People v. Fukama-Kabika

234 N.E.3d 50

2023 IL 128824

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Jean FUKAMA-KABIKA, Appellant.

(Docket No. 128824)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed November 30, 2023

Rehearing denied January 22, 2024

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County, the Hon. Thomas J. Difanis, Judge, presiding.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Kathryn L. Oberer, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The question presented in this appeal is whether the trial court retains jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. May 17, 2019) to correct an omission in its written sentencing order to include a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) that the court had previously informed the defendant of and that "is included in the sentence as a matter of law." Round v. Lamb, 2017 IL 122271, ¶ 16, 418 Ill.Dec. 274, 90 N.E.3d 432. For the following reasons, we hold that Rule 472 authorizes the trial court to make such a correction. We therefore affirm the appellate court’s judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In May 2015, the State charged defendant Jean Fukama-Kabika with one count of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2014)), one count of criminal sexual abuse (id. § 114.50(a)), and one count of unlawful restraint (id. § 10-3(a)). Defendant later was charged with a second count of criminal sexual assault. Id. § 11-1.20.

¶ 4 On the first day of trial, outside the prospective jurors’ presence, the Champaign County circuit court advised defendant of the potential penalties if the jury were to find him guilty. The court noted that, in count I, defendant was charged with criminal sexual assault, a Class 1 felony. The court explained that defendant would face a "penitentiary sentence of not less than four nor more than fifteen years," as well as "a period of mandatory supervised release of three years up to natural life." The court noted that count II, criminal sexual abuse, was a Class 4 felony. If he was found guilty on that count, defendant would face a sentence of one to three years in prison and a one -year period of MSR.

¶ 5 On count III, unlawful restraint, the trial court explained that the offense was a Class 4 felony. If he was found guilty on that count, defendant would face one to three years in prison and an MSR period of one year. And on count IV, the second charge of criminal sexual assault, the court reiterated that the offense was a Class 1 felony and that defendant would face "four to fifteen years in prison" and "mandatory supervised release of three years to natural life." The court also explained that, if defendant was found guilty of both counts of criminal sexual assault, "any sentences would run consecutive, one to the other." Defense counsel confirmed that the trial court had accurately informed defendant of the potential penalties.

¶ 6 After the jury was selected and the parties presented opening arguments, the victim, arresting officers, and other witnesses testified for the State. Defendant and two witnesses testified for the defense. The State then recalled the victim as a rebuttal witness. After the parties presented closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury on the applicable law. On May 19, 2017, the jury found defendant guilty of all charges.

¶ 7 At the sentencing hearing on October 27, 2017, on count I, criminal sexual assault, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison. That sentence was "consecutive to a seven-year sentence" for count IV, the second charge of criminal sexual assault. On count II, criminal sexual abuse, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence that would run concurrently with the sentences in counts I and IV. And on count III, unlawful restraint, the court sentenced defendant to a term of one year in prison that ran consecutively to counts I and IV. The trial court did not mention the MSR terms during the sentencing hearing. That same day, a written sentencing order was entered. In relevant part, the order stated that defendant was sentenced to an MSR term of "3 years" on counts I and IV and an MSR period of "1 year" on counts II and III.

¶ 8 In November 2017, defendant filed a notice of appeal. On direct appeal, defendant claimed that (1) the trial court erred when providing its instructions to the jurors under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), (2) the trial court violated his constitutional right to a public trial when it excused one of defendant’s "supporters" who was caught shaking hands with a juror as they exited the courtroom during jury selection, (3) the trial court erred when it permitted the victim to be recalled in rebuttal, and (4) defendant was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant and improperly vouched for the victim’s credibility during his closing argument.

¶ 9 Meanwhile, on February 25, 2019, a record office supervisor at the Danville Correctional Center addressed a letter to the trial court. In relevant part, the supervisor noted that defendant’s sentencing order indicated that his MSR period on counts I and IV was three years. Referencing section 5-8-1(d)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2014)) and People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 30, 356 Ill.Dec. 759, 962 N.E.2d 444, the supervisor observed that the sentence should have included an MSR term of three years to life. She asked the trial court to send her "the amended order, issued nunc pro tunc to the original sentencing date."

¶ 10 The record office supervisor evidently mailed the letter to the prosecutor who tried the case, instead of mailing it to the trial court. On March 1, 2019, the prosecutor forwarded the letter to the trial court, noting, in part, that the court had the authority to amend the written sentencing order under Rule 472. The prosecutor also offered to "file a formal motion" upon the court’s request. That same day, apparently without providing notice to the parties, the trial court issued an amended order confirming that defendant’s MSR term on counts I and IV was "3 years to natural life," The order noted that it was "effective nunc pro tunc as of October 27, 2017."

¶ 11 In July 2020, while his direct appeal was still pending, defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief. In his postconviction petition, defendant contended that (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims set forth in the postconviction petition; (2) the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion to suppress statements that he made to the police when he had not been provided Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)); (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s improper presentation of rebuttal evidence; (4) he was denied a fair trial "where the State was permitted to introduce unfounded and prejudic[ial] evidence via other witnesses that was hearsay"; (5) he was deprived of an impartial jury due to improper Zehr admonishments (People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984)); (6) he was denied a fair trial based on the State’s comments that shifted the burden of proof; (7) he was denied a fair trial by the State’s delayed disclosure of a witness; and (8) he was denied a fair trial based on the cumulative effects of trial counsel’s errors.

¶ 12 On July 29, 2020, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition at the first stage as frivolous and patently without merit. In early August 2020, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition. The appellate court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant that same day. Separately, on August 11, 2020, the appellate court resolved defendant’s direct appeal by affirming the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 13 In June 2022, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition. 2022 IL App (4th) 200371-U, ¶ 36, 2022 WL 2305759. In relevant part, defendant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to correct the written sentencing order to reflect the term of MSR required by law. Id. ¶ 9. The appellate court found that the trial court was powerless to impose a term of MSR other than that provided by statute, namely, three years to natural life. The appellate court determined that the trial court’s misstatement of the MSR term on the written sentencing order was a clerical error. Id. ¶ 34. And it observed that Rule 472 permits the circuit court to retain jurisdiction to correct clerical errors " ‘resulting in a discrepancy between the record and the actual judgment of the court.’ " Id. (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(a)(4) (eff. May 17, 2019)). Because defendant’s sentence for criminal sexual assault included an MSR period of three years to life and the written sentencing order simply read three years, the appellate court ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a corrected sentencing order. Id.

¶ 14 This court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

[1–5] ¶ 16 At issue is whether, pursuant to Rule 472, the trial court retained jurisdiction to correct an omission in the written sentencing order that created a discrepancy between the statutorily required MSR term and the written sentencing order. "Interpretation of the Illinois Supreme Court rules is governed by the same...