People v. Jenkins

2023 IL App (5th) 210085

221 N.E.3d 1161

468 Ill.Dec. 939

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Darius A. JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 5-21-0085

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Filed April 14, 2023

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Arianne Stein, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

James Gomric, State's Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Pamela S. Wells, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendant, Darius A. Jenkins, appeals the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County that granted the State's motion to reconsider an earlier ruling, entered by a different judge of the circuit court, that granted the defendant a new trial following a full evidentiary hearing that was held subsequently to a preliminary Krankel inquiry¹ that was ordered by this court. See People v. Krankel , 102 Ill. 2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984). For the following reasons, we reverse the order granting the State's motion to reconsider, and we remand for a new trial.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 For purposes of brevity and judicial economy, we discuss only the facts necessary to our disposition of this appeal. The defendant was convicted, following a December 2011 jury trial, of first degree murder for his role in the shooting death of Dominic Brown and subsequently was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 45 years. See People v. Jenkins , 2014 IL App (5th) 120177-U, ¶¶ 4-13, 2014 WL 2106699. The defendant filed a direct appeal, and thereafter this court remanded to the circuit court of St. Clair County for, inter alia , a proper preliminary Krankel inquiry into the defendant's pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. ¶¶ 22-24. Following remand, the defendant again appealed, arguing that the State improperly was allowed to participate in the preliminary Krankel inquiry held on remand. See People v. Jenkins , No. 5-15-0343, ¶ 4 (2017) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c) ). This court agreed, noting that "while conducting a preliminary Krankel inquiry, the circuit court elicited the State's input, and the State took an adversarial position, arguing that [the defendant's] claims were without merit." Id. ¶ 5. Accordingly, we "remand[ed] the cause to the circuit court for a new preliminary Krankel inquiry before a different judge and without the State's adversarial participation." Id.

¶ 4 On remand, the case was assigned to a different judge, the Honorable Stephen P. McGlynn. On April 4, 2018, Judge McGlynn held a preliminary inquiry hearing in which he asked the defendant to describe to him, in the defendant's own words, the defendant's contentions of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The defendant read a prepared note to Judge McGlynn, in which the defendant asserted each of his claims in extensive detail, including his claim that witness Arthur Reed gave perjured testimony at the defendant's trial. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to counsel's "failure to impeach and/or investigate" Reed's testimony, particularly because "[c]ounsel was aware that Reed was a snitch, willing to lie in order to get favors from the State." The defendant argued that "[c]ounsel knew that Reed had signed an affidavit claiming that he had lied as a snitch in the past for a sentence reduction in other cases," and that "[c]ounsel could have used this affidavit to impeach Reed in order to show that Reed was willing to lie in exchange for a better deal, but counsel did not." The defendant noted that he had a newer affidavit from Reed in which Reed admitted that he lied at the defendant's trial about seeing the defendant on the night of the murder. The defendant claimed that, in the affidavit, Reed stated that when Reed was being held "in segregation in Lawrence," St. Clair County Assistant State's Attorney Joe Christ approached Reed about the defendant's case, which Reed knew about "based on rumors he had heard around town." The defendant contended that "[i]n exchange for testimony that Reed saw me leave the scene of the crime that night, Christ promised to keep Reed in the St. Clair County jail as long as he could so that [Reed] could visit with his family."

¶ 5 When the defendant finished, Judge McGlynn stated as follows:

"That was well done. You certainly met the burden of establishing that there's enough questions about what happened at this trial to proceed to the next stage. I certainly am concerned any time there's an allegation of perjured testimony, [and] you have a supporting affidavit saying that the supposed eyewitness is now saying he was not there and that he lied *** after talking to prosecutors about your case in his own. So, at this stage I will appoint counsel to represent you to *** help you pull this together."

