People v. Garcia

550 P.3d 637

2024 CO 41M

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

v.Donald L. GARCIA, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 22SC633

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 10, 2024

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing July 1, 2024

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 19CA1629

Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Megan A Ring, Public Defender, Jeffrey A Wermer, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, and JUSTICE SAMOUR joined.

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 After a jury convicted him of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, Donald L. Garcia argued for the first time on appeal that the judge who presided over his case was statutorily disqualified because, when she was the managing defender for the Alamosa Public Defender’s Office, she had covered for his lawyer in a brief pretrial proceeding. Garcia asserted that this amounted to structural error requiring automatic reversal. A split division of the court of appeals agreed and reversed Garcia’s conviction. We granted certiorari to consider whether a defendant who is aware of potential grounds to disqualify a judge, but fails to object, waives or forfeits their claim that the judge was disqualified under Colorado’s judicial disqualification statute, section 16-6-201, C.R.S. (2023). We conclude that a defendant who fails to object under these circumstances waives their objection.

¶2 Applying that rule to the specific facts of this case, we then determine that Garcia waived his claim by failing to object or move for the judge’s disqualification. Thus, the division majority erred in concluding that Garcia’s conviction must be automatically reversed for structural error. And because the record in this case establishes that Garcia waived his claim under section 16-6-201, we need not decide whether it is structural error for a statutorily disqualified judge to preside over a case under the circumstances presented here.

¶3 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand the case back to the division to consider Garcia’s arguments that section 13-1-122,C.R.S. (2023), deprived the judge of judicial authority and that her service violated his due process right to an impartial judge.

I. Facts and Procedural History.

¶4 In April 2017, Garcia stole his employer’s truck and drove it off a county road and into a ditch, where the truck broke down. Garcia caused extensive damage to the truck.

¶5 The prosecution charged him in Saguache County District Court with one count of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft. Kate Mattern, with the Alamosa Regional Office of the State Public Defender’s Office, was appointed to represent Garcia. Over the next several months, Mattern filed substantive motions and appeared on Garcia’s behalf at several hearings in Saguache County District Court. On April 17, 2018, Amanda Hopkins, then the Managing Public Defender in the Alamosa Public Defender’s Office, covered for Mattern, appearing briefly on Garcia’s behalf at a pretrial readiness conference one month before his trial was scheduled to take place. But Garcia failed to appear at the hearing, so the trial court vacated the trial date and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Hopkins uttered a total of thirty-nine words during the hearing.

¶6 Approximately three months later, on July 10, 2018, Hopkins was appointed to the Twelfth Judicial District Court bench.

¶7 Garcia appeared on bond on July 17, 2018. Mattern then appeared for him during his next regularly scheduled court appearance on August 21, 2018, though Garcia again failed to appear. The court gave Mattern the opportunity to contact Garcia and have him appear two days later in Rio Grande County Court. The court scheduled Garcia’s next appearance for September 18, 2018, but noted that it would issue a bench warrant for Garcia’s arrest if he failed to appear in court in Rio Grande. That turned out to be unnecessary as Garcia appeared as ordered in Rio Grande County Court.

¶8 When Garcia next appeared in Saguache County District Court on September 18, he was represented by John Hoag, another attorney with the Alamosa Public Defender’s Office. And this time, presiding over his case was now-Judge Amanda Hopkins.

¶9 Leading up to his trial, Garcia appeared with Hoag before Judge Hopkins eight times. Both Mattern and Hoag represented Garcia during his two-day trial in May 2019. Garcia’s counsel never voiced an objection to Judge Hopkins presiding over Garcia’s case during any of the eight pretrial appearances, or at any point during the trial or the sentencing hearing.

¶10 A jury convicted Garcia of one count of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, and Judge Hopkins subsequently sentenced him to probation.

¶11 Garcia then appealed, and argued for the first time that he was entitled to automatic reversal of his conviction because Judge Hopkins was statutorily disqualified from presiding over his case under section 16-6-201. The People responded that Garcia waived his claim by failing to object or move for Judge Hopkins’s disqualification. Alternatively, the People asserted that Garcia’s claim should be reviewed for plain error because no evidence in the record demonstrated that Judge Hopkins was actually biased against him.

