People v. Imperati

211 N.Y.3d 126

226 A.D.3d 1069

The PEOPLE, etc., EX REL. Andrew D. ELLIS, etc., on behalf of Michael A. Cavagnolo, petitioner,

v.Kirk IMPERATI, etc., respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—April 22, 2024

April 26, 2024

Margaret M. Walker, Poughkeepsie, NY (Andrew D. Ellis pro se of counsel) for petitioner.

Anthony P. Parisi, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Lily Gebru of counsel), for respondent.

VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.

DECISION, ORDER & JUDGMENT

Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application to release Michael Cavagnolo on his own recognizance or, in the alternative, under nonmonetary conditions, in effect, upon Dutchess County Indictment No. 21/2024.

ADJUDGED that the writ is sustained, without costs or disbursements, and Michael Cavagnolo is released upon his own recognizance on condition that Michael Cavagnolo shall (1) wear an electronic monitoring bracelet, with monitoring services to be provided by a qualified entity pursuant to CPL 510.40(4)(c), and any violations of the conditions set forth herein relating to the electronic monitoring shall be reported by the electronic monitoring service provider to the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County, and further proceedings pursuant to CPL 510.40(4)(d), if any, shall be conducted by the County Court, Dutchess County; (2) remain confined to his residence in Dutchess County except for visits to his attorney, his medical providers, or court, and must travel directly from his residence in Dutchess County to his attorney, his medical providers, or court, and directly back to his residence in Dutchess County when conducting those visits; (3) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, dangerous instrument as defined in Penal Law § 10.00(13), deadly weapon as defined in Penal Law § 10.00(12), or other dangerous weapon; (4) surrender all passports, if any, he may have to the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County, or, if he does not possess a passport, he shall provide to the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County an affidavit or affirmation, in a form approved by the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County, in which he attests that he does not possess a passport, and shall not apply for any new or replacement passports; and (5) provide to the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County an affidavit or affirmation, in a form approved by the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County, in which he attests that if he leaves the jurisdiction he agrees to waive the right to oppose extradition from any foreign jurisdiction; and it is further,

ORDERED that upon receipt of a copy of this decision, order and judgment together with proof that Michael Cavagnolo has arranged for electronic monitoring with a qualified entity pursuant to CPL 510.40(4)(c), has surrendered all passports, if any, he may have to the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County, or, if he does not possess a passport, has provided to the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County an affidavit or affirmation, in a form approved by the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County, in which he attests that he does not possess a passport, and shall not apply for any new or replacement passports, and has provided to the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County an affidavit or affirmation, in a form approved by the Office of the District Attorney of Dutchess County, in which he attests that if he leaves the jurisdiction he agrees to waive the right to oppose extradition from any foreign jurisdiction, the Warden of the facility at which Michael Cavagnolo is incarcerated, or his or her agent, is directed to immediately release Michael Cavagnolo from incarceration.

Michael Cavagnolo was charged with making a terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20), after he allegedly called the emergency phone number of the Hyde Park Police Department and made threats of violence, including to shoot police offi- cers and to blow up the police department. The County Court determined that making a terroristic threat, as a violent felony offense, constitutes a qualifying offense pursuant to CPL 510.10(4)(a) and set bail. The petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding, contending that the County Court was without authority to impose monetary conditions for Cavagnolo’s release because making a terroristic threat is not a "qualifying offense" pursuant to CPL 510.10(4).

"In 2019, the legislature enacted comprehensive bail reform legislation, which in large part eliminated cash bail and specified a set of crimes for which such bail may be set" (People ex rel. Rankin v. Brann, 41 N.Y.3d 436, 441, — N.Y.S.3d —, — N.E.3d —; see L 2019, ch 59, § 1, part JJJ). Those crimes for which a court may fix bail, "qualifying offense[s]," are defined in CPL 510.10(4). For all other crimes, the court "shall" release the defendant pending trial on his or her own recognizance, though the court may impose nonmonetary conditions if the court makes a specific finding that releasing the defendant on his or her own recognizance will not reasonably assure the defendant’s return to court (id. § 510.10[3]; see People ex rel. Rankin v. Brann, 41 N.Y.3d at 441–42, — N.Y.S.3d —, — N.E.3d —).

