People v. J.S.

319 Cal.Rptr.3d 87

IN RE J.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.J.S., Defendant and Appellant.

C099115

Court of Appeal, Third District.

Filed March 5, 2024

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Placer County, Todd D. Irby, Judge. Reversed. (Super. Ct. No. 52009173)

Kristen Owen, Coronado, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Craig S. Meyers, Deputy Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Duarte, J.

This case involves a question of statutory interpretation. Under California law, any person who "satisfactorily completes" a term of probation after classification as a ward of the juvenile court is entitled to have the juvenile wardship petition dismissed and to have all records pertaining to that petition sealed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (a)).¹ On appeal, J.S. challenges the order denying his motion requesting such relief. He argues the juvenile court erred by interpreting subdivision (c)(1) of section 786 as precluding relief as a matter of law when there is any new finding of wardship during the period of probation. He contends that because the statute precludes relief as a matter of law when there was a new finding of wardship (or conviction) based only on the commission of a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, the court improperly concluded that he was categorically ineligible for relief because there was a new finding of wardship based on the commission of a misdemeanor battery.

We agree and therefore reverse. Because the juvenile court did not reach the issue of whether J.S. had otherwise "substantially compli[ed]" with the terms and conditions of his probation so as to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed it, we remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Given the limited issue raised on appeal, we briefly summarize the pertinent facts and procedure. The facts underlying the charged offenses are taken from the probation report. We recite the facts for background purposes only; they are not material to the resolution of this appeal.

First Juvenile Wardship Petition

In March 2021, the People filed a section 602 juvenile wardship petition, charging J.S. with six counts, including second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and misdemeanor battery (id., § 242). Three weeks later, in April 2021, a first amended section 602 juvenile wardship petition was filed, adding one count against J.S. (battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)) and a special allegation that J.S. personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the battery (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a).) These charges arose out of two separate incidents in January and April 2021 where J.S. physically attacked and seriously harmed other minors.

In the first incident, which involved the taking of a guitar, J.S. punched a minor in the face and strangled and punched a second minor, who suffered a concussion. At the time the guitar was taken, J.S. was with three other juveniles. In the second incident, which occurred approximately three months later at school, J.S. repeatedly punched a minor in the face without provocation during class, causing injuries. This incident occurred three days after J.S. threatened to fight the victim because he threw a football that landed near J.S. J.S. was 13 years old at the time of the first incident and 14 years old at the time of second.

In May 2021, J.S. admitted to committing second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), misdemeanor battery (id., § 242), and battery with serious bodily injury (id., § 243, subd. (d)), as well as the great bodily injury enhancement allegation (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)). The remaining charges were dismissed at the People’s request, and J.S. was released on home supervision.

In June 2021, J.S. was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on formal probation with various terms and conditions, including conditions requiring that he obey all laws and serve 15 days in a juvenile detention facility.

Second Juvenile Wardship Petition

Around 10 months later, in April 2022, the People filed a second section 602 juvenile wardship petition against J.S. In May 2022, J.S. was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court based on a finding that he committed a misdemeanor battery. (Pen. Code, § 242.) It is undisputed that J.S. was on probation at the time the offense was committed. The record does not disclose the facts underlying the offense.²

Termination of Probation and Sealing of Juvenile Records

In February 2023, the probation department filed an application for dismissal of wardship, requesting the juvenile court dismiss the wardship and all proceedings instituted in the juvenile court against J.S. In making this request, the probation department stated: "There is no apparent need for further supervision as satisfactory adjustment has been indicated. All conditions set by the Court have been met, and the minor does not appear to require continued Wardship." The probation department also requested that the records pertaining to both the first and second juvenile wardship petitions be sealed pursuant to section 786. In doing so, the probation department noted that J.S. had "satisfactorily completed probation for purposes of … section 786."

In a written response, the People indicated that they had no objection to the "successful termination" of J.S.’s probation or to the sealing of records pertaining to the second juvenile wardship petition. However, they objected to the sealing of records pertaining to the first juvenile wardship petition, arguing that such relief was not warranted because J.S. was "disqualified under … section 786(c)(1) in that he suffered a ‘new finding of wardship … during the period of … probation.’ " (Emphasis omitted.) The People did not object to the sealing of these records on the ground that J.S. had failed to substantially comply with the reasonable orders of pro- bation that were within his capacity to perform.

At the March 2023 hearing on the probation department’s application, the juvenile court terminated J.S.’s probation after finding successful completion and ordered that all records pertaining to the second juvenile wardship petition be sealed pursuant to section 786.³ As for the request to seal records pertaining to the first juvenile wardship petition, the court took the matter under submission. During the hearing, J.S. argued that contrary to the People’s contention, he was not categorically ineligible for relief with respect to this petition because although there was a new finding of wardship during the period of probation, misdemeanor battery is not a crime of moral turpitude and section 786 only precludes relief as a matter of law when the new finding of wardship was based on a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.

Motion to Seal Juvenile Records

In June 2023, J.S. filed a motion to seal juvenile records under section 786, which sought an order dismissing the first juvenile wardship petition and sealing the records pertaining to that petition based on his satisfactory completion of probation., J.S. argued that such relief was warranted "pursuant to [section] 786(f) on the grounds that [he] had no new findings of wardship for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during the period of … probation."

Three days later, the juvenile court issued a written order denying J.S.’s motion. The court concluded that relief under section 786 was not warranted as a matter of law because there was a new finding of wardship during the period of probation. In so concluding, the court rejected J.S.’s interpretation of the statute, finding that contrary to J.S.’s contention, the plain language of section 786, subdivision (c)(1) provides three separate "disqualifying categories": "(1) ‘no new findings of wardship’ or (2) ‘a felony offense’ or (3) ‘a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.’ " In other words, the court was not persuaded by J.S.’s construction of the statute; namely, that relief under section 786 is not precluded as a matter of law when, as here, there was a new finding of wardship, during the period of probation that was not based on a felony offense or a misdemeanor offense involving moral turpitude. Instead, the court found that J.S. was categorically, ineligible for relief due to his adjudication for misdemeanor battery.

Appeal

J.S. timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I Interpretation of Section 786

J.S. argues the juvenile court erred in concluding that he was categorically ineligible for relief under section 786 due to any new finding of wardship during his period of probation. He argues the statute is properly interpreted as precluding relief only when there was a new finding of wardship (or conviction) based on a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles

[1] "Normally, we review a juvenile court’s decision to seal or to refuse to seal records for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]

But where, as here, the court’s decision raises an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo." (In re D.H. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 44, 51, 271 Cal.Rptr.3d 919.)

[2, 3] " ‘ "As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose." [Citation.] "We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent." [Citations.] The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in...