People v. Isbell

2020 IL App (3d) 180279

163 N.E.3d 1226

444 Ill.Dec. 310

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Gary R. ISBELL, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal No. 3-18-0279

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Opinion filed September 3, 2020

James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and Mark D. Fisher, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Justin G. Jochums, State's Attorney, of Lewistown (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Gary F. Gnidovec, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Gary R. Isbell, appeals following his conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery. He argues that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated with respect to the only charge upon which he was convicted. He thus contends that a motion to dismiss that charge would have been meritorious and that defense counsel was therefore ineffective for failing to bring such a motion. In the alternative, defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse defendant's conviction outright.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On January 10, 2017, the State charged defendant via complaint with two counts of misdemeanor domestic battery ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2016)). Count I of the complaint alleged that defendant "made contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Mallory Griffith, a family or household member of the defendant, in that said defendant grabbed Mallory Griffith by the neck with his hand(s)." Count II of the complaint alleged that defendant "made contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Mallory Griffith *** in that said defendant body slammed Mallory Griffith to the ground with his hand(s)."

¶ 4 Defendant posted bond on January 25, 2017. On March 18, 2017, defendant filed a speedy trial demand. After that date, the docket shows that the court granted continuances in the case on at least seven occasions, five of which were on defendant's motion.

¶ 5 On April 2, 2018, the State charged defendant with a third count of misdemeanor domestic battery (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)). Count III alleged that defendant "knowingly caused bodily harm to Mallory Griffith *** in that said defendant pushed Mallory Griffith to the ground."

¶ 6 Defendant's jury trial commenced on April 17, 2018. Farmington police chief Carl Powell testified that Griffith came to the police station on January 2, 2017, alleging that her former boyfriend, defendant, had battered her the day before. Powell testified that Griffith told him that defendant "came in the house, then grabbed her cell phone, got angry with her, and body slammed her, then drug her through the house and kept hitting her." Powell took photographs of Griffith's injuries, which were admitted into evidence. The three photographs show a large bruise on Griffith's left leg, a small bruise on her left arm, and a red mark on the inside of her right arm.

¶ 7 Griffith testified that on January 1, 2017, defendant came to her house, grabbed her cell phone from her hand, and threw it to the ground. Griffith testified that defendant "instantly body slammed me to the ground onto the wood floor." Griffith attempted to flee, but she testified: "[E]very time I got up he body slammed me as hard as he could right back down to the ground." When the State asked Griffith if defendant was pushing her down, Griffith replied: "Every time I get up, he's back to body slamming me right back down, either on my ceramic tile or hardwood floors in my house." Defendant eventually stopped attacking her and left the house.

¶ 8 Defendant testified that on the morning in question he and Griffith argued about text messages she had received. Defendant began reading Griffith's messages, and Griffith lunged at him. Defendant testified: "We kind of came like wrapped up with each other. We ended up to where her feet got tangled, we lost our balance, we both went to the floor pretty hard." Defendant denied hitting, body slamming, or choking Griffith.

¶ 9 The jury found defendant guilty on count III and not guilty on counts I and II. The court sentenced defendant to one year of conditional discharge and 90 days in jail.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Defendant argues on appeal that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss count III of the complaint on speedy trial grounds. Because we agree and reverse defendant's conviction outright on those grounds, we need not consider defendant's alternative sufficiency of the evidence argument.

¶ 12 Section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 mandates that a person free on bail or recognizance must be tried within 160 days of the date of his demand for a speedy trial, "unless delay is occasioned by the defendant." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2016). Where a defendant moves for or agrees to a continuance, the ensuing delay is considered attributable to him and will not count against the 160-day period. People v. Patterson , 392 Ill. App. 3d 461, 467, 332 Ill.Dec. 58, 912 N.E.2d 244 (2009). "A defendant not tried within the statutory period must be released from custody and is entitled to have the charges dismissed." People v. Hall , 194 Ill. 2d 305, 327, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521 (2000) ; 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2016).

