People v. Hudnut

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDGAR JOHN HUDNUT, Defendant and Appellant.

H045536

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

June 24, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1652269)

Following the denial of a suppression motion, defendant Edgar John Hudnut pleaded no contest to transporting methamphetamine for sale in exchange for the dismissal of other charges, one year in county jail, and three years' formal probation. He now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Summary¹

San Jose police officer Sean Delgado testified that shortly after midnight on October 8, 2016, he and his partner, Officer Lucas, were on patrol in the area of Oakland Road and Corie Court in San Jose. While stopped at a red light in their marked patrol car, the officers saw a Cadillac and a minivan parked in the parking lot of a closed business park. Six or seven people were congregated near the driver's side of the Cadillac. Delgado testified that many of the people dispersed as he and Lucas drove into the parking lot. One individual exited the passenger side of the Cadillac, got into theminivan, and drove away. Another sprinted to the nearby creek, leaving behind a bicycle. Defendant exited the driver's side of the Cadillac but remained on the scene.

The officers approached defendant and a woman and instructed them to sit on the curb. They complied. Eleven minutes later, Delgado observed a baggie of methamphetamine in the Cadillac, between the driver's seat and the car door. Delgado saw the baggie when he shined his flashlight down into the driver's window.

At the start of the 11-minute detention, Lucas asked defendant and the woman about the individual who ran and left a bike behind, noting that his decision to flee was suspicious. Lucas asked defendant for his name and date of birth within approximately the first two-and-a-half minutes of the detention. Defendant provided that information and volunteered, "I might have a warrant, but it's not mine, it's my brother's. It's my AKA. So if you do a little investigation it'll come up it's his." Approximately four minutes into the detention, after Lucas asked the woman for her name and date of birth, he radioed the names to dispatch to perform a records check. While waiting to hear back, Delgado and Lucas informed a third officer, who had since arrived on the scene, as to what they had observed. Lucas also patted down the woman and defendant; those searches yielded no evidence.

Approximately seven-and-a-half minutes into the detention, dispatch provided Lucas with physical descriptions, including tattoo information, for the names provided. Lucas asked the woman to describe her tattoos, if any. The officers also asked defendant to show them his forearm. As defendant complied, he stated that he did not have a tattoo on his forearm, and that dispatch was describing his brother. Defendant also said that he and his brother have similar tattoos on their chests, which can confuse police when he doesn't have his identification. After seeing that defendant did not have the documented forearm tattoo, Lucas looked through defendant's wallet for his identification, which Lucas located nine minutes and 21 seconds into the detention. Nine-and-a-half minutesinto the detention, Lucas asked dispatch, "that's on a different PFN?"² Five seconds later Lucas stated "no, that was a different P--," before trailing off.

Another individual then approached Lucas and asked about retrieving the bike abandoned by the person who had fled when the officers arrived. Lucas spoke with that individual for about one minute. Immediately after that conversation, at 11 minutes and eight seconds into the detention, Delgado called Lucas over to the Cadillac. Delgado informed Lucas that he had observed what appeared to be a baggie of methamphetamine in the Cadillac.³ The officers opened the vehicle and retrieved the baggie.

Delgado testified that he read defendant his Miranda⁴ rights, after which defendant said that he distributes drugs for free and the recipients give him beer or "EBT" cards.

B. Procedural History

A felony complaint filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court on December 2, 2016 charged defendant with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1) and transportation, sale, or distribution of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 2). The complaint alleged that defendant had a prior felony conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c).

On June 29, 2017, defendant filed a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized from his car and his subsequent statements to police as the fruits of an unconstitutional detention. In July, the court concurrently held a preliminary hearing and a hearing on the suppression motion. On July 17, 2017, the court denied the motion to suppress and held defendant to answer on the charges. The prosecutor filed an information to supersede the complaint.

Defendant renewed his motion to suppress by way of a Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss filed on August 29, 2017. The trial court denied that motion on September 21, 2017.

On October 16, 2017, defendant pleaded no contest to count 2 in exchange for the dismissal of count 1 and the prior conviction allegation, three years' formal probation, and one year in county jail. In accordance with that agreement, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on three years' formal probation, ordered defendant to serve a one-year county jail sentence, and dismissed the other charges on January 26, 2018. Defendant timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant challenges the denial of his suppression motion, arguing his detention was illegal at its inception due to lack of reasonable suspicion and, alternatively, was unreasonably prolonged. We reject these contentions.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 646-660.) It is "the prosecution's burden to prove 'that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.' " (People v. Thomas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1115.)

A detention, which is a seizure "of an individual that [is] strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose" (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821), "occurs when the officer, by means of force or show of authority, has restrained a person's liberty." (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 56, citing (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16 (Terry).) Such detentions often are referred to as "Terry stops."

A detention or Terry stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when it is supported by reasonable suspicion; that is, "when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances,provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity." (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 (Souza).) Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, but requires more than "a mere 'hunch' that something is odd or unusual about the person detained." (Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 780.) " 'The possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.' " (Souza, supra, at p. 233.)

The permissible scope of an investigative detention will vary based on the applicable facts and circumstances, but the scope must always be tailored to the underlying justification for the detention. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500.) In terms of duration, a detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." (Ibid.) A detention that is legal "at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope." (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 18.) "For example, [a detention that] continue[s] for an excessive period of time" is unconstitutional. (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt County (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 185-186 (Hiibel).) "There is no fixed time limit for establishing the constitutionality of an investigatory detention. Rather, . . . [t]he issue . . . 'is whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.' " (People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 537-538.)

"Where, as here, the defendant challenges the suppression ruling by a motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 995, we review the determination of the magistrate who ruled on the motion to suppress, not the findings of the trial court." (People v. Fews (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 553, 559.) "We defer to the magistrate's factual findings 'when supported by substantial evidence, and view the record in the light most favorable to the challenged ruling.' " (People v. Wallace (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82, 88-89.) "[W]e . . . exercise our independent judgment in determining whether . . . the challengedsearch was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." (People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245.)

B. The Detention Was Supported by Reasonable Suspicion

The People and defendant agree that the police detained defendant when they instructed him to sit on the curb. They dispute whether that detention was justified at its...