People v. Goree

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAUL LAMOUNT GOREE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 357302

Court of Appeals of Michigan

September 22, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 18-009718-01-FH

Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Murray and Borrello, JJ.

Per Curiam.

The prosecution appeals as of right the order dismissing the charges against defendant of possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v); possession of the controlled substance Alprazolam, MCL 333.7403(2)(b); and possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d). The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. The prosecution also disputes the trial court's order requiring the return of civil forfeiture funds to defendant. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Dearborn Heights Police Department Officer Jacob Esposito executed a traffic stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger after observing the vehicle's license plate was unlit. According to Officer Esposito, the vehicle stopped within a reasonable amount of time, and there was no reason to suspect the vehicle's occupants possessed any illegal substances.

After verifying that the vehicle and the driver were properly licensed and insured, Officer Esposito returned to the vehicle. Before releasing the vehicle, however, Officer Esposito observed that the driver continued to appear "nervous" and "fidgety," so Officer Esposito asked the driver to step out of the vehicle. Officer Esposito then observed defendant make a "furtive gesture" to the floor of the vehicle, and Officer Esposito thought defendant, too, appeared "a little nervous." Defendant was also ordered from the vehicle. As defendant exited the vehicle, Officer Esposito smelled marijuana and noticed a small orange pill on the passenger seat where defendant was sitting. Officer Esposito searched the vehicle where illegal substances were discovered.

Defendant moved the trial court to dismiss, arguing Officer Esposito illegally prolonged the traffic stop and, therefore, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop should be suppressed. The trial court agreed, finding that the search and seizure were unreasonable. As a result of this ruling defendant moved to dismiss the charges, which the trial court granted. Defendant moved for the return of $554 seized along with the substances, which the trial court also granted. This appeal followed.

II. SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIDENCE

A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, an issue must be raised in the trial court to preserve it for appellate review. People v Heft, 299 Mich.App. 69, 78; 829 N.W.2d 266 (2012). The prosecution presents several arguments contesting the trial court's order suppressing the evidence-some of which are unpreserved for our review because they were not presented in the trial court. These unpreserved arguments include the prosecution's contention defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the subject vehicle, and that Officer Esposito's search was reasonable under the search incident to lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The prosecution's other arguments contesting the suppression of the evidence are preserved because some variation of these arguments was presented to the trial court.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress. People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich.App. 127, 137; 854 N.W.2d 114 (2014). With respect to the prosecution's preserved arguments, this Court reviews for clear error the trial court's factual findings as to a motion to suppress. People v Hrlic, 277 Mich.App. 260, 262-263; 744 N.W.2d 221 (2007). "Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made." People v Blevins, 314 Mich.App. 339, 348-349; 886 N.W.2d 456 (2016). The prosecution's unpreserved arguments are reviewed for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763; 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999).

"To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence." Id. at 763-764 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "To the extent that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo." People v Clark, 330 Mich.App. 392, 415; 948 N.W.2d 604 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.^[1] [US Const, Am IV (footnote added).]

"[T]he 'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'" People v Williams, 472 Mich. 308, 314; 696 N.W.2d 636 (2005), quoting Ohio v Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39; 117 S.Ct. 417; 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). "Reasonableness is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances. Because of endless variations in the facts and circumstances implicating the Fourth Amendment, reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not lend itself to resolution through the application of bright-line rules." Williams, 472 Mich. at 314 (quotation marks and citations omitted). "A warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States." People v Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 362; 224 N.W.2d 867 (1975).

Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is generally regarded as "fruit of the poisonous tree" and will be excluded in the case against the defendant. People v Mahdi, 317 Mich.App. 446, 470; 894 N.W.2d 732 (2016). "The exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine intended to compel compliance with the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." People v Maggit, 319 Mich.App. 675, 693-694; 903 N.W.2d 868 (2017). This is "a harsh remedy designed to sanction and deter police misconduct where it has resulted in a violation of constitutional rights and should be used only as a last resort." People v Corr, 287 Mich.App. 499, 508; 788 N.W.2d 860 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The exclusionary rule is designed to deter future Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement. People v Hill, 299 Mich.App. 402, 412; 829 N.W.2d 908 (2013), quoting Davis v United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-237; 131 S.Ct. 2419; 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011).

A traffic stop is considered a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. People v Simmons, 316 Mich.App. 322, 326; 894 N.W.2d 86 (2016) ("[S]topping a vehicle and detaining the occupants amounts to a seizure."); Brendlin v California, 551 U.S. 249, 256-257; 127 S.Ct. 2400; 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (A passenger was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable person in the passenger's position would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave.). An officer may stop a vehicle so long as the officer has probable cause to believe a violation of traffic laws has occurred. People v Davis, 250 Mich.App. 357, 363; 649 N.W.2d 94 (2002). After stopping the vehicle, the officer may detain the vehicle long enough to run a Law Enforcement Information Network ("LEIN") check, id. at 364-368, and to ask reasonable questions concerning the alleged traffic violation, with due concern for the safety of the encounter. Williams, 472 Mich. at 315. "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed." Rodriguez v United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354; 135 S.Ct. 1609; 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). However, "when a traffic stop reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified in extending the detention long enough to resolve the suspicion raised." Williams, 472 Mich. at 315.

The trial court ruled that Officer Esposito did not have probable cause to search the passenger side of the vehicle because the officer testified that defendant only made a "furtive gesture," and did not indicate anything else of concern. But Officer Esposito's testimony, which was unrefuted, was that the driver of the vehicle appeared nervous and fidgety during the entirety of the stop. Under Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 U.S. 106; 98 S.Ct. 130; 43 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) and its progeny, Officer Esposito did not violate the Fourth Amendment by ordering the driver and defendant out of the vehicle.

Mimms held that "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures." Id., 434 U.S. at 111 n 6. Mimms established a "bright line" rule. Maryland v Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 n 1; 117 S.Ct 882; 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). This bright-line rule was summarized by then-Judge Kavanaugh in ...