People v. Guyton

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CANDACE RENEE GUYTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 354221

Court of Appeals of Michigan

September 2, 2021

UNPUBLISHED

Kent Circuit Court LC No. 19-001492-FC

Before: Tukel, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Gadola, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement charging armed robbery, MCL 750.529. In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the prosecutor dropped a separate case against her and a third habitual offender sentencing enhancement. Defendant sought to withdraw her guilty plea after sentencing because she qualified only as a second habitual offender, not a third habitual offender, and, therefore, she contends that she did not actually understand the full context of her plea agreement. The trial court denied defendant's motion concluding that defendant's guilty plea was knowing understanding, and voluntary despite the mistake regarding her habitual offender status. We agree.

Defendant also contends that she is entitled to resentencing because she was sentenced based on inaccurate information. She alternatively argues that her presentence investigation report (PSIR) should be amended. As discussed in greater detail later, we conclude that defendant waived her argument that she was sentenced based on inaccurate information, but we remand for the ministerial task of amending her PSIR.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS

Defendant participated in the armed robbery of a restaurant with her accomplice, Kenneth Agnew. According to an employee of the restaurant who was on duty at the time, Agnew and defendant entered the restaurant near closing time. Defendant had a plastic bag and Agnew directed the employee to the cash register and displayed what appeared to be a gun. The employee resisted Agnew's instructions and called out to her coworkers; defendant and Agnew fled. Grand Rapids Police Detective Amanda Johnson recovered Agnew's phone from the scene of another restaurant robbery close in time, and Agnew implicated defendant. Defendant disclosed her involvement in the robbery to another officer and in jail phone calls with Agnew.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the decision of a trial court regarding a motion to withdraw a plea. People v Brinkey, 327 Mich.App. 94, 97; 932 N.W.2d 232 (2019). This Court also reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for resentencing for an abuse of discretion. People v Puckett, 178 Mich.App. 224, 227; 443 N.W.2d 470 (1989).^[1] The same standard applies to a trial court's response to a claim of inaccuracy in a PSIR. People v Lucey, 287 Mich.App. 267, 275; 787 N.W.2d 133 (2010). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." People v Mahone, 294 Mich.App. 208, 212; 816 N.W.2d 436 (2011). "A trial court also necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." People v Al-Shara, 311 Mich.App. 560, 566; 876 N.W.2d 826 (2015).

III. PLEA WITHDRAWAL

"While there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once the trial court has accepted it, a defendant may move to have his or her plea set aside on the basis of an error in the plea proceedings." Brinkey, 327 Mich.App. at 97 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[A] motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing is governed by MCR 6.310(C)." People v Blanton, 317 Mich.App. 107, 118; 894 N.W.2d 613 (2016). In relevant part, MCR 6.310(C)(3) states:

If the trial court determines that there was an error in the plea proceeding that would entitle the defendant to have the plea set aside, the court must give the advice or make the inquiries necessary to rectify the error and then give the defendant the opportunity to elect to allow the plea and sentence to stand or to withdraw the plea. If the defendant elects to allow the plea and sentence to stand, the additional advice given and inquiries made become part of the plea proceeding for the purposes of further proceedings, including appeals.^[2]

"In other words, under MCR 6.310(C), a defendant seeking to withdraw his or her plea after sentencing must demonstrate a defect in the plea-taking process." Brinkey, 327 Mich.App. at 97 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Guilty pleas are governed by MCR 6.302, but strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential. Id. Rather, "[o]ur Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, and whether a particular departure from the requirements of MCR 6.302 justifies or requires reversal depends on the nature of the noncompliance." Id. "Automatic invalidation of a plea due to a violation of MCR 6.302 is only required if the defendant establishes that the waiver was neither understandingly nor voluntarily made, not merely 'that the trial court failed to strictly comply with MCR 6.402(B).'" Id. (citation omitted).^[3]

To ensure that a guilty plea is accurate, the trial court must establish a factual basis for the plea. In order for a plea to be voluntary and understanding, the defendant must be fully aware of the direct consequences of the plea. The penalty to be imposed is the most obvious direct consequence of a conviction. Therefore, MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires the trial court to advise a defendant, prior to the defendant's entering a plea, of the maximum possible sentence for the offense and any mandatory minimum sentence required by law." [People v Pointer-Bey, 321 Mich.App. 609, 616; 909 N.W.2d 523 (2017) (quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis omitted).]

