People v. Jackson

2020 IL App (1st) 143025 -B

177 N.E.3d 755

448 Ill.Dec. 699

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Darron JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-14-3025

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.

Modified opinion filed September 3, 2020

James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Yasemin Eken, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary P. Needham, and Margaret G. Lustig, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 After a jury trial, defendant Darron Jackson, age 16 at the time of the offense, was convicted as an adult of the first degree murder of Kenneth Porter and of personally discharging the firearm that caused Porter's death. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 50 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC).

¶ 2 After his conviction was affirmed and his first postconviction petition was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, arguing (1) that a 50-year sentence for a minor violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ),¹ pursuant to recent decisions concerning minors by the United States Supreme Court, such as Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and (2) that the automatic transfer provision of Illinois's Juvenile Court Act of 1987 ( 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2002) ) violates the federal and state due process clauses ( U.S. Const., amend. XIV ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 ), the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ),² and the federal eighth amendment ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ).

¶ 3 The trial court denied defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition, and this court affirmed. However, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order directing this court to vacate our judgment and to reconsider in light of its recent decision in People v. Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763. After reconsidering, we reverse and remand for resentencing, for the reasons that we explain below.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The State's evidence at trial showed that, on September 10, 2003, at 10:30 a.m., defendant shot and killed Kenneth Porter as Porter was standing in the middle of an intersection at Madison Street and Fourth Avenue, in Maywood, Illinois. This court has already discussed the evidence at trial in our Rule 23 orders affirming his conviction on appeal ( People v. Jackson , No. 1-04-3656, 371 Ill.App.3d 1203, 344 Ill.Dec. 470, 936 N.E.2d 1227 (2007) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 )) and affirming the dismissal of his first postconviction petition ( People v. Jackson , No. 1-08-1546, 391 Ill.App.3d 1118, 367 Ill.Dec. 838, 982 N.E.2d 988 (2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 )). We incorporate these orders by reference, and we will not repeat here our prior discussion of the evidence at trial. There are no issues raised on this appeal concerning the evidence at trial. The issues raised on appeal are purely legal issues concerning defendant's sentencing.

¶ 6 After a jury trial, defendant was convicted on September 2, 2004, of first degree murder. The State proceeded on a single charge of enhanced first degree murder which meant that the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant, while armed with a firearm, personally discharged the firearm that proximately caused the victim's death. The jury was so instructed and returned a verdict of guilty.

¶ 7 At the sentencing hearing on September 28, 2004, the assistant state's attorney (ASA) observed that defendant was subject to a mandatory firearm enhancement, which provided that "25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court."³ As a result, the minimum possible sentence was 45 years, and the maximum was natural life. The ASA asked for natural life.

¶ 8 The presentence report showed that defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense and 17 years old at the time of sentencing. Defendant had no prior criminal or juvenile arrests or convictions. His parents were married and employed, and defendant lived with them and his siblings until his arrest. Defendant reported no alcohol or drug use problems. In addition, none of his family members had alcohol or drug issues, and none had been incarcerated or placed on probation. Defendant had no children and had attended school regularly until his arrest, receiving mostly A and B grades. The Cook County Jail School verified that defendant was then enrolled in its high school. Prior to his arrest, defendant had worked on Saturdays part-time at a local store for two to three years. Defendant stated that he had been a member of the "Blackstones" gang, but quit when he was arrested. Defendant also stated that he had attended the Keystone Baptist Church " ‘all my life.’ "

¶ 9 In aggravation, the State read a victim impact statement by the victim's mother, which stated, in part: "[Defendant], I remember you when you were knee high. Now look at you, a murderer, too young to really know what you have done, just a little boy who became a murderer because of a gun." In mitigation, the defense presented the statement of defendant's mother.

¶ 10 The trial court imposed a sentence of 60 years, which the trial court noted would be served at 100% of the time.⁴

Before imposing sentence, the trial court's entire remarks were:

"I have carefully considered factors in aggravation and mitigation, including the victim impact letter of [the victim's mother] and the defendant's mother's letter and the arguments of the lawyers.

[Defendant], I recall your testimony in which you stated what happened to [the victim] is no big deal to you. I disagree with you for, you see [the victim] was a human being who was somebody's son, grandson, brother and cousin.

The State proceeded to trial on an enhanced version of first degree murder. The jury not only found you guilty of killing [the victim], but when you did so, you were armed with a firearm and you personally discharged that firearm and it proximately caused the death of [the victim].

Sir, your penalty is 60 years in the [IDOC]. You will serve 100 percent of this time."

¶ 11 Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court denied on November 17, 2004. Defense counsel argued that the defendant's "no big deal" remark did not refer to the shooting itself, but rather referred to the disagreement between defendant and the victim, to show that it would not have been a motive for murder. Denying the motion, the trial court found:

"In mitigation, the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and has led a law abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime.

In aggravation, the evidence revealed the Defendant shot the victim as he walked from school. Also, the evidence established that this assault was not provoked. The victim was not armed. There were no fighting or threatening words. Finally, the Defendant fled the scene after the attack.

Once again, the Court has weighed the Defendant's rehabilitation potential and the seriousness of the offense. In addition, the Court considered the Defendant's age, the nature of the crime, the Defendant's educational and family background, and the nature and character of the Defendant himself, including his lack of criminal background, the Defendant's demeanor and character, mental habits and social environment.

The Court finds the sentence of sixty years in the [IDOC] is a proper and appropriate sentence, that the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same or like offense; that the Defendant's criminal conduct was egregious; and that the Defendant's act was premeditated and executed in a manner which he planned or predicted; that the character and attitude of the Defendant indicated that he is likely to commit another crime."

¶ 12 On appeal, this court affirmed defendant's conviction but reduced his sentence from 60 to 50 years. Jackson , No. 1-04-3656, 371 Ill.App.3d 1203, 344 Ill.Dec. 470, 936 N.E.2d 1227 (unpublished order under to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ). We observed that defendant was a 16-year-old with "no previous criminal history caught up in a street gang." Jackson , slip op. at 23, 371 Ill.App.3d 1203, 344 Ill.Dec. 470, 936 N.E.2d 1227. Finding that his 60-year sentence was "close to" a de facto life sentence, we reduced his sentence by 10 years to make it less than a life sentence and to allow for rehabilitative potential. Jackson , slip op. at 23, 371 Ill.App.3d 1203, 344 Ill.Dec. 470, 936 N.E.2d 1227.

¶ 13 A year after his direct appeal, defendant retained counsel,⁵ who filed a postconviction petition on March 24, 2008, and further amended the petition on April 11, 2008. On May 23, 2008, the trial court dismissed the amended postconviction petition at the first stage as frivolous and patently without merit, and this court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Jackson , No. 1-08-1546, 391 Ill.App.3d 1118, 367 Ill.Dec. 838, 982 N.E.2d 988 (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 14 On May 15, 2014, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file his first successive postconviction petition, arguing that, since his claims were based on recent changes in the law, he could not have raised these claims in his direct appeal or in his original 2008 postconviction petition.

¶ 15 In his pro se motion and accompanying petition, defendant argued, first, that his 50-year sentence was a de facto life sentence because the sentence exceeded his life expectancy.⁶ He argued that his sentence, which included no eligibility for parole, was, in effect,...