[1–4] The petitioner contends that making a terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20) is specifically listed as a nonqualifying offense pursuant to CPL 510.10(4)(g). "When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, [the] primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature" (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653, 660, 827 N.Y.S.2d 88, 860 N.E.2d 705 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98). "The statutory text is the clearest indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of Mestecky v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.3d 239, 243, 66 N.Y.S.3d 207, 88 N.E.3d 365 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d at 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98). "A statute must be construed as a whole, and its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other. Further, in appropriate circumstances, the Court may inquire into the purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history" (Matter of Peyton v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 36 N.Y.3d 271, 280, 140 N.Y.S.3d 447, 164 N.E.3d 253 [citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted]; see Matter of DCH Auto v. Town of Mamaroneck, 38 N.Y.3d 278, 292, 172 N.Y.S.3d 662, 192 N.E.3d 1141).

CPL 510.10(4)(a) provides that all violent felony offenses, with two exceptions not applicable here, constitute qualifying offenses (see id.). Making a terroristic threat is a violent felony offense (see Penal Law §§ 70.02[1][c]; 490.20). Notwithstanding that provision of the statute, CPL 510.10(4)(g) enumerates several terrorism-related offenses that constitute qualifying offenses, including "a felony crime of terrorism as defined in [Penal Law article 490], other than [making a terroristic threat under Penal Law § 490.20]." Thus, CPL 510.10(4) provides conflicting provisions as to whether making a terroristic threat constitutes a qualifying offense for which bail may be fixed.

[5, 6] "Under principles of statutory construction, whenever there is a general and a specific provision in the same stat- ute, the general applies only where the particular enactment is inapplicable" (Matter of Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan, 27 N.Y.3d 1, 9, 29 N.Y.S.3d 230, 49 N.E.3d 699; see Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Sullivan, 32 N.Y.3d 652, 658, 95 N.Y.S.3d 544, 119 N.E.3d 1225; Matter of Gershow Recycling of Riverhead, Inc. v. Town of Riverhead, 193 A.D.3d 731, 733, 148 N.Y.S.3d 122). CPL 510.10(4)(a) is a general provision insofar as it provides that all violent felony offenses, with two exceptions, constitute qualifying offenses. Conversely, the relevant clause in CPL 510.10(4)(g) is specific insofar as it expressly exempts making a terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20) from the list of violent felony offenses that constitute qualifying offenses. Applying this principle of statutory construction, the specific provision in CPL 510.10(4)(g) that expressly exempts making a terroristic threat from the list of violent felony offenses that constitute qualifying offenses controls (see Matter of Gershow Recycling of Riverhead, Inc. v. Tenon of Riverhead, 193 A.D.3d at 733, 148 N.Y.S.3d 122).

[7] Moreover, under well-settled principles of statutory construction, a statute should be construed to give meaning and effect to all of its words and provisions so that an interpretation that renders words or clauses superfluous should be rejected (see Matter of Mestecky v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.3d at 243, 66 N.Y.S.3d 207, 88 N.E.3d 365; Matter of National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Reichman, 221 A.D.3d 69, 78–79, 199 N.Y.S.3d 526; People v. Dewall, 15 A.D.3d 498, 500, 790 N.Y.S.2d 182). CPL 510.10(4)(g) provides, in relevant part, that a felony crime of terrorism defined in Penal Law article 490 is a qualifying offense, "other than" making a terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20). Notably, all other felony crimes of terrorism defined in article 490 of the Penal Law are either violent felony offenses (see e.g. Penal Law §§ 70.02[1], 490.10, 490.15, 490.35) or class A felony offenses (see e.g. Penal Law §§ 490.27, 490.28), which are qualifying offenses pursuant to CPL 510.10(4)(d). To accept the People’s position that making a terroristic threat is a qualifying offense notwithstanding the language of CPL 510.10(4)(g) would render that provision’s exclusion of...