People v. J.D.

464 P.3d 785

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

IN the INTEREST OF J.D., Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 18SC41

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 8, 2020

Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: The Noble Law Firm, LLC, Tara Jorfald, Lakewood, Colorado

En Banc

CHIEF JUSTICE COATS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 The People sought review of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the district court's order voiding a ruling of the juvenile magistrate. See People in Interest of J.D. , 2017 COA 156, 468 P.3d 35. The district court had found that the juvenile magistrate lacked jurisdiction to grant J.D.’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, further, that J.D.’s sole remedy for a failure of his counsel to render effective assistance in advising him concerning his deferred adjudication was to file a petition with the court for reinstatement of his review rights nunc pro tunc. By contrast, the court of appeals found that the juvenile magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain J.D.’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was a motion in a delinquency case the magistrate had been appointed to hear, and it was not a motion seeking review of any prior order of the magistrate.

¶2 Because a juvenile magistrate is not prohibited, either by statute or court rule, from revisiting his prior rulings, decrees, or other decisions in a case he has been properly appointed to hear, unless and until the proceedings have culminated in a final order or judgment, and because a guilty plea, prior to sentencing and entry of a judgment of conviction, does not constitute a final judgment or order, the district court erred in ruling that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over the juvenile's Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although on different grounds, the judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.

I.

¶3 The People filed petitions in delinquency charging J.D. with conduct that would constitute trespassing and arson if committed by an adult. J.D. elected to proceed before a magistrate rather than a district court judge, and ultimately entered into a deferred adjudication agreement, requiring entry of a guilty plea to one count of third degree trespassing, to be followed by a one-year period of deferral, subject to specified conditions, including restitution. After the juvenile's counsel failed to timely object to a subsequent restitution order for $25,647.06, and after several attempts by the juvenile to have the restitution order reconsidered proved unsuccessful as untimely or procedurally improper, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, pursuant to Crim. P. 32(d).

¶4 Following a hearing at which the juvenile's plea counsel conceded that he mistakenly thought his representation had terminated after the guilty plea entered and therefore did not timely object to the restitution order, the magistrate granted the juvenile's motion. On petition for review, filed by the People, however, the district court concluded that the magistrate's earlier imposition of restitution as a condition of deferral finalized sentencing, and therefore the magistrate lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the juvenile's motion to withdraw his plea. Although the district court appeared to rule that it also lacked jurisdiction to review the magistrate's order, it nevertheless clearly declared the magistrate's order granting the juvenile's motion to withdraw his guilty plea void, ordered the deferred adjudication reinstated, and expressly granted the juvenile leave to file a Petition for Reinstatement of Review Rights Nunc Pro Tunc with the district court, solely for the purpose of challenging the effectiveness of his counsel's representation. On appeal of the district court's ruling, the court of appeals reversed, holding that because a challenge to the effectiveness of counsel necessarily required more than a mere reconsideration of the existing record, the magistrate's consideration of the juvenile's motion to withdraw on the grounds of inadequate advice and failure of his counsel to object necessarily implicated matters outside the record and therefore did not amount to a review of any of his prior orders.

¶5 The People petitioned for further review by this court.

II.

¶6 The relationship between the district court judge and a juvenile magistrate appointed to hear matters under the juvenile court's jurisdiction is governed by both statute and court rule. See § 19-1-108, C.R.S. (2019); C.R.M. 5 ; C.R.M. 6. By statute, juvenile magistrates are empowered to conduct hearings in the manner provided for the hearing of cases by the court. § 19-1-108(3)(a.5). At the conclusion of a hearing, the magistrate is required to, among other things, prepare findings and a written order that will become the order of the court, absent the filing of a petition for review by the judge. § 19-1-108(4)(c). Such a review of a magistrate's findings and order by the judge is permitted solely upon the record of the hearing before the magistrate, is limited to the grounds set forth in C.R.C.P. 59 (motions for Post-Trial Relief), and is a prerequisite to the filing of an appeal with the court of appeals or supreme court. § 19-1-108(5.5).

