People v. Grayer

237 N.E.3d 442

2023 IL 128871

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Santana GRAYER, Appellant.

(Docket No. 128871)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed December 29, 2023.

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook Coun- ty, the Hon. Vincent M. Gaughan, Judge, presiding.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Cristina Law Merriman, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found defendant, Santana Grayer, guilty of attempted vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 18-3 (West 2020)). On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by arguing that, due to his state of voluntary intoxication, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the specific intent to commit the offense.

¶2 A divided appellate court panel affirmed. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, 461 Ill. Dec. 417, 203 N.E.3d 1019. The majority first found that evidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer relevant to the issue of intent given that the legislature amended section 6-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (now the Criminal Code of 2012) (Code) (Pub. Act 92-466, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002) (amending 720 ILCS 5/6-3)), removing voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, ¶ 39, 461 Ill.Dec. 417, 203 N.E.3d 1019. The majority went on to find that, even if voluntary intoxication remained relevant to specificintent offenses, the evidence failed to establish defendant’s state of intoxication was so extreme that he was unable to form the requisite intent. Id. ¶ 42. We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence but for different reasons than the appellate court.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 At a bench trial, the victim, Arnold Ong, testified that on September 6, 2020, he drove his white Honda CRV for the ridesharing service Lyft. At about 6 p.m. he received a notification through the Lyft app with a new ride for a woman named Phyllis. When Ong arrived at the pickup location, he noticed a group of people gathered. Ong spoke to Phyllis, who told Ong that she purchased the ride for defendant. Ong testified that defendant could walk but swayed side to side and that defendant sounded intoxicated when he spoke.

¶5 Defendant got into the back seat, and Ong started to drive following the GPS directions from the Lyft app to the drop-off location. Ong did not know if the drop-off location was defendant’s house; he just followed the directions on the Lyft app. During the drive, defendant told Ong that he was going the wrong way. Ong told defendant that they were going in the correct direction by following the Lyft app’s GPS directions. Defendant raised his voice and told Ong multiple times that he wanted to drive the vehicle himself. Ong refused, and defendant became angry and grabbed Ong’s shirt. Defendant also put his right hand on his own waist, which Ong described as "trying to grab something, and I thought it was a deadly weapon." While defendant held onto Ong, he told him, "I’m going to kill you" multiple times. Ong explained, "I was so scared at the time. And then I—that’s the time I realized my life was at stake. So as soon as I found a gas station, I tried to pull over and seek some help from people around me."

¶ 6 Ong pulled into a gas station, picked up the keys to his car and his cell phone, and exited the vehicle as fast as he could to avoid being harmed. Defendant also exited the vehicle and "chas[ed]" Ong around the car. Ong then went inside the gas station to call 911. Defendant stayed outside, next to Ong’s vehicle. Ong remained inside the gas station until police arrived, but at one point he stepped outside to check on his vehicle and saw defendant waving Ong’s house keys that he had left inside the car.

¶7 Ong spoke with police when they arrived. He did not remember if he told the officers at the gas station that he thought defendant may have a gun or knife. Ong also did not tell the 911 dispatcher that he believed defendant had a weapon. Ong did not recall telling anyone inside the gas station convenience store that he thought defendant had a weapon. However, when Ong later spoke with police again at the police station, he told an officer that he thought defendant had a weapon.

¶ 8 The State submitted surveillance video of the incident from the gas station’s security system into evidence. The video shows Ong driving the car into the gas station and parking it next to a gas pump. Ong exits the vehicle first. Defendant then exits the vehicle, and Ong moves toward the front of the vehicle. Ong turns around when defendant also starts walking toward the front of the vehicle. Ong opens the driver’s door and picks up his car keys and cell phone and closes the door again when defendant approaches. Ong then started walking toward the back of the vehicle with defendant following him. Ong circles the vehicle once again while defendant follows.

¶ 9 When defendant is standing near the front driver’s side, he opens the door and looks at Ong over the top of the vehicle. Defendant stays there while Ong goes inside the gas station convenience store. Defendant then walks around the vehicle and leans against the rear passenger side door. Later, Ong opens the door to the gas station store, but Ong goes back inside when defendant starts walking toward him. Later in the video, defendant is seen standing next to the open driver’s door holding Ong’s house keys. Defendant is seen shaking the keys toward the convenience store.

¶ 10 About 20 minutes after they arrived at the gas station, defendant enters the vehicle and sits in the driver’s seat. Defendant appears to be reaching toward the dashboard with the house keys in his hand, making a turning motion. Defendant repeats this motion several times. He then reclines the seat and lies back until police arrive.

¶ 11 The State rested. Defendant did not present any evidence on his own behalf.

¶ 12 In closing arguments, defense counsel argued, in relevant part, that the State failed to prove the element of specific intent. Although counsel argued that the evidence showed that defendant could not form the specific intent to hijack the vehicle, counsel’s reliance on defendant’s voluntary intoxication focused on her argument that the evidence showed that defendant merely wanted to go home and was upset by the fact that he believed Ong was not driving in the correct direction.

¶ 13 The State argued that "being drunk isn’t an excuse for criminal activity and that’s what happened here." According to the State, defendant articulated his intent to take the vehicle from Ong when he asked if he could drive and threatened to kill Ong when Ong refused. Additionally, defendant’s actions at the gas station supported a finding of intent given that defen- dant appeared to taunt Ong with the house keys he found inside the car along with the fact that the State believed the surveillance video showed defendant reach toward the vehicle’s ignition in an effort to start the vehicle.

¶14 After hearing the arguments, the court noted that there was "evidence of some intoxication" but that the other evidence showed that defendant was aware of his environment, knew different directions, and "knew that to his way of thinking" Ong was driving in the wrong direction. The court concluded that defendant was "not intoxicated as a legal defense." The court found Ong’s testimony credible that defendant grabbed the sleeve of Ong’s shirt and reached toward his own waistband with his other hand. The court also found that the surveillance video showed that defendant attempted to start the car using Ong’s house keys. The court found defendant guilty of attempted vehicular hijacking and sentenced defendant to five years’ imprisonment.

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the offense. 2022 IL App (1st) 210808, ¶ 34, 461 Ill.Dec. 417, 203 N.E.3d 1019.¹ Defendant claimed the evidence failed to establish that he possessed the requisite specific intent to commit vehicular hijacking or that he took a substantial step toward the commission of that offense. Id. ¶ 32.

¶ 16 On the issue of intent, defendant acknowledged that voluntary intoxication is not an affirmative defense in Illinois. However, defendant argued his voluntary intoxication remained relevant to specific-intent offenses, like attempt. Considering his intoxication, defendant argued that his actions and statements were not indicative of an attempt to steal Ong’s car. Instead, the circumstances showed that he pulled on Ong’s sleeve to get his attention and that the threats to kill Ong were mere drunken hyperbole.

¶ 17 A majority of a divided appellate court panel framed defendant’s argument as "essentially contend[ing] that [defendant] was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the specific intent necessary to commit the offense of attempted vehicular hijacking." Id. ¶ 38. The majority rejected the argument on the grounds that voluntary intoxication is no longer a defense, given that the legislature amended section 6-3, removing voluntary intoxication as a defense. Id. ¶¶ 38-41. Nevertheless, the majority went on to find that the evidence did not establish that defendant’s "intoxication was ‘so extreme’ as to suspend entirely his power of reasoning." Id. ¶ 42. Defendant appeals.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 In this court, defendant maintains that the evidence is insufficient to prove he had the specific intent to commit attempted vehicular hijacking beyond a reasonable doubt....