People v. Johnson

870 N.E.2d 415

225 Ill.2d 573

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Charles JOHNSON, Appellee.

No. 102096.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 24, 2007.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin and Michael Glick, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, James Fitzgerald, Mary L. Boland and Laura M. Boedeker, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Kari K. Firebaugh, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

The central issue in this case is whether the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)) violates due process because it required the defendant, Charles Johnson, to register as a sex offender after he was convicted, in the circuit court of Cook County, of aggravated kidnapping of a minor. See 720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000). The State appeals the decision of the appellate court that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. 363 Ill.App.3d 356, 300 Ill.Dec 176, 843 N.E.2d 434. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

In 1986, the General Assembly enacted the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act, which required persons convicted of sex offenses against children to register with local law enforcement. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 221 et seq. In 1996, the statute was renamed the Sex Offender Registration Act and expanded to include certain sex offenses against adults, as well as nonsexual offenses against children. See 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1996). Section 2(A)(1)(a) of the Act defined "sex offender" as a person charged with and convicted of an enumerated sex offense. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a) (West 2002). Section 2(B)(1.5) of the Act included, in its definition of "sex offense," aggravated kidnapping "when the victim is a person under 18 years of age, the defendant is not a parent of the victim, and the offense was committed on or after January 1, 1996." 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2002). A person convicted of a sex offense must register as a sex offender with local law enforcement. See 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2002).

On October 23, 1999, the defendant and four accomplices kidnapped Elmora Kimbrough and her 20-month-old grand-daughter and demanded a ransom from Kimbrough's son. Two of the accomplices were arrested when they attempted to collect the ransom, and they led the police to a van where the victims and the defendant were found. The defendant was arrested and later indicted on one count of armed robbery, one count of armed violence, one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, one count of aggravated battery, nine counts of aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of unlawful use of a weapon.

On December 14, 2001, the defendant entered open guilty pleas to the armed robbery of Kimbrough and the aggravated kidnapping of her granddaughter, and the State dismissed the remaining counts against him. The trial court found a factual basis for the guilty pleas, and the defendant became subject to the registration requirements of the Act as a person charged with and convicted of aggravated kidnapping of a minor by a nonparent. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed the facts of this case and noted that Kimbrough had been undressed and bound during the kidnapping in order to control her, but that there were no sexual assault allegations. On January 29, 2002, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 17 years' imprisonment for each offense. He appealed.

The appellate court determined that the defendant received negotiated plea admonishments under Supreme Court Rule 605(c), rather than open plea admonishments under Rule 605(b) (see 210 Ill.2d R. 605(b)), and remanded for compliance with that rule. People v. Johnson, No. 1-02-2531, 344 Ill.App.3d 1213, 307 Ill.Dec. 316, 859 N.E.2d 316 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On remand, the trial court admonished the defendant in accordance with Rule 605(b) and denied the defendant's pro se "motion to correct a void sentence" and "motion requesting reconsideration and reduction of sentence." In its ruling the court repeated that there were no sexual assault allegations: Kimbrough "was held, and at one time all her clothes were taken off * * *, I guess as part of controlling her they made her take all her clothes off." The defendant appealed, raising for the first time the constitutionality of the Act.

The appellate court determined that defense counsel failed to file a certificate under Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (see 210 Ill.2d R. 604(d)), and again remanded for compliance with that rule. 363 Ill.App.3d at 360, 300 Ill.Dec. 176, 843 N.E.2d 434. The appellate court further held that the Act, as applied to the defendant, violated the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 363 Ill.App.3d at 363-64, 300 Ill.Dec. 176, 843 N.E.2d 434. The appellate court found, "The record indicates that defendant's offense of aggravated kidnaping was not sexually motivated." 363 Ill.App.3d at 363, 300 Ill.Dec. 176, 843 N.E.2d 434. Consequently, concluded the court, there was no rational relationship between the defendant's designation as a sex offender and the state's interest in protecting the public. 363 Ill.App.3d at 363, 300 Ill.Dec. 176, 843 N.E.2d 434.

Justice Wolfson concurred with the majority's decision to remand the cause for a Rule 604(d) certificate, but he dissented on the constitutional issue. 363 Ill.App.3d at 364, 300 Ill.Dec. 176, 843 N.E.2d 434 (Wolfson, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to Justice Wolfson,

"It is the nature of the crime—kidnaping a child—that triggers the Registration Act provisions. * * *

* * * Once an offender makes the decision to commit the aggravated kidnaping of a child, there is a very real possibility the child will become a victim of sexual abuse. Our reports are filled with such cases.

In this case the crime was interrupted while it was in progress. The child was being held in a stolen van when the police arrived. The legislature has the authority to protect children from such an offender. Requiring him to register his name and address with law enforcement officials does not offend due process of law." 363 Ill.App.3d at 364-65, 300 Ill.Dec. 176, 843 N.E.2d 434 (Wolfson, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).

ANALYSIS

After we allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal, Public Act 94-945 was adopted. Effective June 27, 2006, Public Act 94-945 amended section 2(B)(1.5) and redefined the term "sex offense" under the Act. Section 2(B)(1.5) of the Act now includes, in its definition of sex offense, aggravated kidnapping "when the victim is a person under 18 years of age, the defendant is not a parent of the victim, the offense was sexually motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act, and the offense was committed on or after January 1, 1996." (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 94-945, § 1025, eff. June 27, 2006 (amending 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5)).

Public Act 94-945 also contained the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act. See Pub. Act 94-945, eff. June 27, 2006 (adding 730 ILCS 154/1 et seq.). A person convicted of, inter alia, aggravated kidnapping of a minor by a nonparent must now register under the Sex Offender Registration Act when the offense is sexually motivated, and under the Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act when it is not. Section 11 of this Act provides for transfers from one registry to the other:

"(a) The registration information for a person registered under the Sex Offender Registration Act who was convicted or adjudicated for an offense listed in subsection (b) of Section 5 of this Act may only be transferred to the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registry if all the following conditions are met:

(1) The offender's sole offense requiring registration was a conviction or adjudication for an offense or offenses listed in subsection (b) of Section 5 of this Act.

(2) The State's Attorney's Office in the county in which the offender was convicted has verified, on a form prescribed by the Illinois State Police, that the person's crime that required or requires registration was not sexually motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act.

(3) The completed form has been received by the registering law enforcement agency and the Illinois State Police's Sex Offender Registration Unit." Pub. Act 94-945, eff. June 27, 2006 (adding 730 ILCS 154/11(a)).

Though we have held that the Sex Offender Registration Act applies retroactively (see People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413, 418, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000)), we have not held that the amendments to that statute in Public Act 94-945 do so. Generally, a statutory amendment cannot be given retroactive effect absent a clear expression of legislative intent. See In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d 300, 321 n. 3, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002); see also People v. Atkins, 217 Ill.2d 66, 71, 298 Ill.Dec. 50, 838 N.E.2d 943 (2005) (intimating that a statutory amendment may be applied retroactively where the legislature so intends). Here, amended section 2(B)(1.5), like original section 2(B)(1.5), applies to persons convicted of aggravated kidnapping of a minor after January 1, 1996. This obviously includes the defendant. Under the original statute, aggravated kidnapping of a minor was defined as a sex offense, regardless of its motivation. As Justice Wolfson noted in his dissent, the nature of the crime itself triggered the registration requirement. See 363 Ill.App.3d at 364, 300 Ill.Dec. 176, 843 N.E.2d 434 (Wolfson, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). Under the amended sta...