People v. Johnson

2023 IL App (4th) 210662

218 N.E.3d 394

467 Ill.Dec. 59

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Desean W. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-21-0662

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Filed March 3, 2023

James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Darrel F. Oman, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Daniel K. Wright, State's Attorney, of Springfield (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and James Ryan Williams, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Desean W. Johnson was convicted of aggravated domestic battery, domestic battery, and aggravated battery following a jury trial. The evidence at trial showed there was an altercation at a New Year's Eve gathering between defendant, his girlfriend, her two sons, and another individual. On appeal, defendant contends that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated due to procedures implemented by the Sangamon County circuit court following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant also alleges that the admonishments he received when deciding to proceed pro se were insufficient under supreme court rules. He also claims that the trial court erred in refusing to tender to the jury a self-defense instruction. Finally, defendant claims there was sufficient cumulative error during the proceedings to warrant reversal of his conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was arrested in the early hours of January 1, 2020, after police responded to an altercation at the home of his paramour, Erica Murray, who was hosting a New Year's Eve gathering. The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated domestic battery ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3 (West 2020) ), three counts of aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(f)(1), (a)(5)), and one count of domestic battery (id. § 12-3.2(a)(2)). The indictments alleged defendant committed these offenses by strangling and stabbing Murray, causing bodily harm to Murray's son J.H. by cutting him with a knife, and strangling Kenisha Davis, Murray's friend.

¶ 4 At his arraignment, defendant was informed of the charges against him as well as their potential penalties. On January 9, 2020, defendant appeared with his appointed public defender and demanded a preliminary hearing. The State moved to continue the matter, and defendant objected, asserting his right to a preliminary hearing. The matter was continued. There were two more hearings in January 2020, at which defendant demanded a preliminary hearing and the State moved to continue the matter, alleging that it was unable to locate or subpoena the arresting officer. The State was granted continuances over objection at each hearing.

¶ 5 On January 29, 2020, the State filed a grand jury indictment. The next day, defendant appeared with counsel. The State explained the possible sentences for defendant in relation to each count in the indictment. Defense counsel entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a jury trial. Defendant began to voice his displeasure with appointed counsel. The court explained that the matter had been assigned to another judge and the appropriate remedy was to file a motion with the assigned judge.

¶ 6 At a status hearing conducted February 10, 2020, defense counsel explained that defendant had given him two motions to file in the case but that he had just been assigned to the matter and wanted a continuance to review the file and the motions. Defendant immediately interjected, "Oh, no. I want a speedy trial. I want a speedy trial." While attempting to schedule another hearing date, defendant again insisted on a speedy trial. Counsel explained he was not prepared to try the case and the State explained the grand jury transcript had not been returned. Counsel informed defendant that he had the opportunity to go pro se , but otherwise, counsel was not prepared to proceed to trial. Defendant then began arguing the merits of his motion to dismiss the grand jury indictment to the court. The following exchange then occurred.

"THE COURT: I'm going to give your attorney the continuance. We're going to put this on March 23rd. If you're not happy with that, you can hire your own counsel, or you can go pro se.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I'm not happy with that. I'm not happy with that.

MR. REISER [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: She just gave you the two options.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. So whatever you gotta do. I don't want the March 23rd court date, I want a speedy trial. That don't sound like 120 days to me. If I have to go pro se , then that's what it gotta be."

The court struck the order granting the continuance and scheduled a hearing for the following day to admonish defendant on the consequences of proceeding without counsel.

¶ 7 The next day, defendant appeared and almost immediately began arguing the substance of two motions to dismiss that defense counsel had not filed. In addressing his request to proceed pro se , defendant admitted he wanted to be represented by counsel but his public defender had court appearances preventing him from proceeding as quickly as he desired. The court explained that counsel had multiple jury trials scheduled in front of defendant's case and had only just received discovery in this case. Defendant then took issue with the fact that counsel was not arguing his motion to dismiss. The court explained that being represented by counsel meant the attorney would decide what motions would be filed in the case. Counsel had not had a chance to review the motion and was not prepared to argue it. The court again admonished defendant that, if he wanted to file and argue the motion at that moment, he would need to go pro se. The hearing then devolved into defendant arguing the merits of his motion to dismiss. Eventually, defendant agreed to retain appointed counsel, and the matter was set for status. Before the hearing concluded, defendant attempted to obtain the prosecutor's personal information for a tort claim he was planning to file. The court directed him to file a request under the Freedom of Information Act ( 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2020)).

¶ 8 At a status hearing on March 3, 2020, defense counsel advised the court that he had reviewed defendant's proposed motions and had met with him in person to discuss the case. Following that conversation, defendant expressed to counsel his desire to represent himself. Defendant complained to the court that counsel was incompetent, lazy, and had too busy of a schedule and asked the court to find a public defender who would "work harder." The court responded, "In no way do I want you to go pro se. " After a lengthy discussion, the court finally admonished defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984), explaining the charges he faced; the minimum and maximum sentence of each offense, including the mandatory supervised release terms and whether the sentences would run consecutively or concurrently; and that he had the right to be represented by counsel. Defendant stated that he understood the admonishments. When the court explained that he would be treated as if he were an attorney and would need to comply with applicable trial rules, defendant began to express doubt about his decision. The court offered to schedule another hearing so that defendant could consider the decision, but defendant declined. The court then began to admonish defendant pursuant to a local court document titled "waiver of right to counsel." Defendant again began to question whether he wanted to proceed pro se , and the court stated, "this is not a good avenue for you to take. You just need to let Mr. Reiser do his job. So I'm going to ask you again: Do you want to go pro se or do you want to continue with Mr. Resier as your attorney? Or you can hire private counsel." Unsure of his decision, defendant once again began arguing counsel needed to file his motion to dismiss. The court then directed defendant to consider what had been discussed and continued the matter.

¶ 9 When defendant appeared in front of the trial court three days later, he initially indicated he wished to proceed without counsel. The court again admonished him on the nature of the charges he faced and the minimum and maximum sentences. The court then asked defendant if he understood the consequences he was facing. Defendant replied, "Fourteen years, 85 percent, yes." The court also admonished defendant he would be at a substantial disadvantage proceeding without counsel and would not be able to complain on appeal he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant took issue with that assertion and began arguing with the court. The court replied, "You have a competent attorney who has been appointed to represent you. Just because you disagree on tactical decisions isn't a sufficient reason to appeal going pro se. " Once the court finished admonishing defendant, he stated that he wished to continue with appointed counsel.

¶ 10 As is by now well known, the COVID-19 pandemic was well underway by April 2020, and the Illinois Supreme Court entered a series of administrative orders in response. The first such order directed circuit courts to implement procedures to minimize the impact of the pandemic while still providing access to justice and continuing to hear essential court matters and proceedings. In re Illinois Courts Response to COVID-19 Emergency , Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (Mar. 17, 2020). Another order quickly followed, allowing for the chief judge of each circuit to continue trials for 60 days and until further order of the court; the order further provided that, in criminal matters, "any delay resulting from this emergency order shall not be attributable to either the State or the defendant for purpose of section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 [citation]." In re Illinois Courts Response to COVID-19 Emergency/Impact on...