People v. Harrison

212 A.D.3d 651

180 N.Y.S.3d 624

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Christopher Storm HARRISON, appellant.

2019–11001

Ind. No. 2384/17

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—December 1, 2022

January 11, 2023

Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Genevieve M. Cahill of counsel), for appellant.

Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Lauren Tan, Marion Tang, and Glenn Green of counsel), for respondent.

COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Timothy P. Mazzei, J.), rendered July 22, 2019, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree for stabbing his mother multiple times, thereby causing her death. In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of murder in the second degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, he failed to meet his burden of proving the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence (see Penal Law §§ 25.00[2] ; 40.15; People v. Kiarie, 198 A.D.3d 814, 155 N.Y.S.3d 212 ; People v. Trojan, 73 A.D.3d 818, 819, 900 N.Y.S.2d 405 ).

Moreover, the County Court properly denied defense counsel's request to charge the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury. An extreme emotional disturbance defense charge is appropriate if the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that, at the time of the homicide, the defendant "was affected by an extreme emotional disturbance, and that [the] disturbance was supported by a reasonable explanation or excuse rooted in the situation as he perceived it" ( People v. McKenzie, 19 N.Y.3d 463, 466, 951 N.Y.S.2d 691, 976 N.E.2d 217 ; see People v. Roche, 98 N.Y.2d 70, 75–76, 745 N.Y.S.2d 775, 772 N.E.2d 1133 ; People v. Harris, 95 N.Y.2d 316, 319, 717 N.Y.S.2d 82, 740 N.E.2d 227 ). Here, there was no reasonable view of the evidence supporting the conclusion that, at the time of the homicide, the defendant was affected by an extreme emotional disturbance. The defendant's statements and actions immediately prior to and following the crime established that his act of repeatedly stabbing his mother was premeditated, deliberate, and calculated, and is entirely inconsistent and incompatible with his self-serving assertions that he "lost control" (see People v. Bailey, 142 A.D.3d 1096, 1097–1098, 37 N.Y.S.3d 592 ).

The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contentions that the County Court should have sought clarification from the jury regarding two notes the jury sent during deliberations, and that the court's responses to the notes were not meaningful (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 534, 542, 36 N.Y.S.3d 68, 55 N.E.3d 1041 ). In any event, these contentions are without merit. The record demonstrates that the court's responses were meaningful under the circumstances (see People v. Woodley, 201 A.D.3d 749, 750, 162 N.Y.S.3d 69 ; People v. Heron, 130 A.D.3d 754, 756, 13 N.Y.S.3d 243 ; People v. Cherry, 127 A.D.3d 879, 881, 5 N.Y.S.3d 527 ).

The defendant's contention that certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation were improper and deprived him of a fair trial is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; see People v. Nelson, 125 A.D.3d 58, 65, 998 N.Y.S.2d 216 ). In any event, this contention is without merit. The challenged remarks were either fair comment on the evidence (see People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 383 N.Y.S.2d 204, 347 N.E.2d 564 ), a fair response to issues raised in defense counsel's summation (see People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 399, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9, 430 N.E.2d 885 ), or not so egregious as to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial (see People v. Morales, 171 A.D.3d 945, 947, 98 N.Y.S.3d 121 ).

The County Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial. The decision to declare a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the court, which is in the best position to determine if this drastic remedy is truly necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, and, contrary to the defendant's contention, there was no evidence of coercion by the court's procedures in this matter (see People v. Hardy, 26 N.Y.3d 245, 251–252, 22 N.Y.S.3d 377, 43 N.E.3d 734 ; People v. Diaz, 189 A.D.3d 1063, 1066, 136 N.Y.S.3d 29 ). The defendant's related contention that the court's recitation of a full Allen charge (see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 ) to the jury was coercive is without merit. The full Allen ch...