of the accusatory pleading, is not on probation for the commission of any other felony, and presents satisfactory evidence of five years residence in this state prior to filing the petition. This subdivision does not indicate an intent to grant relief to persons convicted in other states who relocate in California, and does not refer to convictions under any other state's laws, only to sex offenses described in section 290.

Section 4852.01, subdivisions (d) and (e) make this chapter inapplicable to persons serving mandatory life parole, persons committed under death sentences, persons convicted of a violation of subdivision (c) of section 286, section 288, subdivision (c) of section 288a, section 288.5, or subdivision (j) of section 289, although the Governor has the right to grant a pardon.

A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon is a recommendation to the Governor to pardon a convicted felon and restore the civil and political rights of citizenship that had been removed or limited by the felony conviction. (§ 4852.13; People v. Parker (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 888.) The certificate is available to felons who have completed their sentences and an extended period of rehabilitation, and who have resided in California for a period of not less than five years immediately preceding the filing of the petition. (§§ 4852.01, subd. (c), 4852.03, 4852.06; People v. Parker, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 888.) A person convicted of an offense specified in section 290 may not file a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation unless the conviction has been dismissed under section 1203.4. (§ 4852.01, subd. (c); People v. Parker, supra, at p. 1303, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 888.)

For certain civil disabilities, including mandatory lifetime registration as a sex offender, relief may be available based upon receipt of a certificate of rehabilitation, even where no pardon has been obtained. ( People v. Schoop, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 457, 467, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 200, citing People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 877 & fn. 17, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 24 P.3d 1174.) However, persons convicted of certain sex crimes against children are ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation. (§ 4852.01, subd. (d); People v. Ansell, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 877–878, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 24 P.3d 1174.) Among the offenses which will render a defendant ineligible for relief are violations of section 286, subdivision (c); section 288; section 288a, subdivision (c); section 288.5, or section 289 subdivision (j), although the Governor has the right to pardon such individuals. (§ 4852.01, subd. (d).)

(i) Lack of Jurisdiction

The People argue that a superior court of the State of California lacks the authority to issue a certificate of rehabilitation to a person convicted of a crime in a sister state, a question not addressed in any previously published decision. We agree.

“Penal laws ... are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the State, and which, by the English and American constitutions, the executive of the State has the power to pardon.” (Huntington v. Attrill (1892) 146 U.S. 657, 667, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123.) “ ‘Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 669, 13 S.Ct. 224.) “Crimes and offenses against the laws of any State can only be defined, prosecuted and pardoned by the sovereign authority of that State....” (Ibid. ; see also, Robertson v. Watson (2010) 560 U.S. 272, 276, 130 S.Ct. 2184, 176 L.Ed.2d 1024.)

The courts of one sovereignty will not enforce the penal laws of another. (Robertson v. Baldwin (1897) 165 U.S. 275, 278, 17 S.Ct. 326, 41 L.Ed. 715 [arrest and prosecution of seamen in California for abandoning their ship in the State of Oregon in violation of federal law, was unauthorized].) Therefore, a defendant cannot be arrested and prosecuted in California...