People v. Grays

162 A.D.3d 1224

79 N.Y.S.3d 711

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Jerry D. GRAYS, Appellant.

107761

108917

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: April 30, 2018

Decided and Entered: June 14, 2018

Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Keith Schockmel of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.

John M. Muehl, District Attorney, Cooperstown (Michael F. Getman of counsel), for respondent.

Before: McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Devine, Clark and Pritzker, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Clark, J.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Otsego County (Burns, J.), rendered July 17, 2015, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of conspiracy in the second degree and criminal solicitation in the second degree, and (2) by permission, from an order of said court, entered November 4, 2016, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without a hearing.

In October 2010, while serving a term of incarceration in the Otsego County jail, defendant indicated to a fellow inmate that he wanted to have his former girlfriend, the mother of his children, murdered and asked if the inmate knew of anyone he could hire for that purpose. The inmate reported defendant's request to his attorney, who, in turn, contacted the authorities. As part of the ensuing investigation into the legitimacy of defendant's request, an undercover police officer posed as a hit man for hire. Over the course of two separate phone calls and a meeting at the jail, defendant agreed to pay the purported assassin $100,000 to have his ex-girlfriend killed. In furtherance of the agreement, defendant provided the undercover officer with the address and physical description of his ex-girlfriend, as well as two separate maps of the floor plan of her home. Defendant was arrested shortly thereafter and charged by indictment with conspiracy in the second degree. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to 8? to 25 years in prison. However, on appeal, we reversed the judgment of conviction and dismissed the indictment as jurisdictionally defective, "without prejudice to the People to re-present any appropriate charges to another grand jury" ( People v. Grays, 121 A.D.3d 1178, 1179, 994 N.Y.S.2d 451 [2014] ).

The following month, a second grand jury charged defendant with conspiracy in the second degree and criminal solicitation in the second degree. Defendant was represented by counsel throughout pretrial proceedings; however, prior to trial, County Court granted defendant's request to proceed pro se. After a jury trial, defendant was once again convicted as charged. County Court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 8? to 25 years and imposed a lengthy order of protection against defendant in favor of the ex-girlfriend and their two children. County Court denied defendant's subsequent motion, made pursuant to CPL 440.10, for an order vacating the judgment of conviction, without a hearing. Defendant now appeals from the judgment of conviction and, by permission, from the order denying his postconviction motion.

Defendant initially contends that his motion to dismiss the indictment should have been granted because, without any curative instruction having been given by the People, he was required to testify before the grand jury in prison garb and restraints and while accompanied by an armed and uniformed correction officer. However, defendant failed to timely file this motion within five days of his arraignment, as required (see CPL 190.50[5][c] ), and, thus, County Court properly denied the motion (see People v. Littebrant, 55 A.D.3d 1151, 1153, 867 N.Y.S.2d 550 [2008], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 818, 881 N.Y.S.2d 26, 908 N.E.2d 934 [2009] ). Additionally, a review of the indictment belies defendant's assertion that count 1 of the indictment, charging him with conspiracy in the second degree, did not charge him with committing any overt acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy (see People v. Lakomec, 86 A.D.2d 77, 78–79, 449 N.Y.S.2d 71 [1982] ; compare People v. Pichardo, 160 A.D.3d 1044, 1048, 74 N.Y.S.3d 152 [2018] ).

Next, defendant asserts that County Court's searching inquiry was insufficient to ensure that his waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Where a defendant invokes his constitutional right to forgo the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se (see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 [1975] ; People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 15, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 324 N.E.2d 322 [1974] ), the trial court must determine whether the defendant is knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waiving the right to counsel (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255 [2011], cert. denied 565 U.S. 1261, 132 S.Ct. 1746, 182 L.Ed.2d 531 [2012] ; People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 103, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154 [2002] ). In ascertaining whether such a waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, the court must "test an accused's understanding of the waiver" and be "reasonably certain that [he or she] appreciates the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right to counsel" ( People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 516, 520, 683 N.Y.S.2d 164, 705 N.E.2d 1205 [1998] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Slaughter, 78 N.Y.2d 485, 491, 577 N.Y.S.2d 206, 583 N.E.2d 919 [1991] ; People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 438 N.E.2d 1133 [1982], cert. denied 459 U.S. 1178, 103 S.Ct. 830, 74 L.Ed.2d 1024 [1983] ). The court must also "delve[ ] into a defendant's age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, voluntary waiver" ( People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d at 520, 683 N.Y.S.2d 164, 705 N.E.2d 1205 ; see People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 583, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 [2004] ). While the required searching inquiry need not be conducted in any specific manner, it " ‘must accomplish the goals of adequately warning a defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and apprising a defendant of the singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication’ " ( People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d at 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154, quoting People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d at 520, 683 N.Y.S.2d 164, 705 N.E.2d 1205 ; see People v. Kaltenbach, 60 N.Y.2d 797, 799, 469 N.Y.S.2d 685, 457 N.E.2d 791 [1983] ).