¶ 13 Where defense counsel fails to bring a speedy trial violation to the attention of the court in the form of a motion to dismiss charges, counsel renders constitutionally ineffective assistance. People v. Staten , 159 Ill. 2d 419, 431, 203 Ill.Dec. 230, 639 N.E.2d 550 (1994). Thus, when a defendant raises an ineffectiveness claim on such grounds, we must only consider whether a motion to dismiss charges on speedy trial grounds, had it been filed by counsel, would have been meritorious. E.g. , id. ; People v. Phipps , 238 Ill. 2d 54, 65, 342 Ill.Dec. 893, 933 N.E.2d 1186 (2010). The remedy for ineffective assistance in this regard is the same as the remedy for any speedy trial violation found on appeal: outright reversal of the conviction or convictions in question. People v. Beyah , 67 Ill. 2d 423, 429, 10 Ill.Dec. 568, 367 N.E.2d 1334 (1977) ; People v. Boyd , 363 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1039, 301 Ill.Dec. 56, 845 N.E.2d 921 (2006).

¶ 14 The application of the speedy trial statute "becomes more complicated when the defendant is charged with multiple, but factually related, offenses at different times." People v. Williams , 204 Ill. 2d 191, 198, 273 Ill.Dec. 250, 788 N.E.2d 1126 (2003). What has come to be known as the Williams rule was first announced by the First District in 1981, when it held:

"Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges. Continuances obtained in connection with the trial of the original charges cannot be attributed to defendants with respect to the new and additional charges because these new and additional charges were not before the court when those continuances were obtained." People v. Williams , 94 Ill. App. 3d 241, 248-49, 49 Ill.Dec. 820, 418 N.E.2d 840 (1981).

Our supreme court, which would formally adopt the Williams rule, explained the rationale underlying the rule as follows:

"The harm in a contrary result is obvious: a trial by ambush. The State could lull the defendant into acquiescing to pretrial delays on pending charges, while it prepared for a trial on more serious, not-yet-pending charges. We cannot presume that a defendant would have agreed to a continuance if he had faced both charges ." (Emphasis added.) Williams , 204 Ill. 2d at 207, 273 Ill.Dec. 250, 788 N.E.2d 1126.

¶ 15 A later-filed charge will only be considered " ‘new and additional’ " for purposes of applying the Williams rule where it is subject to compulsory joinder.

People v. Williams , 193 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17, 249 Ill.Dec. 840, 737 N.E.2d 230 (2000). The compulsory joinder statute requires that "[i]f the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution *** if they are based on the same act." 720 ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 2016).

¶ 16 In subsequent cases, our supreme court has made clear that compulsory joinder is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the application of the Williams rule. In Phipps , for example, the court explained that the Williams rule should be applied only in those situations in which the underlying rationale for the rule is applicable. Phipps , 238 Ill. 2d at 67, 342 Ill.Dec. 893, 933 N.E.2d 1186. The court added:

"The focus is on whether the original charging instrument gave the defendant sufficient notice of the subsequent charges to prepare adequately for trial on those charges. If the original charging instrument gives a defendant adequate notice of the subsequent charges, the ability to prepare for trial on those charges is not hindered in any way. *** In those circumstances, the rationale for declining to attribute to the defendant delays in connection with the original charges does not apply." Id. at 67-68, 342 Ill.Dec. 893, 933 N.E.2d 1186.

Thus, in determining whether the Williams rule will be applied, courts must compare the original charge to the new charge and discern whether the former provided sufficient notice of the latter, such that the defendant would not be subject to the " ‘trial by ambush’ " meant to be remedied by the Williams rule. E.g. , id. at 68-70, 342 Ill.Dec. 893, 933 N.E.2d 1186 ; People v. Staake , 2017 IL 121755, ¶¶ 40-45, 421 Ill.Dec. 936, 102 N.E.3d 217.

¶ 17 With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the arguments of the parties on appeal. Defendant...