People v. Hudson

226 N.E.3d 36

2023 IL App (1st) 192519

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Victor HUDSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-19-2519

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Filed January 30, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 18 CR 12339, The Honorable Angela Munari Petrone, Judge, presiding.

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Deepa Punjabi, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique Abraham, Daniel Piwowarczyk, and Justin Erb, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 A team of officers executed a warrant at the home of several members of the Hudson family, including Victor Hudson. According to the search warrant, the officers were looking for Tommie Williams, who they suspected of manufacturing and distributing cannabis. The officers did not find Williams or cannabis; instead, they found Hudson and a gun. The State charged Hudson with armed habitual criminal, and a jury found him guilty. The trial court sentenced Hudson to nine years in prison.

¶ 2 Hudson challenges his conviction on three grounds: (i) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (ii) the trial court committed multiple errors when responding to questions from the jury, and (iii) the trial court erroneously barred testimony that (a) the officers’ search warrant targeted someone other than Hudson and (b) the officers were not looking for a gun.

¶ 3 We agree with Hudson that the evidence against him is weak. To prove Hudson’s guilt, aside from an unmemorialized confession, which Hudson denied making, the State relied on two utility bills and a bottle of pills found in the same bedroom as the gun. By contrast, Hudson presented three witnesses and documentary evidence showing that he lived in the basement, not in the bedroom where officers found the bottle and gun. At oral argument, the State conceded these accounts presented "conflicting evidence" that was not "completely overwhelmingly one-sided" and that required the jury "to make a credibility determination." The jury had the task of deciding between these narratives, and their decision to find Hudson guilty was not unreasonable.

¶ 4 The trial court also committed no error in responding to the jury’s questions about the jury instructions. We do not assess whether the trial court could have answered the jury’s questions better, only whether the court answered them adequately. The trial court did so.

¶ 5 We find error, however, in the trial court’s decision to exclude the contents of the warrant. In the unique circumstances here, we conclude that the warrant’s contents do not implicate the hearsay rule because its introduction would have been to provide a full explanation of the police conduct in executing the warrant. In a similar, though distinct vein, we also are persuaded by Hudson’s analogy to the completeness doctrine in other contexts and find that, absent a chance to introduce evidence the warrant targeted a different person and other items, testimony about the existence of the warrant here casted a cloud of predetermined guilt over the remainder of the trial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶ 6 Observation

¶ 7 Hudson’s mother was in bed, and without warning, about a dozen armed police officers burst into her home. Several officers came to her bedroom, guns drawn, shouting profanities. Meanwhile, officers in the living room held her 17-year-old grandson to the ground with knees in his back. Hudson entered the living room, and an officer punched his face without warning. The officers mostly do not dispute applying force.

¶ 8 The dissent believes we have engaged in fact-finding to arrive at this narrative, but this testimony comes from the record. Dorothy Hudson testified that officers came into her room shouting, "everybody get the F up," and "had the light and gun in [her] face." She describes hearing a "boom, boom, boom," which she learned was police coming through the front door. We learn that when Hudson entered the living room, she told the officers, "that’s my son," and "they said shut the F up; and they hit him."

¶ 9 Randy testified that he was sleeping and "hear[d] a big old boom" and saw what he estimated as "15, 17" officers with "a lot of guns." Randy adds, "the officer was yelling, like get the F down," and Hudson said, "please, get off my son *** and the officer hit him" with a "closed fist" on his nose. Hudson testified that he heard a "bamming" upstairs and went into the living room where he saw "Randy, and the police got their knee in his back." Hudson told the officers to "hold on" and asked, "what’s happening." Then the officer "punched [him] in [his] nose."

¶ 10 The officers agreed that "12 to 15" officers entered the home. They testified that Randy raised his middle fingers and yelled at them and that Hudson ignored commands to stop walking into the living room. Officer Tellez agreed that he "grabbed [Randy] by the wrists" and then "rolled to the ground and began wrestling" after Randy stiffened his arms. Thus, we reject the dissent’s groundless assertion that we "cherry-pick[ed]" testimony. Infra ¶ 114. The officers did not dispute applying force.