¶7 Rule 5 of the Colorado Rules for Magistrates delineates with some particularity the powers of magistrates in general. In addition to enumerating the specific matters a magistrate is authorized to decide and the process he is authorized to issue, the rule specifies that an "order or judgment" of a magistrate in any judicial proceeding, unless sooner stayed, becomes effective upon the date of the order or judgment and will remain in effect pending review by a reviewing judge; and further, that other than the correction of clerical errors, a magistrate will have no authority to consider a petition for rehearing. C.R.M. 5(a). With regard to review by the judge of all orders or judgments of a magistrate other than those requiring party consent, Rule 7(a) dictates that only "final" orders or judgments, meaning those that fully resolve an issue or claim signed by the magistrate, C.R.M. 7(a)(3), are reviewable by the district court judge. With regard to orders or judgments entered by a magistrate when consent is necessary, Rule 7(b) specifies that review by the district court judge will not be available in the manner permitted by Rule 7(a), and instead review is limited to an appeal pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Appellate Procedure, in the same manner as an appeal of a judgment of the district court.

¶8 Resolution of the question whether a juvenile magistrate is constrained from granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea entered pursuant to an agreement for a deferred adjudication therefore depends not only on the nature of such a plea and motion themselves, but also on a proper interpretation, or construction, of both statute and rule. With regard to the question of interpretation, we have often held that a statute takes its meaning from the language chosen by the legislature to express its intent. People v. Owens , 228 P.3d 969, 972 (Colo. 2010). If that language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and is therefore ambiguous, People in Interest of G.S.S. , 2020 CO 32, ¶ 12, 462 P.3d 592 (citing Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 725, 729 ), a number of intrinsic and extrinsic aids have either been provided by the legislature itself or have developed over hundreds of years to assist in determining which among a number of reasonable interpretations is the one that reflects legislative intent. In interpreting rules of this court, we have similarly applied these long-accepted principles, People v. G.S. , 2018 CO 31, ¶ 32, 416 P.3d 905, 913 ; Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C. v. Flood , 2012 CO 38, ¶ 30, 278 P.3d 348, 358, with the difference, however, that the intent to be identified is that of the supreme court, according to our own purposes and drafting conventions.

¶9 A provision existing as part of a comprehensive whole must be understood, when possible, in pari materia—harmonious with the entire scheme. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson , 185 P.3d 811, 813 (Colo. 2008). We presume that the legislature intended that various parts of the comprehensive scheme be consistent with and apply to each other, without requiring the legislature to incorporate each by express reference in the other.

See Martinez v. People , 69 P.3d 1029, 1033 (Colo. 2003). In a similar fashion, we construe our own rules within the context of the broader scheme and the purpose to be served by the scheme as a whole. People v. Owens , 2014 CO 58, ¶ 13, 330 P.3d 1027, 1031.

¶10 Whether or not there exists an irreconcilable tension between the statutory provisions for review of the orders of juvenile magistrates and the rules governing the conduct of magistrates in civil and criminal proceedings, neither the statute nor the rules can be reasonably understood to preclude a juvenile magistrate from entertaining a motion authorized by Crim. P. 32(d) prior to sentencing. Notwithstanding the broad definition of "Order or Judgment" in the definitional section of the magistrate rules, see C.R.M. 3(e) ("All rulings, decrees or other decisions of a judge or a magistrate made in the course of judicial proceedings."), when the numerous references throughout the rules to that phrase are read in pari materia, there can be little question that a magistrate, just as a judge, retains the ability to modify or reconsider any of his rulings made in the course of judicial proceedings until those proceedings culminate in a final, reviewable order or judgment. With regard to magistrates serving in juvenile cases, in particular, the statute makes this proposition even more clear.

¶11 For those cases in which the juvenile either lacks or has waived the right to a hearing before a judge, the statute broadly...