Here, County Court went to great lengths to impress upon defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The court thoroughly tested defendant's knowledge and understanding of the law and criminal procedure and, in doing so, specifically pointed out to defendant several areas in which his knowledge and understanding were lacking, including with respect to the applicable standard of proof and the rules governing cross-examination and the admission of evidence. The court emphasized that although defendant demonstrated a "basic understanding" of the law, he would be at a distinct disadvantage because his understanding was not "complete." The court stated that self-representation was "fraught with peril" and repeatedly urged defendant to reconsider his request to proceed pro se. Further, in conducting its inquiry, County Court elicited from defendant appropriate and relevant pedigree information, which revealed that defendant was a high school graduate and had previous experience with the criminal justice system. Upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that County Court engaged in a sufficient searching inquiry so as to enable a finding that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel (see People v. Jackson, 160 A.D.3d 1125, 1126–1127, 74 N.Y.S.3d 661 [2018] ; People v. Sanders, 295 A.D.2d 639, 640, 743 N.Y.S.2d 618 [2002], lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 771, 752 N.Y.S.2d 12, 781 N.E.2d 924 [2002] ; compare People v. Myers, 160 A.D.3d 1029, 1032–1033, 74 N.Y.S.3d 394 [2018] ; People v. Guarnieri, 122 A.D.3d 1078, 1080–1081, 996 N.Y.S.2d 776 [2014] ). Moreover, contrary to his assertions, defendant was not entitled to hybrid representation (see People v. Silburn, 31 N.Y.3d 144, 151, 74 N.Y.S.3d 781, 98 N.E.3d 696 [2018] ; People v. Rodriguez, 95 N.Y.2d 497, 501, 719 N.Y.S.2d 208, 741 N.E.2d 882 [2000] ; People v. Mirenda, 57 N.Y.2d 261, 265–266, 455 N.Y.S.2d 752, 442 N.E.2d 49 [1982] ), and County Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting stand-by counsel's role to that of an "advisor" (see People v. Yu–Jen Chang, 92 A.D.3d 1132, 1133, 939 N.Y.S.2d 596 [2012] ; People v. Hilts, 46 A.D.3d 947, 949, 846 N.Y.S.2d 750 [2007], affd 13 N.Y.3d 895, 895 N.Y.S.2d 286, 922 N.E.2d 872 [2009] ).

Nor do we find merit in defendant's argument that County Court should have charged the jury with respect to the defense of renunciation. A defendant facing charges for criminal solicitation and/or conspiracy is entitled to the affirmative defense of renunciation only where, "under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his [or her] criminal purpose, the defendant prevented the commission of such crime" ( Penal Law § 40.10[4] ). Here, assessed in the light most favorable to defendant (see People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1, 12, 586 N.Y.S.2d 545, 598 N.E.2d 693 [1992] ; People v. Butts, 72 N.Y.2d 746, 750, 536 N.Y.S.2d 730, 533 N.E.2d 660 [1988] ), there is no reasonable view of the evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant took any affirmative steps that "would have prevented the crime in the event that [the undercover police officer] had intended to carry out the [solicited murder]" ( People v. Sisselman, 147 A.D.2d 261, 264, 542 N.Y.S.2d 801 [1989], lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 819, 546 N.Y.S.2d 577, 545 N.E.2d 891 [1989] ). Accordingly, County Court properly rejected defendant's request for a renunciation charge.

Defendant also argues that he was deprived of a...