People v. Hill

2022 IL App (1st) 171739 -B

215 N.E.3d 207

465 Ill.Dec. 411

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Martin HILL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-17-1739

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Filed August 1, 2022

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Tomas G. Gonzalez, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique Abraham, David Iskowich, and Koula A. Fournier, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶1 After a jury found Martin Hill guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder—offenses he committed at age 15—the trial court sentenced Hill to a mandatory term of life in prison to run consecutively with a 30-year sentence for the attempt. We affirmed the trial court's judgment on direct appeal. People v. Hill , 326 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 285 Ill.Dec. 300, 811 N.E.2d 787 (2001) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ). Hill filed a postconviction petition raising several claims, including a challenge to his life sentence as unconstitutional. The parties agreed that Hill's mandatory life sentence violated the principles established in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which holds that mandatory life without parole for a juvenile defies the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The court resentenced Hill to two concurrent terms of 54 years for first degree murder to run consecutively with a 6-year sentence for attempt, which Hill contends still violates Miller and its progeny.

¶2 The State conceded, during oral argument, that Hill's sentence would be unconstitutional if it is a de facto life sentence. But, the State argued, because of Hill's eligibility for day-for-day good behavior credit potentially permitting his release after 30 years in prison, he did not receive a de facto life sentence. In our first opinion we disagreed. At the time, our appellate court's overwhelming weight of authority had concluded that good-time credit had no impact on determining whether a defendant's sentence constituted a de facto life sentence. See People v. Peacock , 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, ¶ 19, 434 Ill.Dec. 498, 136 N.E.3d 1023 ; People v. Daniel , 2020 IL App (1st) 172267, ¶ 26, 447 Ill.Dec. 501, 174 N.E.3d 518 ; People v. Thornton , 2020 IL App (1st) 170677, ¶ 22, 444 Ill.Dec. 777, 165 N.E.3d 423 ; People v. Simental , 2021 IL App (2d) 190649, ¶ 18, 453 Ill.Dec. 231, 187 N.E.3d 205. But see People v. Evans , 2017 IL App (1st) 143562, ¶ 14, 416 Ill.Dec. 769, 86 N.E.3d 1054 (applying day-for-day credit to determine whether defendant's sentence constituted life term).

¶3 Dissatisfied with that result, the State filed a petition for leave to appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court held the State's petition while it decided People v. Dorsey , 2021 IL 123010, 451 Ill.Dec. 258, 183 N.E.3d 715. In Dorsey , the court concluded that we must consider the possibility of a defendant's early release based on sentence credit when determining the applicability of Miller principles to his or her sentence. Id. ¶ 65. After Dorsey , the Illinois Supreme Court entered a supervisory order directing us to vacate our earlier opinion and consider how Dorsey affects our judgment.

¶4 We have vacated our previous opinion and now conclude, bound as we are by Dorsey , that Hill's new sentence is not a de facto life sentence. By definition, his new sentence cannot violate Miller under either the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause. Applying traditional sentencing review, however, we find the trial court abused its discretion by minimizing the veritable mountain of evidence explaining the impact of Hill's youth and circumstances on his criminal conduct and further explaining his ability as an adult to conform his conduct with the law. Given this, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reweigh Dr. Cunningham's testimony in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.

¶5 Background

¶6 In 1998, Hill was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder relating to a shooting on December 29, 1994. At the time, Hill was 15 years old.

¶7 Hill told authorities that, before the offense, he was out walking when a car approached. The driver was Leon Jones, Tommy Wilson sat in the front passenger seat, and McKinzie Ranson sat in the back passenger seat. Wilson, 18 years old, instructed Hill to get in the back seat, and Hill complied, claiming he sat behind Jones on the driver's side. A few minutes later, Jones pulled the car alongside the victims’ car, and Wilson and Ranson shot at the car. Hill told authorities that Wilson and Ranson were the shooters.

¶8 At Hill's trial, two eyewitnesses identified Hill as the front seat passenger and Ranson as sitting in the back on the passenger side. They saw shots coming out of the car from both the front and back passenger side. Notwithstanding the conflicting testimony, the jury convicted Hill as a shooter.

