People v. Hinds

2023 NY Slip Op 03265

The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Corey Hinds, Appellant.

Nos. 112560, 112700

Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

June 15, 2023

Calendar Date: May 4, 2023

Bruce E. Knoll, Albany, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Paul Czajka, District Attorney, Hudson (James A. Carlucci of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Clark, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Ceresia, JJ.

Egan Jr., J.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Jonathan D. Nichols, J.), rendered September 20, 2018 convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of rape in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and (2) by permission, from an order of said court, entered February 3 2021, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without a hearing.

On February 4, 2017, police received a report that defendant had raped the victim that afternoon at his mother's residence in the City of Hudson, Columbia County. A police sergeant contacted defendant's mother to request her consent to process the residence for evidence, and she agreed to meet the sergeant there. The sergeant arrived first, and defendant answered the door and stated that he had been sleeping on the couch. Defendant's mother arrived while they were speaking and demanded to know "who touched that girl," after which defendant admitted to having sex with the victim but added, unprompted, that "[n]obody raped" her. Defendant was detained and transported to the police station for questioning. Defendant's mother consented to a search of the residence and claimed that defendant did not have a bedroom there; during a walk-through of the residence, however, the sergeant observed a digital scale and what appeared to be crack cocaine, as well as defendant's identification card, on top of a television stand in a bedroom. A search warrant was thereafter obtained and the search recovered, among other things, a used condom in a trash can in that bedroom, a quantity of what proved to be crack cocaine, and a loaded Glock 32.357 caliber pistol under a cushion of the couch defendant was sleeping on when the sergeant initially arrived.

Defendant was charged by felony complaint with various offenses and, on February 9, 2017, he executed a written waiver of both his right to a preliminary hearing and his statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial (see CPL 30.20, 30.30). On March 16, 2018, an indictment was handed up charging defendant with rape in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Following an unsuccessful effort to suppress statements he made to investigators after an arrest that he claimed violated Payton v New York (445 U.S. 573 [1980]), defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment upon the understanding that he would be sentenced, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 17 years and postrelease supervision of five years on the rape conviction and lesser concurrent prison terms on the remaining convictions. Defendant also agreed to waive his right to appeal. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea arrangement. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence and, by permission, from the denial of his subsequent CPL article 440 motion without a hearing. ^[1]

We affirm. At the outset, defendant claims upon his direct appeal that his plea was rendered involuntary by the ineffective assistance of counsel, but that issue is "unpreserved for our review in the absence of any indication that he moved to withdraw his plea despite having had ample opportunity to do so," and the record does not reflect that defendant made any statements during the plea colloquy or at sentencing that implicated the narrow exception to the preservation requirement (People v Stuber, 205 A.D.3d 1147, 1148 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1136 [2022]; see People v Robert, 214 A.D.3d 1085, 1086-1087 [3d Dept 2023]; People v Ballard, 200 A.D.3d 1476, 1477-1478 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 925 [2022]). To the extent that defendant advances a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence upon direct appeal, that argument is foreclosed by his guilty plea (see People v Fisher, 28 N.Y.3d 717, 722 [2017]; People v Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5 [1985]).

Next, defendant's argument that County Court abused its discretion in rejecting his pretrial request for substitution of his assigned counsel is unpreserved given his failure to move to withdraw his plea (see People v Morehouse, 140 A.D.3d 1202, 1203 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 934 [2016]). In any event, the basis offered by defendant for that request amounted to communication difficulties - which counsel advised County Court were the result of defendant's failure to show up for scheduled meetings or return telephone calls - defendant's discomfort with counsel's work as an assistant district attorney years earlier, and defendant's generalized concern that counsel did not have his "best interests in mind." Those assertions did not suggest that good cause for substitution, such as irreconcilable differences or a conflict of interest, existed, nor did they "trigger the need for an inquiry into whether good cause existed," and it follows that County Court properly denied defendant's request (People v Mitchell, 129 A.D.3d 1319, 1321 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1041 [2015]; see People v Linares, 2 N.Y.3d 507, 511-512 [2004]; People v Toledo, 144 A.D.3d 1332, 1333-1334 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1001 [2017]).

Defendant also argues that the preindictment delay of 13 months violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. This right can be waived, and the record reflects that defendant did waive it in the preliminary hearing and speedy trial waiver that he executed in February 2017 (see People v Rodriguez, 50 N.Y.2d 553, 557 [1980]; People v White, 32 N.Y.2d 393, 399 [1973]; see also CPL 30.20; People v Jordan, 62 N.Y.2d 825, 826 [1984]). We add that, even if defendant had not waived his right to advance the speedy trial argument, it would still be unpreserved given his failure to move to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds (see People v Griner, 207 A.D.3d 892, 892 [3d Dept 2022]; People v Fay, 154 A.D.3d 1178, 1180 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1115 [2018]; cf. People v Regan, ___ N.Y.3d ___, ___, 2023 NY Slip Op 01353, *3 [2023]). The remaining arguments advanced by defendant in his pro se supplemental brief relating to his direct appeal are foreclosed by his guilty plea, his unchallenged appeal waiver or both.

We accordingly turn to the appeal from the order denying defendant's pro se CPL article 440 motion, in which defendant claimed that he was actually innocent of the crimes for which he pleaded guilty and advanced arguments relating to the ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. "To the extent that defendant's motion to vacate is predicated upon his claim of actual innocence we note that vacatur of a judgment of conviction on this ground is expressly conditioned upon the existence of a verdict of guilt after trial and defendant's plea of guilty therefore forecloses relief upon this ground" (People v Lamb, 162 A.D.3d 1395, 1397 [3d Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks, emphasis, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1112 [2018]; see CPL 440.10 [1] [g]; People v Vittengl, 203 A.D.3d 1390, 1392 [3d Dept 2022]). In any event, the proof cited by defendant falls well short of "clear and convincing evidence of 'factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency of evidence of guilt,'" as required (People v Mosley, 155 A.D.3d 1124, 1125 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 985 [2018], quoting People v Hamilton, 115 A.D.3d 12, 23 [2d Dept 2014]). Defendant pointed out, for instance, that DNA evidence recovered after the incident suggested that the victim had sex with another male, but that fact was irrelevant since defendant himself admitted that he also had sex with the victim and the only question was whether that sex had been consensual. Further, although defendant's mother claimed that he did not have a bedroom at the residence and that the loaded handgun recovered there was hers, in view of the facts that the digital scale, crack cocaine and used condom with defendant's DNA were found in a bedroom along with his identification, as well as that the handgun was recovered from the couch where he was sleeping when the first...