¶ 11 In any event, we do not decide between the different narratives. Instead, justice demands we recognize this unseemly behavior, which exacerbates the climate of distrust toward both law enforcement and the criminal justice system that prevails among many black and brown residents. The law enforces a standard of behavior for the actors in our criminal legal system, including enforcement personnel, prosecutors, defense attorneys, correction and probation officers, and the courts. When those actors’ behavior offends that standard and endangers members of the public, the judiciary must not remain silent, else our silence signifies indifference and, in a broader sense, approval. See People v. Washington, 2020 IL App (1st) 163024, ¶ 50, 453 Ill.Dec. 21, 186 N.E.3d 1055 (2021) (Walker, J., dissenting) (remaining silent leads to wrongful convictions that "can devastate families, foreclose career opportunities, and undermine the integrity of our justice system").

¶ 12 Simply put, the behavior the Hudsons described is incompatible with the fail’ and equitable administration of justice. Illinois courts have historically commented on misbehavior not an issue in the case when the record divulges an abuse of office, mistreatment of another, or conduct otherwise inappropriate. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 75 Ill. App. 3d 259, 279-80, 30 Ill.Dec. 751, 393 N.E.2d 1098 (1979) ("Although the actions of [the officers] in inflicting the injuries upon defendant were regrettable and although this court cannot excuse nor condone the excessive force used since it appears to have been unnecessary to effectuate the arrest, we conclude that *** the force used *** did not result in defendant giving a statement."); see also, e.g., People v. Potts, 2021 IL App (1st) 161219, ¶ 165, 458 Ill.Dec. 401, 196 N.E.3d 961 (finding, "we would not condone *** conduct from the police" even where "we have no authority" to remedy it); People v. Finklea, 119 Ill. App. 3d 448, 454, 74 Ill.Dec. 959, 456 N.E.2d 680 (1983) (court "d[id] not mean to condone the police conduct in [the] case" even though conduct did not result in reversible error in defendant’s interrogation). Cf., e.g., People v. White, 16 Ill. App. 3d 419, 428, 306 N.E.2d 660 (1973) (noting, "we do not condone the conduct of the prosecutor" where only issue was judge’s consideration of improper sentencing factor); People v. Foss, 201 Ill. App. 3d 91, 94, 147 Ill.Dec. 254, 559 N.E.2d 254 (1990) ("we cannot condone the prosecutor’s conduct" even though conduct did not amount to error). Consistent with this precedent, we must speak about what the Hudsons saw and heard.

¶ 13 To say nothing in the face of the treatment of the Hudsons would be incompatible with the judiciary’s role as a fundamental protector of the citizen against arbitrary or unwarranted conduct by the State. We write in the hope that "[e]very community resident [can] live, work, and travel confident in an expectation that interactions with police officers will be fair, operate consistent with constitutional norms, and be guided by public safety free from bias or discrimination." U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Police Use of Force: An Examination of Modern Policing Practices 137 (Nov. 2018) https://www.usccr.gov/files/pubs/2018/11-15-Police-Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CGR-AQQ9].

¶ 14 Our observation has no bearing on the guilt or innocence of Hudson or the issues before us. Nonetheless, the dissent confuses this observation, this obiter dicta (Latin for "said in passing"), with a "factual determination." Infra ¶ 113. It goes so far as to cite cases as if our observation were binding, including Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), a case about officer safety, and People v. Mandarino, 2013 IL App (1st) 111772, 373 Ill.Dec. 653, 994 N.E.2d 138, where we affirmed the conviction of a police officer for aggravated battery and official misconduct following a traffic stop.

¶ 15 In an accountable and fair criminal justice system, law enforcement officers treat everyone with whom they interact the same way they would want themselves and their family members treated under similar circumstances. See Dean A. Strang, Bryan Stevenson Brings Light to Our Criminal Justice System’s Darkest Comers, The Progressive Magazine, Dec. 28, 2015, https://progressive.org/magazine/bryan-stevenson-brings-light-criminal-justice-system-s-darkest-corners/ [https:// perma.cc/7645-5Z7T] ("We don’t need police officers who see themselves as warriors. We need police officers who see themselves as guardians and parts of the community.").

¶ 16 Our observation speaks...