¶9 The trial court originally sentenced Hill to two concurrent terms of mandatory life in prison without parole for each of two counts of first degree murder, with a consecutive term of 30 years in prison for the attempt.

¶10 This court affirmed Hill's convictions on direct appeal. In 2001, Hill filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. While it was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407. Based on Miller and People v. Davis , 2014 IL 115595, 379 Ill.Dec. 381, 6 N.E.3d 709, which held that Miller applied retroactively on postconviction review, the parties agreed that Hill should be resentenced. Hill's counsel, the State, and the circuit court believed resentencing must precede resolving other postconviction claims. Although all agreed that Hill's underlying sentence should be vacated, an order—written or oral—formally granting postconviction relief or vacating the original sentence is absent from the record.

¶11 The circuit court held a new sentencing hearing. Based on the law at the time of the offenses, the parties agreed that the sentencing range for each murder was 20 to 60 years, to run concurrently, and the sentencing range for the attempted murder was 6 to 30 years, to run consecutively to the murder sentences.

¶12 During Hill's resentencing hearing, Dr. Mark Cunningham testified as an expert in clinical psychology and forensic psychology. Dr. Cunningham reviewed Hill's records and conducted interviews with Hill and his family members. He testified on general psychological trends and risk factors in teens and how those factors applied to Hill. Dr. Cunningham concluded that Hill had various psychological and behavioral issues that would have affected his decision-making ability.

¶13 Dr. Cunningham explained that teens are less capable than adults of mature judgments and experience a higher propensity for engaging in risky and illegal behaviors. Similarly, teens have trouble self-regulating and controlling their impulses; thus, they are more susceptible to negative external influences. Given their desire for approval and fear of rejection, teens succumb to peer pressure even without direct coercion are far more likely than adults to commit crimes in a group context or where the presence of peers is a motivating factor. Not only does the brain of teens not operate the same way as an adult brain, but this immaturity lessens the level of their moral culpability.

¶14 Neurodevelopmental factors could reduce a teen's functional maturity. The neurodevelopmental factors that reduced Hill's functional maturity relative to other 15-year-olds included fetal cigarette exposure, his mother's weight loss while pregnant with him, ADHD-type symptoms, anoxic experiences where the brain was deprived of oxygen, and a history of head injury. In addition, Dr. Cunningham believed that Hill, though he did not have an ADHD diagnosis, displayed symptoms on the ADHD continuum, including inability to focus, hyperactivity, and impulsivity.

¶15 Dr. Cunningham noted Hill had a history of traumatic experiences, including physical abuse by his mother from belt whippings that left enduring welts, a climate of hostility between his parents, significant recurrent exposure to prostitution, exposure to community violence, and sexual abuse by women 5 to 15 years older. Hill, at age 12, also witnessed a peer being gruesomely crushed to death by an elevator in Hill's building. Hill lived in a housing project characterized by heavy gang activity, pervasive drug dealing, and drug abuse. Eighty percent of male teens in the housing project engaged in felony-level criminal activity. Hill personally observed numerous acts of violence such as multiple shootings. Abused and maltreated youth, like Hill, often show immediate and long-term psychological, emotional, and physical effects, including insufficient capacity for emotional self-regulation, drug or alcohol problems, and violent or criminal behavior.

¶16 Hill had many risk factors, which effects Dr. Cunningham considered catastrophically cumulative. Dr. Cunningham concluded (i) Hill's participation in the offense reflected a 15-year-old's brain immaturity, including poor judgment, faulty values, and empathy deficits; (ii) the impulsivity and co-participation characterizing Hill's involvement fit the brain immaturity of a 15-year-old; (iii) certain neurodevelopmental factors reduced Hill's functional maturity relative to other 15-year-olds; (iv) Hill's functional maturity at the time of the offense was negatively impacted by traumatic experiences; (v) Hill's daily marijuana use further compromised his functional maturity; (vi) Hill lacked sufficient maturity, perspective, and ego strength to resist the pervasive influence of his violent and corrupt community; and (vii) family...