¶12 In a split, published decision, a division of the court of appeals reversed Garcia’s conviction, holding as a matter of first impression that it is structural error for a statutorily disqualified judge to preside over a case. People v. Garcia, 2022 COA 83, ¶ 6, 519 P.3d 1064, 1067. The division majority first determined that Judge Hopkins was required to recuse herself under section 16-6-201(1)(c), which provides that "[a] judge of a court of record shall be disqualified to hear or try a case if … [sh]e has been of counsel in the case." Id. at ¶ 5, 519 P.3d at 1067 (alteration in original) (quoting § 16-6-201(1)(c)). In so concluding, the majority relied on this court’s opinion in People v. Julien, 47 P.3d 1194 (Colo. 2002), see Garcia, ¶ 5, 519 P.3d at 1067, where we explained that "a judge must disqualify … herself sua sponte … if facts exist tying the judge to personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, some supervisory role over the attorneys who are prosecuting the case, or some role in the investigation and prosecution of the case during the judge’s former employment." Julien, 47 P.3d at 1198. In the majority’s view, Judge Hopkins’s appearance for Mattern on Garcia’s behalf at the April 17 hearing—brief as it was—meant that she had played some role in his defense and had "been of counsel" in the case, and she therefore erred by not disqualifying herself.¹ Garcia, ¶ 5, 519 P.3d at 1067 (quoting § 16-6-201(1)(c)).

¶13 Next, drawing on this court’s opinion in People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, 454 P.3d 1044, the majority determined that Judge Hopkins’s failure to disqualify herself constituted structural error requiring reversal. Garcia, ¶¶ 7–9, 519 P.3d at 1067. In Abu-Nantambu-El, we held that it is structural error for a juror who is statutorily disqualified pursuant to section 16-10-103(1), C.R.S. (2023), to nonetheless serve on a jury because such jurors "are conclusively presumed by law to be biased."¶ 32, 454 P.3d at 1051. Extending Abu-Nantambu-El’s reasoning to the judicial disqualification context, the majority explained that section 16-6-201 similarly "conclusively presumes that a judge who previously served in the case as counsel is biased." Garcia, ¶ 8, 519 P.3d at 1067. Perceiving "no logical distinction … between a statutorily disqualified juror and a statutorily disqualified judge," id., the majority concluded that structural error occurred because Garcia stood trial "before a biased judge." Id. at ¶ 9, 519 P.3d at 1067 (quoting Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 10, 288 P.3d 116, 119).

¶14 The majority rejected the People’s argument that Garcia waived his judicial disqualification claim. Noting that waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege," id. at ¶ 11, 519 P.3d at 1067 (quoting People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39, 416 P.3d 893, 902), the majority found that nothing in the record made Judge Hopkins’s prior involvement in the case "obvious to Garcia or his attorneys." Id. And the majority dismissed the People’s concern that a rule requiring automatic reversal would lead to unfair gamesmanship, reasoning that "[t]he prosecutor had the same opportunity to raise the issue as did Garcia." Id. at ¶ 12, 519 P.3d at 1068. Consequently, the majority reversed Garcia’s conviction. Id. at ¶ 13, 519 P.3d at 1068.

¶15 Judge Dailey dissented in relevant part and concluded that Garcia’s failure to raise his judicial disqualification claim constituted a waiver. Id. at ¶ 23, 519 P.3d at 1069 (Dailey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In reaching this conclusion, he first assumed, without deciding, that it is structural error for a statutorily disqualified judge to preside over a trial. Id. at ¶ 24, 519 P.3d at 1069–70. But, he explained, "even fundamental rights can be waived, regardless of whether the deprivation thereof would otherwise constitute structural error." Id. at ¶ 25, 519 P.3d at 1070 (quoting Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48, ¶ 8, 386 P.3d 440, 443). And "[u]nless the basis for disqualification is actual bias," he continued, "failure to timely request a substitution of judge waives any claim that the judge should have recused herself." Id. at ¶ 26, 519 P.3d at 1070 (citing People v. Dobler, 2015 COA 25, ¶ 7, 369 P.3d 686, 688). He emphasized, as well, that while the statutory scheme "deems Judge Hopkins to be impliedly biased," it does not declare that she is actually biased. Id. at ¶ 27, 519 P.3d at...