People v. Garrett

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOYCE MIGNON GARRETT, Defendant and Appellant.

C080236

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

January 11, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 14F07681)

After the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant Joyce Mignon Garrett pleaded no contest to misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). Under the terms of the plea agreement, defendant was given three years' probation and was ordered to serve 120 days in jail.

Defendant contends that the court erred in denying her motion to suppress. She also asks us to independently review the sealed record of the hearing on her Pitchess¹ motion to confirm that no discoverable evidence existed concerning the searching deputy's propensity for dishonesty, acts of moral turpitude, excessive force or false reporting. We conclude the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, and, having reviewed the sealed transcript of the Pitchess hearing, we conclude that no additional information was discoverable under Pitchess and its progeny. We therefore affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A May 2015 information charged defendant with felony possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) She pleaded not guilty, and moved to suppress the evidence against her. The following facts were developed at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence:

In November 2014, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department received a citizen complaint from someone living on Fenwick Way in Sacramento that Black males and Black females were engaging in hand-to hand-drug sales with passing cars near the intersection of Fenwick Way and Longdale Drive. The complainant believed the individuals were from a nearby house with a "box trailer" on the property.

After receiving the complaint, Deputy Jeffrey Massagli personally surveyed the area and identified a house located on Fenwick Way with a large box trailer that matched the description in the complaint. The house was about eight or nine houses down from the intersection of Fenwick Way and Longdale Drive.

Massagli conducted a records check of the area in the department's Known Persons File database. That database includes information regarding whether a person ison probation as well as his or her address, but does not include copies of actual probation documents. From the database, Massagli learned that an African American woman on probation, defendant, lived at the home on Fenwick Way with the box trailer. According to the information he discovered, defendant was on formal searchable probation out of Placer County until October 2016.²

Given defendant's probationary status and the citizen complaint of drug sales coming from that location, Massagli and other deputies went to the Fenwick Way house on November 10, 2014, at approximately 1:40 p.m. to conduct a probation search. After knocking on the front door, a male voice asked, "who is it?" Massagli stated they were the sheriff's department and that they were there to conduct a probation search. He then heard a lot of "shoveling" or "activity" inside the house, including feet moving around and doors closing, before a man finally opened the front door.

Inside, officers found a Caucasian man, four African American men, and two African American women. Defendant was not among those individuals. The officers detained the individuals while they conducted a protective sweep of the house. During the sweep, deputies discovered that the master bedroom door was locked. The deputies asked the detained occupants if anyone had a key to the door, and none of them responded. Massagli also asked whether the bedroom belonged to any of them, and they all responded that it did not.

Massagli's partner kicked the door open and found defendant lying on the bed fully clothed. Massagli searched defendant and found a clear plastic baggie containingmethamphetamine in her pants pocket. In a portion of the house defendant identified as her office, deputies located three boxes of the same kind of clear plastic baggies and two digital scales. A laptop computer with defendant's name as the screensaver and a cellular phone that received an e-mail addressed to defendant were also found while the officers were searching. Other mail with defendant's name was also located at the address.

During cross-examination, Massagli acknowledged that he did not contact the probation department prior to initiating the search. He did not know the facts of the particular charge underlying defendant's grant of probation, or whether probation had conducted any prior visits to defendant's residence. He did not check who was on the lease for the house and he did not know what kind of car, if any, defendant drove. Nor had he seen defendant at the property the day of the search.

After considering the parties' moving papers and hearing the arguments of counsel, the court denied the motion to suppress. The court found that defendant was on searchable probation out of Placer County, and that the probation condition, as evidenced by court exhibit 1 admitted during the hearing, required her to "submit [her] person, vehicle or residence to search or seizure anytime without the benefit of a warrant as directed by any peace officer." The court also found that Massagli knew of defendant's search terms before conducting the search. It found that the probation department said defendant lived at the Fenwick Way house, that defendant was associated with the house, and that "[i]t wouldn't take a lot of sleuthing to think it might be the probationer who [was] behind that locked door."

Following the denial of her motion to suppress, defendant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The court placed her on three years' probation and ordered her to serve 120 days in jail. Defendant timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion. She challenges the search of her residence on multiple grounds, including that officers did not have reason to believe she lived at the residence and was present at the time they conducted the probation search, that insufficient evidence supported the trial court's findings, that the search was excessive in scope because insufficient evidence showed officers were aware of defendant's probation search terms, that the search did not qualify as a valid protective sweep, and that the officers did not reasonably believe the locked bedroom in which defendant was found was under her control. Given these alleged shortcomings, she argues that all fruits of the entry and search should have been suppressed. We are not persuaded.

"As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable." (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 (Woods).) In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress, we review the record in the light most favorable to the order since " 'all factual conflicts must be resolved in the manner most favorable to the [superior] court's disposition on the [suppression] motion.' " (Ibid.) "But while we defer to the superior court's express and implied factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, we exercise our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search on the facts so found." (Id. at pp. 673-674.)

1. The Probation Search of Defendant's Residence was Proper

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath oraffirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) "A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within one of the 'specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' " (Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 674.)

One well settled exception to " 'the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.' " (Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 674.) In California, probationers may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid prison. (Ibid.; People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 608 ["[a] probationer . . . consents to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term"].)

"Warrantless searches are justified in the probation context because they aid in deterring further offenses by the probationer and in monitoring compliance with the terms of probation." (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 (Robles).) A probation search is "limited in scope to the terms articulated in the search clause [citation] and to those areas of the residence over which the probationer is believed to exercise complete or joint authority." (Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 681.)

" '[W]here probation officers or law enforcement officials are justified in conducting a warrantless search of a probationer's residence, they may search a residence reasonably believed to be the probationer's.' " (People v. Downey (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th...