People v. Gonzalez-Quezada

546 P.3d 142

2023 COA 124M

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Jaime GONZALEZ-QUEZADA, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 21CA1229

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. III.

Announced December 28, 2023

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing February 15, 2024

Weld County District Court No. 19CR2595, Honorable Vincente G. Vigil, Judge

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jessica A. Pitts, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ

¶ 1 Defendant, Jamie Quezada,¹ appeals his second degree murder conviction. We affirm. In doing so, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reject the statutory heat of passion sentence mitigator. We also conclude that the trial court did not violate Quezada’s right of confrontation or his ability to effectively test the veracity of an eyewitness to the shooting. Finally, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, we conclude that the trial court did not deny Quezada his right to a public trial by excluding a disruptive observer from remotely viewing the trial.

I. Procedural History and Background

¶ 2 The trial court admitted evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found the following facts. Jaime and Alejandra Nancy Quezada² were married for five years before the homicide. Prior to the marriage, Quezada had three children and Nancy had one child. They had problems throughout the marriage, and on or around October 6, 2019, Nancy moved out of the marital home and stayed with a friend while she considered how to move forward.

¶ 3 Nancy worked as a personal trainer at a local gym. On October 9, 2019, at 4:18 a.m., she and the victim, Gilberto Marron, made plans to meet at the gym. They were in an intimate relationship. At around 4:47 a.m., Nancy and Marron got in the back seat of her car, which was in the gym’s parking lot. Marron was on the passenger side, and Nancy was on the driver’s side. What occurred in the car’s back seat was disputed at trial. Nancy claimed that they went into the back seat so that he could give her a hug and then they started talking. She testified that she rested her head on Marron’s lap for about five minutes during their conversation. Quezada contended at trial that she appeared to be performing fellatio on Marron.

¶ 4 Unbeknownst to Nancy and Marron, Quezada was also in the parking lot. The area was well-lit, and it was possible to see into other vehicles even though it was early in the morning. Quezada claimed that he decided to go to the gym that morning to say "hi" to Nancy. When he saw her place her head in Marron’s lap, he retrieved his 9 mm pistol from the center console, drove up to the passenger side of Nancy’s car, got out of his truck, and fired at least one shot into the car through the back seat window. At some point, Nancy jumped from the back seat to the front of the car.

¶ 5 Marron got out of the ear and tried to flee, but Quezada fired about five more shots, one of which struck Marron in the head, resulting in a fatal injury. Marron was shot a total of six times and died in the parking lot. Shortly after shooting Marron, Quezada allegedly said. "[T]his is what happens when you mess with married women." He also spoke to Nancy, saying something along the lines of, "[T]his is what you wanted, right?"

¶ 6 Quezada drove away in his truck. Nancy then immediately called the police. During the call, Nancy referred to Marron as a "friend." Police did not discover the intimate nature of their relationship until later.

¶ 7 Quezada turned himself in to the police about five hours after the shooting. Before doing so, he confided to friends and family that he had "wasted" someone after seeing that person with his wife. He also spoke with a bondsman. The People charged Quezada with one count of first degree murder, relat- ing to Marron, and a count of reckless endangerment, relating to Nancy.

¶ 8 The jury trial, which took place in May 2021, was held under COVID-19 protocols. To limit the number of people who were physically present in the courtroom, the trial was also live streamed on Webex. The remote participants in the trial included the court-approved interpreters who provided interpretation for the benefit of Quezada’s and Marron’s family members. The court repeatedly reminded Webex observers to mute themselves during the trial. On the seventh day of the trial, the court disconnected a line participating via Webex because the observer at that phone number repeatedly failed to mute their microphone and the noise was disrupting the testimony.

¶ 9 The jury convicted Quezada of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. The court sentenced him to forty-eight years in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 10 Quezada contends that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to disprove the heat of passion mitigator. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

[1–5] ¶ 11 We review a sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo, evaluating "whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Donald, 2020 CO 24, ¶ 18, 461 P.3d 4 (quoting Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010)). Our analysis is guided by four well-established principles. First, we give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences that might fairly be drawn from the evidence. Id. at ¶ 19. Second, we defer to the jury’s resolution of the credibility of witnesses. Butler v. People, 2019 CO 87, ¶ 20, 450 P.3d 714. Third, we may not serve as a thirteenth juror by weighing various pieces of evidence or resolving conflicts in the evidence. Id. Fourth, a conviction cannot be based on guessing, speculation, conjecture, or a mere modicum of relevant evidence. Donald, ¶ 19.

[6, 7] ¶ 12 A person commits murder in the second degree if the person knowingly causes the death of another person. § 18-3-103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. Second degree murder may be mitigated from a class 2 felony to a class 3 felony if it is committed under the heat of passion. Heat of passion is defined as a serious and highly provoking act by the intended victim that affected the defendant sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person. § 18-3-103(3)(b). But if, between the provocation and the killing, there is an interval sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing is a class 2 felony. Id. Heat of passion provocation is a mitigating factor for attempted second degree murder. People v. Tardif, 2017 COA 136, ¶ 6, 433 P.3d 60. If there is sufficient evidence to support giving an instruction on heat of passion, the prosecution is required to disprove the mitigator beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

B. Application

[8] ¶ 13 To support his contention that the People failed to meet their burden on the sentence mitigator, Quezada points to evidence in the record from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that he was acting under a sudden heat of passion: (1) he was unaware of Nancy’s relationship with Marron until the events at issue; (2) he allegedly went to the gym to say hello to his wife; and (3) there were just a few seconds between when he saw Nancy lower her head into the victim’s lap and when he fired the first shot.

¶ 14 The trial court properly instructed the jury on the People’s "burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Quezada was not acting upon a sudden heat of passion." The court also properly instructed the jury on the definition of "heat of passion." Thus, the question is whether there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Quezada did not act under a sudden heat of passion when he murdered the victim. We conclude that there was.

¶ 15 The jury could have found against Quezada on the heat of passion mitigator based on the following facts: (1) Quezada was arguably lying in wait for Nancy and Marron to arrive; (2) Quezada knowingly placed himself in a situation where he could discover their relationship, thus undermining the suddenness component of the mitigator; (3) there was time for Quezada to reflect before he fired the fatal shot; (4) his statement to Marron about "messing" with married women may have indicated premeditation; and (5) his question to Nancy about whether this is what she wanted also may have led the jury to conclude that he was not acting under a heat of passion. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution disproved the heat of passion mitigator, and thus reject Quezada’s sufficiency challenge.

III. Fifth Amendment Invocation

¶ 16 Quezada also argues that the trial court erred by (1) allowing Nancy to testify even though she planned to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights as they related to sexual assault charges pending against her and (2) excluding extrinsic evidence that would have identified the victim of Nancy’s alleged sexual assault. We disagree.

A. Fifth Amendment

1. Additional Facts

¶ 17 During the investigation into the shooting, Nancy revealed that she had a sexual relationship with Quezada’s biological son, who was nineteen at the time of the disclosure. Further investigation revealed that the relationship started when Quezada’s son was a minor. In April 2021, the month before Quezada’s trial, Nancy was charged with one count of aggravated incest and two counts of sexual assault. The prosecutor in that case was also the prosecutor in Quezada’s case.

¶ 18 Quezada’s defense counsel filed a motion in...