"[B]ecause the understanding, voluntary, and accurate components of MCR 6.302(A) are premised on the requirements of constitutional due process, a trial court may, in certain circumstances, be required to inform a defendant about facts not explicitly required by MCR 6.302." Blanton, 317 Mich.App. at 119 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). "Furthermore, when a defendant is not fully informed about the penalties to be imposed, there is a clear defect in the plea proceedings because the defendant is unable to make an understanding plea under MCR 6.302(B). Finally, a plea that is not voluntary and understanding violates the state and federal Due Process Clauses." Brinkey, 327 Mich.App. at 99 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).^[4]

Defendant argues that her plea was not understanding and voluntary because the prosecutor misinformed her that, by pleading guilty, defendant would not be prosecuted as a third habitual offender. The prosecutor, however, was mistaken because defendant had only one prior felony conviction and, therefore, she could have been prosecuted as only a second habitual offender. See MCL 769.10. Defendant's minimum sentence guidelines range without enhancement was 51 to 85 months, the upper value of which increased to 106 months as a second habitual offender, and to 127 months as a third habitual offender. MCL 777.21; MCL 777.62.

In a plea agreement, the defendant is "persuaded to surrender his valuable right to trial with its accompanying rights and procedural safeguards in exchange for concessions aimed at sentence reduction and certainty." People v Killebrew, 416 Mich. 189, 200; 330 N.W.2d 834 (1982). Thus, the defendant "is bargaining for the length of his incarceration" and will "know in advance what will happen to him when he leaves the courtroom." Id. A plea may not be understanding and voluntary when a defendant is misinformed of the benefits of the plea, such as when the prosecution promises to dismiss a charge for which a legal bar precludes conviction. People v Graves, 207 Mich.App. 217, 219-220; 523 N.W.2d 876 (1994) (bargaining for dismissal of second count of armed robbery when as a matter of law defendant could only be convicted of a single count). This includes when a court gives the defendant an exaggerated belief in the benefits of the plea. People v Lawson, 75 Mich.App. 726, 730; 255 N.W.2d 748 (1977), citing Hammond v United States, 528 F.2d 15, 19 (CA 4, 1975) (promising the defendant that the prosecution would not seek consecutive sentences even though the trial court could not have imposed consecutive sentences).

Whether a plea is voluntary depends on the defendant's knowledge "of the actual value of the bargain" offered by the prosecutor. People v Williams, 153 Mich.App. 346, 350; 395 N.W.2d 316 (1986). In this case, defendant understood that she was agreeing to the dismissal of one case against her, as well as a guidelines minimum sentence of up to 85 months, rather than up to the 127 months she was erroneously led to believe was a possible sentence as a third habitual offender, when the maximum permissible sentence would have been up to 106 months as a second habitual offender. Thus, the misinformation led defendant to believe that her bargain included insulating her minimum sentence from potentially 42 additional months, when the benefit she actually received was insulation from potentially just 21 additional months.

Consequently defendant did not receive the actual benefit of the bargain she thought she had struck. Defendant did, however, still retain significant benefits as a result of the plea bargain. Indeed, a second case against defendant was dropped and she was not sentenced as a habitual offender even though she qualified as a second habitual offender. The bargain was for a guidelines-range sentence regardless of the degree of enhancement defendant thus avoided. Even though defendant could not have been sentenced as a third offender, she was still properly informed of her potential statutory minimum and maximum sentences. As such, even though there were errors in the plea taking process, the trial court and prosecutor substantially complied with MCR 6.302. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its...