¶ 6 Judge McGlynn then described in detail the exhibits that were presented to him by the defendant at the hearing, including Reed's 2013 affidavit. Throughout the hearing, Judge McGlynn described the proceedings as being "post-conviction" and, when returning the exhibits to the defendant, told the defendant that the defendant could share them with his new counsel "in preparation of going forward on your post-conviction petition."

¶ 7 On March 25, 2019, Judge McGlynn held a status hearing in the case. He again referred to the proceedings as being "post-conviction proceedings" and stated that he expected "the next meaningful hearing to be a hearing where *** we hear the testimony of multiple witnesses." He thereafter repeatedly referred to the hearing that was to follow as an "evidentiary hearing."

¶ 8 On May 29, 2019, the evidentiary hearing took place. Judge McGlynn stated at the outset of the hearing that amended Krankel claims had been filed. Thereafter, he again referred to the proceedings before him as "these post-conviction proceedings." Defense counsel subsequently stated that he wished to clarify that "this technically is not a post-conviction petition. This is *** simply on the Krankel assertions." Judge McGlynn thereafter stated, "this is an evidentiary hearing on the criticisms that at the time of the initial trial the defendant did not have adequate assistance of counsel; that, in fact, the counsel was ineffective so much so that he should be entitled to a new trial." Counsel for the State, and the defendant's counsel, agreed with Judge McGlynn, with counsel for the State specifically stating, "We are essentially in an extended post-trial motion," to which Judge McGlynn responded, "That's the way I look at it." Judge McGlynn thereafter allowed the defense to begin calling its witnesses.

¶ 9 Extensive testimony was adduced from the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Of significance to the issue we find dispositive of this appeal, the defendant testified that at the time of the murder, he did not know Arthur Reed and would not have recognized Reed. When asked how many conversations he had had with Reed, the defendant testified, "None." He testified that he knew "a couple" of Reed's cousins or family members. He testified that he did not know that Reed was a potential witness against him until the day his trial was scheduled to start. He testified that he later learned from another inmate at the county jail that Reed "would just jump on other people's cases as a witness against them" and that the inmate gave the defendant a copy of an affidavit Reed had executed in which Reed acknowledged that he would offer testimony in other people's cases in exchange for better deals in his own cases. The defendant testified that he gave the affidavit to his trial counsel. The affidavit was admitted into evidence at the hearing. The defendant testified that after his trial, he learned that Reed was "buddies" with the wife of Dominic Brown, the murder victim in this case, and that Reed and Brown's wife "were drug addicts" who "ran around and got high together."

¶ 10 Arthur Reed testified that he was presently serving a 15-year sentence in the Illinois Department of Corrections at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. He testified that he had testified against the defendant at the defendant's trial because he "was forced to do that." He testified that he had "testified to what they told [him] to say," which was that he saw the defendant with a gun on two previous occasions and that, on the night of the murder of Brown, Reed saw the defendant "running from the scene of which the victim was killed." He testified that he did not see the defendant do those things, that he "was nowhere in that neighborhood," and that in fact he was in St. Louis, Missouri, at the time of the murder. He testified that Assistant State's Attorney Joe Christ contacted him while he was imprisoned at Lawrenceville Correctional Center and, thereafter, had him brought to St. Clair County, where Christ and a woman Reed did not identify by name told Reed "what they wanted [him] to say" at the defendant's trial, and "threatened also that they [were] going to charge [him] with a burglary to an old building."

¶ 11 Reed testified that prior to that, he had never met Christ or the woman, who Reed said was also introduced to him as an assistant state's attorney. He testified that he believed that Christ contacted him because of Reed's friendship with Brown's wife. He testified that he recognized the aforementioned affidavit that had been admitted into evidence at the hearing, that he signed it, and that it was true. He agreed that the case mentioned in that affidavit involved someone named Suntez Pasley and that, in the affidavit, Reed recanted the testimony he had given in Pasley's case. He agreed that, in the affidavit, he stated that he had lied in Pasley's case to get a better deal in his own case. Reed testified that after he testified against the defendant, "Joe Christ...