People v. Johnson

2021 IL App (3d) 180357

195 N.E.3d 686

457 Ill.Dec. 550

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Philip JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal No. 3-18-0357

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Filed February 26, 2021

James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and Jay Wiegman, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Stewart J. Umholtz, State's Attorney, of Pekin (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Stephanie Raymond, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendant, Philip Johnson, appeals the second-stage dismissal of his successive postconviction petition. The defendant argues that his constitutional rights were violated where he received a de facto life sentence as a juvenile offender.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The defendant and his older sister, Angela S. Oakes, were charged by information with two counts of first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994)) for killing their father, James T. Johnson, and their father's girlfriend, Frances M. Buck. The defendant was 16 years old at the time; Oakes was 20 years old. The defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count of first degree murder for killing Buck and one count of the lesser offense of second degree murder (id. § 9-2(a)(2)) for killing his father. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to recommend a total sentence of 110 years’ imprisonment, which included consecutive terms of 90 years for first degree murder and 20 years for second degree murder.

¶ 4 At the plea hearing, the State advised the court that, if the defendant proceeded to trial and was convicted on the original charges, the defendant would be sentenced to a mandatory sentence of natural life imprisonment without parole. However, the State then explained that under the charges he was pleading guilty to, the normal sentencing range for first degree murder would be 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment, but the term would be extended to 100 years due to the brutal and heinous nature of the killing. For second degree murder, the State explained that defendant faced a range of 4 to 20 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 5 The court admonished the defendant, asked the defendant some questions, and read the charges and the possible penalties to the defendant. The State then presented the factual basis for the plea, stating that on July 20, 1994, the dead bodies of James and Buck were discovered in their bed by James's ex-wife. An autopsy revealed the cause of death for both victims to be gunshot wounds to their heads. During a police interview, the defendant admitted to killing his father and Buck, stating that, at the time of the murder, the defendant and Oakes were overcome by their father's physical and emotional abuse.¹ The defendant went into his father's room while he slept and shot his father in the head with a .22-caliber, single-shot rifle. Buck awoke from the sound of the shot, and the defendant shot Buck in the head because she saw him. He then left the residence and disposed of the gun.

¶ 6 The court found the defendant's guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily made and found that a factual basis existed for the plea. The court asked if, in light of the plea agreement, the defense waived evidence in mitigation and the preparation of a presentence investigation report. Defense counsel stated that it did. The court asked the State if it had information regarding the defendant's criminal history. The State responded that it was not aware that the defendant had any prior criminal history. The court then accepted the plea, sentencing the defendant, per the terms of the plea, to 90 years’ imprisonment for the first degree murder of Buck and a consecutive sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment for the second degree murder of his father. The court's written order found the defendant eligible for the extended-term sentence for the murder of Buck due to the exceptionally brutal and heinous nature of the killing. The court also noted that the defendant was eligible for good conduct credit, but the Department of Corrections alone would determine whether he received that credit.

¶ 7 The defendant filed his first postconviction petition in 1999. The trial court denied the petition, and this court granted defense counsel's motion for leave to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley , 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). People v. Johnson , No. 3-06-0868, 354 Ill.Dec. 277, 957 N.E.2d 593 (2008) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 8 In 2017, the defendant filed an "expedited" motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, which is the subject of this appeal. The court granted the defendant leave to file the petition and appointed counsel. Counsel amended the petition to allege the defendant's constitutional rights were violated under Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), where he was sentenced to a de facto life sentence without consideration of his youth and attendant circumstances.

¶ 9 Attached to the petition were several exhibits, including a psychological evaluation and report made in preparation for trial, school records, and statements from the defendant's family. The evaluation and accompanying exhibits showed that the defendant suffered from learning disabilities and had a verbal IQ of 77, which placed him in the borderline range of intellectual functioning. The defendant repeated two grades twice in school. The psychological report summarized statements given by multiple witnesses regarding the long-term physical and emotional abuse the defendant and Oakes received at the hand of their father. James was described as a "mean drunk" who shot several family pets in front of the defendant and Oakes, hit the defendant daily with his hands and other objects, such as a screwdriver, and was very controlling. James's nickname for the defendant was " ‘Stumb,’ stuck between stupid and dumb." James once broke the defendant's arm. He also limited the defendant's social interactions. The defendant had sought help from authorities, including teachers and the police, to no avail. The psychologist noted that the defendant "presented as intensely angry about how his father had treated him yet tearful and deeply remorseful about his actions." The defendant told the psychologist that he did not think about the consequences of the shooting at the time but only thought about living a life without the physical and emotional abuse. The defendant became tearful when speaking with the psychologist, stating that he would take it back if he could. Based on the results of several psychological tests, the psychologist opined that the defendant had a strength in visual perception and visual association, which is "seen in individuals growing up in a hostile social environment." Moreover, the psychologist stated that the test scores suggested that the defendant acted under extreme duress and followed a pattern "common in individuals who have been subjected to physical abuse, to demeaning evaluations, and to excessive familial control preventing normal development, socialization, and achievement." The psychologist found that the defendant suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and possessed a limited capacity to think flexibly, weigh alternatives, and anticipate consequences. The psychologist opined that the defendant's failed attempts to stop his father's abuse by seeking help, coupled with his inability to concentrate and control himself, likely caused the defendant to believe killing his father was his only recourse.

¶ 10 The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that Miller did not apply because the defendant did not receive a mandatory life sentence or a de facto life sentence but a discretionary sentence that the defendant agreed to and the court found appropriate. The court granted the motion and dismissed the petition, finding that the constitutional issues the defendant raised could not be established since he entered into a fully negotiated guilty plea.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his successive postconviction petition at the second stage of the proceedings. A postconviction proceeding is a collateral proceeding that allows review of constitutional issues that were not, and could not have been, adjudicated on direct appeal. People v. Ortiz , 235 Ill. 2d 319, 328, 336 Ill.Dec. 16, 919 N.E.2d 941 (2009). The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) generally contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. Ortiz , 235 Ill. 2d at 328, 336 Ill.Dec. 16, 919 N.E.2d 941. However, a defendant may seek leave of court to file a successive postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). Where, as here, a defendant is granted leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition is effectively advanced to the second stage of postconviction proceedings. See People v. Wrice , 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 90, 357 Ill.Dec. 33, 962 N.E.2d 934 ; People v. Almodovar , 2013 IL App (1st) 101476, ¶ 81, 368 Ill.Dec. 375, 984 N.E.2d 100. At the second stage, the trial court must determine "whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation." People v. Edwards , 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246, 258 Ill.Dec. 753, 757 N.E.2d 442 (2001). On appeal, our review is de novo. People v. Lee , 2016 IL App (1st) 152425, ¶ 50, 405 Ill.Dec. 1, 57 N.E.3d 686.

¶ 13 The defendant's petition alleged that the de facto life sentence he received as part of his fully negotiated guilty plea is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ). Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court failed to consider his youth and its attendant...