People v. Griffin

240 N.E.3d 479

2024 IL 128587

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Shamar GRIFFIN, Appellee.

(Docket No. 128587)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed March 21, 2024.

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Michael B. McHale, Judge, presiding.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Erin M. O’Connell, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Rachel M. Kindstrand, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Pursuant to a fully negotiated guilty plea agreement, petitioner, Shamar Griffin, pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Cook County to one count of first degree murder in exchange for a 35-year sentence and the dismissal of additional charges. Years later, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)), alleging he was actually innocent and that his attorney failed to investigate his case before steering him to the plea agreement. The circuit court denied the motion for leave to file after finding that petitioner’s guilty plea precluded his actual innocence claim. On appeal the appellate court reversed, finding, under this court’s decision in People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, 450 Ill.Dec. 618, 182 N.E.3d 64, petitioner was permitted to file a petition alleging actual innocence despite his guilty plea. 2022 IL App (1st) 191101-B, ¶ 46, 462 Ill.Dec. 680, 207 N.E.3d 983. The appellate court further determined that under this court’s decision in People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, 450 Ill.Dec. 37, 181 N.E.3d 37, petitioner made a colorable claim of actual innocence and the circuit court should have granted his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. 2022 IL App (1st) 191101-B, ¶ 66, 462 Ill.Dec. 680, 207 N.E.3d 983. The appellate court remanded petitioner’s entire petition without review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. ¶ 68. At the request of the State, we granted leave to appeal.

¶ 2 The issues raised in this appeal are whether (1) the standard applied to an actual-innocence claim at the leave-to-file stage differs based on whether the petitioner was convicted following a trial or he pleaded guilty and (2) each claim in a successive petition must meet the applicable standard to proceed to second-stage postconviction proceedings. We hold that, in determining whether to grant leave to file a successive postconviction petition based on an actual innocence claim, the same standard applies to all petitioners. We further hold that each claim in a successive postconviction petition must meet the applicable standard in order to advance to second-stage postconviction proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In 2010, petitioner was indicted on 24 counts of first degree murder for the shooting death of Milissa ¹ Williams. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010). Petitioner was also indicted on four counts of attempted murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm in the shooting of Otis Houston.

¶ 5 A. Guilty Plea Proceedings

¶ 6 In June 2011, defense counsel informed the circuit court that the parties had an agreement where petitioner would plead guilty to one count of first degree murder in exchange for a 35-year sentence and the dismissal of the additional charges. The court admonished petitioner regarding the consequences of a guilty plea. The court also asked petitioner if he had been threatened or promised anything to induce his guilty plea, and he answered "No, Sir."

¶ 7 The State presented the factual basis for the plea agreement, stating that if the case went to trial, the evidence would show that petitioner shot Williams twice with a handgun and then chased Houston down and shot him four times. Houston would testify that he saw petitioner engage in these acts, identified petitioner in a lineup as the shooter, and would identify petitioner at trial.

¶ 8 The State proffered the grand jury testimony of Lavertice Harmon, who would testify he was on North LeClaire Avenue in Chicago with Leroy Battle, Terrence Washington, Kevin Barnes, and others around 3 a.m. on the date of the shooting. Harmon observed a dark-colored, four-door vehicle with its headlights off drive south on LeClaire Avenue from Le Moyne Street. When the car pulled up to Harmon, he recognized the driver as petitioner, whom he had known for 10 years. Petitioner called Harmon over to the car, and Harmon saw a chrome-colored handgun with a black handle in petitioner’s lap, wrapped in a bandana. Harmon would testify that petitioner stated he was "fixin’ to merk that b***," referring to Milissa Williams, because she had stabbed petitioner in the past. Harmon knew "merk" meant to kill. Harmon asked petitioner to wait so he could warn his friends to get off the street to avoid getting hurt. Petitioner agreed and told Harmon he would drive around the block.

¶ 9 After petitioner left, Harmon went to Williams and Houston and told them to leave the area. Williams was initially reluctant to leave, but she agreed to leave and started to walk toward a park with Harmon and Houston. As they were walking, Harmon spotted the car petitioner was driving and then saw him get out. Petitioner and Williams had a brief conversation that Harmon could not hear; then petitioner took out his gun and shot Williams once. Houston fled, and petitioner chased him and fired multiple shots at him. Harmon reported that petitioner went back to Williams and fired an additional shot at her; she fell to the ground. Petitioner then ran back to the car and drove away.

¶ 10 The State also presented grand jury testimony from Leroy Battle and Kevin Barnes. Both witnesses knew petitioner and would identify him as the shooter. The State next presented the grand jury testimony of Carlton Winters, to whom petitioner admitted he was the shooter. Finally, the State proffered the report from the medical examiner, which indicated Williams died from multiple gunshot wounds. Defense counsel stipulated to the State’s proposed evidence. Petitioner’s statement to the police—in which he admitted he shot Williams—was not included in the State’s factual basis for the plea.

¶ 11 The circuit court accepted petitioner’s plea and sentenced him to 35 years in prison pursuant to the plea agreement. The court admonished petitioner that, if he wished to appeal, he needed to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea within 30 days. Petitioner failed to file a motion to withdraw his plea within 30 days, but he did file a notice of appeal. The court rejected the notice of appeal as untimely and noted that petitioner could seek leave to file a late notice of appeal from the appellate court. Petitioner sought leave to file a late notice of appeal, which was granted.

¶ 12 On appeal, the appellate court granted an agreed motion for summary remand and directed the clerk of the circuit court to modify certain monetary assessments imposed against petitioner. People v. Griffin, No. 1-11-3210 (2012) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).

¶ 13 B. Initial Postconviction Petition

¶ 14 In September 2017, while his direct appeal was pending, petitioner filed an initial postconviction petition raising a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. Petitioner alleged his confession should have been suppressed because the police officers who arrested him did so based on an investigative alert. He also alleged mistreatment while in police custody where for 30 hours he "was threatened and forced to confess." Petitioner alleged his claim was newly discovered because he did not previously know he was not arrested based on an arrest warrant. Finally, petitioner claimed his attorney was ineffective because he failed to investigate petitioner’s illegal arrest and determine it was not pursuant to an arrest warrant.

¶ 15 The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. On appeal, appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). The court granted the motion, as "there [were] no issues of arguable merit to be pursued on appeal." People v. Griffin, No. 1-18-0490 (2020) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).

¶ 16 C. Motion for Leave to File a Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 17 In February 2019, petitioner sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Petitioner alleged he had cause for not bringing the claims in the successive petition earlier because he was unaware that Perrier Myles and Lavonte Moore had information regarding his case until all three men were incarcerated at the same facility. Petitioner further alleged he did not know that Detectives John Folino and Tim McDermott had multiple lawsuits against them until he filed a Freedom of Information Act request. See 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2016). Petitioner argued he was prejudiced because the claims in his successive petition "so infected [the] judgement [sic] of [his] conviction that [his] conviction or sentence violated due process under actual innocence."

¶ 18 Petitioner raised two claims in his successive petition. First, he alleged plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Jerrell Butler as an alternate suspect. Petitioner claimed he informed counsel that, while he was in jail pending trial, he heard "around the jail" that Butler was the person who killed Williams. Cou...