People v. Hampton

41 Cal.App.5th 840

254 Cal.Rptr.3d 575

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Gary Grant HAMPTON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

C081038, C081243

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed November 1, 2019

Elizabeth Campbell and Michael Allen, Hayward, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Catherine Chatman, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, Jesse Witt and Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HULL, J.

This opinion addresses a trial court’s authority to vacate dismissal of a criminal action as part of a plea bargain. Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties made at its suggestion, the trial court vacated its earlier dismissal of an information against defendant Gary Grant Hampton, Jr., in order to approve a plea agreement in this and other pending actions. The court placed defendant on probation, but later, it found he had violated probation and it sentenced him to prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its earlier dismissal and thus could not accept his plea, place him on probation, or sentence him to prison for violating probation.

We reverse. No California authority vests a trial court with jurisdiction to vacate the dismissal of a criminal case upon the stipulation of the parties seeking to adopt a plea agreement. Under California jurisdiction law, a court loses subject matter jurisdiction upon dismissing a criminal case in its entirety, and these rules prevent a court from later vacating such a dismissal, even when the vacation was sought by stipulation of the parties.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

The People by information, charged defendant with battery, criminal threats, assault, spousal battery, false imprisonment, car theft, obstructing use of a cell phone to summon assistance, and five felony priors. Later, the People amended the information to allege defendant had been convicted of a serious felony for purposes of the Three Strikes law. Also, in two separate actions, the People claimed that defendant’s crimes violated his probation.

The People later moved to dismiss the main case and file new charges, and to proceed to trial on the probation violations the following day. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the main case. The court itself gave no reason for the dismissal. The minute order notes the case was dismissed in the interest of justice. Upon dismissing the action, the court ordered defendant to be discharged from custody for purposes of the main case only.

The following day, during the afternoon of trial on the probation violations, the court announced that counsel had met with it in chambers and advised it of a possible resolution in the probation cases. The resolution involved "reactivating" the main case. After reconfirming with counsel, the court stated: "To the extent that I dismissed this matter ... I am setting aside that dismissal and that file will become operative for all purposes and do counsel agree to that?" After counsel agreed, the court ruled, "The dismissal of that case is vacated."

Immediately after vacating the dismissal, the court stated that the prosecutor "has filed a Second Amended Information which absent any objection I am going to have the clerk file." Defense counsel had no objection. She also waived formal arraignment and advisement of rights. The second amended information, filed with the same case number as the previously dismissed main case, omitted the serious felony strike allegation which the first amended information contained. The court entered not-guilty pleas on behalf of defendant to all the charges in the second amended information and denials of the priors.

The court next considered the plea bargain, which addressed all the pending cases. Defendant pleaded no contest to spousal abuse and car theft, and the prosecution dismissed all other charges, including the two violation of probation actions. Defendant was to receive credit for time served. The court released him on his own recognizance and continued the matter for sentencing.

Approximately six months later, defendant moved to withdraw his plea and dismiss the main case. He contended the court did not have jurisdiction to enter his plea because it had no power at the time to reinstate a dismissed count. He claimed that once the court dismissed the main case, it had no jurisdiction, even by stipulation, or inherent authority to vacate the dismissal and allow the information to be amended.

In opposition, the prosecutor submitted a declaration describing what happened when the court vacated the dismissal of the main action. After he, defense counsel, and the court met in chambers over an issue in the violation of probation trial, he, defense counsel, and defendant negotiated a settlement in the courtroom. The prosecutor offered formal probation plus time served on two felonies, one of which qualified as a strike. Defendant rejected that offer because he could not risk a second strike.

The prosecutor then offered probation on two non-strike felonies with credit for time served. This offer required defendant to enter pleas on the charges that were dismissed the previous day. Defendant was amenable. The prosecutor and defense counsel discussed in defendant’s presence the need to refile the dismissed case. The court interjected that rather than the People refile the dismissed case, the court could vacate the dismissal by stipulation. The prosecutor, defense counsel, and defendant agreed on this course.

Continuing his argument against defendant’s motions to withdraw his plea and dismiss the case, the prosecutor agreed it would have been "far cleaner" for the People to have refiled the case under a new case number, which they had the right to do. But at the court’s suggestion to vacate the dismissal as the more expedient method, the parties agreed to do so by stipulation. The prosecutor argued that defendant had waived any irregularity.

The trial court denied defendant’s motions to withdraw the plea and dismiss the case. It did not explain its reasoning. At sentencing, the court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years plus time served.

Less than four months later, the trial court determined defendant had violated his probation. It sentenced him to two years’ incarceration for the car theft and a concurrent two years on the spousal battery. The court credited him with 588 days. The court later issued a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

Defendant raises the same arguments here that he raised before the trial court. He contends in appeal No. C080138 that the judgment against him and his sentence are void because the court had no subject matter jurisdiction when it vacated the dismissal of the main case and accepted his plea. The court lost jurisdiction when it dismissed the main case and thus had no authority to vacate the dismissal. He claims the court could regain jurisdiction only by the prosecutor either obtaining a grand jury indictment or filing a new complaint. ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 14 ; Pen. Code, § 738 [undesignated statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated].)

Alternatively, he argues in appeal No. C081243 that the People brought their petition to revoke probation in bad faith, and the court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and sentenced him to prison.

The People disagree with defendant. They contend in appeal No. C080138 that the trial court had jurisdiction to vacate the dismissal because either the first amended information was revived by stipulation of the parties upon the vacation, or the second amended information was deemed to be the constructive filing of a new complaint, and defendant in entering his plea waived his right to a preliminary hearing. The People cite no authority to support either of these arguments.

The People further argue that if the court did not have jurisdiction, the vacation of the dismissal was a procedural irregularity, and defendant waived all irregularities and admitted all matters essential to the conviction when he entered his plea. They also claim defendant is trifling with the court. He stipulated to vacating the dismissal to facilitate his plea bargain and he received the bargain’s benefit. The People argue he should be estopped from challenging the court’s actions.

In appeal No. C081243, the People claim they did not allege a violation of probation in bad faith, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation.

IC080138

Neither the parties nor we have found a reported California opinion discussing whether the People and the defendant in a criminal action may stipulate to vacate a dismissal to implement a plea bargain.

In general, a dismissal of an entire criminal action is a final order that leaves a court without jurisdiction to reinstate the case. ( Conservatorship of Christopher B. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 809, 816-817, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 69.) Once the court has dismissed the action, it loses jurisdiction to correct judicial error. ( Id . at p. 817, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 69.) "Where no actual fraud has been perpetrated upon the court, a criminal court has no authority to vacate a dismissal entered deliberately but upon an erroneous factual basis." ( Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 285, 287, 171 Cal.Rptr. 387.)

Generally, once the court has lost subject-matter jurisdiction, the parties cannot vest jurisdiction in the court by stipulation. "The parties to a judicial proceeding cannot, either jointly or severally, effectively stipulate or concede that the court either has or lacks jurisdiction to act in the particular matter." ( Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 344, fn. 2, 128 Cal.Rptr. 223, 546 P.2d 727.)...