People v. Gayle

221 A.D.3d 1061

199 N.Y.S.3d 720

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Jamilia GAYLE, Appellant.

112749

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: October 17, 2023

Decided and Entered: November 2, 2023

Steven A. Feldman, Manhasset, for appellant.

Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Lynch, Reynolds Fitzgerald, Fisher and Powers, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Powers, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kathleen B. Hogan, J.), rendered June 23, 2020 in Schenectady County, convicting defendant upon her plea of guilty of the crime of assault in the second degree.

Defendant, who is not a United States citizen, was charged in a four-count indictment with assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and two counts of tampering with physical evidence as a result of her stabbing her paramour in a home where children were present. In satisfaction of the indictment, and with no commitment as to sentencing, defendant pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of assault in the second degree and waived her right to appeal. Supreme Court thereafter sentenced defendant to seven years in prison, followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.

We affirm. Initially, we find no merit to defendant's challenge to the validity of her waiver of appeal. Contrary to defendant's contentions, the plea minutes reflect that, prior to pleading guilty, Supreme Court informed her that an appeal waiver was a condition of the plea agreement and advised her of the separate and distinct nature and scope of the waiver, which defendant indicated she understood. Defendant further executed a written waiver of appeal and confirmed that she had discussed the waiver with counsel. Accordingly, we find that the appeal waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see People v. Foote, 210 A.D.3d 1311, 1312, 178 N.Y.S.3d 634 [3d Dept. 2022] ; People v. Griffin, 177 A.D.3d 1039, 1040, 109 N.Y.S.3d 923 [3d Dept. 2019], lv. denied 34 N.Y.3d 1078, 116 N.Y.S.3d 146, 139 N.E.3d 804 [2019] ). In view of defendant's valid appeal waiver, her challenge to the severity of her sentence is precluded (see People v. Parker, 196 A.D.3d 970, 971, 150 N.Y.S.3d 331 [3d Dept. 2021] ; People v. Mirel, 194 A.D.3d 1198, 1199, 146 N.Y.S.3d 703 [3d Dept. 2021] ).

Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of her plea – premised upon her assertion that she was not properly informed of the potential immigration implications of pleading guilty and was not timely apprised of her Boykin rights – survives her valid appeal waiver, but is unpreserved for our review in the absence of an appropriate postallocution motion (see People v. Crampton, 201 A.D.3d 1020, 1022, 159 N.Y.S.3d 263 [3d Dept. 2022], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1160, 160 N.Y.S.3d 690, 181 N.E.3d 1118 [2022] ; People v. Nichols, 194 A.D.3d 1114, 1115, 146 N.Y.S.3d 699 [3d Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 973, 150 N.Y.S.3d 700, 172 N.E.3d 812 [2021] ). Defendant's contention that her challenge is not subject to the preservation rule insofar as it is premised upon an alleged Boykin violation is without merit, as "[t]he Court of Appeals has made clear ‘that the preservation requirement still applies to Boykin claims. Thus, a challenge to the validity of a plea, whether based on the court's failure to mention the Boykin rights or some other alleged defect in the allocution, must be preserved depending on the facts of each case’ "( People v. Small, 166 A.D.3d 1237, 1238, 86 N.Y.S.3d 677 [3d Dept. 2018] [ellipsis and brackets omitted], quoting People v. Conceicao, 26 N.Y.3d 375, 382, 23 N.Y.S.3d 124, 44 N.E.3d 199 [2015] ). Upon our review of the record, we find that the exception to the preservation rule does not apply (see People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168, 182–183, 980 N.Y.S.2d 280, 3 N.E.3d 617 [2013], cert denied 574 U.S. 840, 135 S.Ct. 90, 190 L.Ed.2d 75 [2014] ; People v. Podeswa, 205 A.D.3d 1139, 1140, 167 N.Y.S.3d 640 [3d Dept. 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1135, 172 N.Y.S.3d 857, 193 N.E.3d 522 [2022] ). In this regard, the record reflects that Supreme Court expressly informed defendant of her Boykin rights prior to her pleading guilty (see People v. Conceicao, 26 N.Y.3d at 382, 23 N.Y.S.3d 124, 44 N.E.3d 199 ; compare People v. Tyrell, 22 N.Y.3d 359, 365–366, 981 N.Y.S.2d 336, 4 N.E.3d 346 [2013] ). The court likewise alerted defendant that pleading guilty could result in certain immigration consequences and confirmed with her that, through her trial counsel, she had consulted with an immigration attorney prior to pleading guilty and that she "understood all the potential impacts of [her] plea upon [her] immigration status" (see People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d at 182–183, 980 N.Y.S.2d 280, 3 N.E.3d 617 ; People v. Manzanales, 170 A.D.3d 752, 753, 93 N.Y.S.3d 587 [2d Dept. 2019] ; People v. Balbuena, 123 A.D.3d 1384, 1385, 999 N.Y.S.2d 600 [3d Dept. 2014] ). In view of the foregoing, and as defendant did not request time to seek additional legal guidance, we also find no merit to defendant's related claim that she was deprived of her Sixth Amendment right by not consulting further with counsel as to the immigration consequences of pleading guilty (see generally People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d at 190, 980 N.Y.S.2d 280, 3 N.E.3d 617 ; People v. Baez–Arias, 203 A.D.3d 1409, 1409–1410, 164 N.Y.S.3d 722 [3d Dept. 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1132, 172 N.Y.S.3d 865, 193 N.E.3d 530 [2022] ; People v. Lawrence, 148 A.D.3d 1472, 1473, 52 N.Y.S.3d 505 [3d Dept. 2017] ).

Finally, we reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in failing to conduct an Outley hearing ( People v. Outley, 80 N.Y.2d 702, 713, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356 [1993] ) prior to sentencing. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, Supreme Court noted certain of defendant's statements in the presentence investigation report suggesting that she had attacked the victim in self-defense. The court then confirmed with defendant, as it had done during the plea proceeding, that she was still waiving any potential defenses and desired to proceed with sentencing. Nothing in the record indicates that the court believed that defendant's statements constituted a violation of any condition of her plea and, as there was no sentencing commitment, no enhanced sentence was imposed (see People v. Kiefer, 195 A.D.3d 1315, 1316–1317, 149 N.Y.S.3d 701 [3d Dept. 20...