People v. Jones

2021 IL App (1st) 180996

187 N.E.3d 167

453 Ill.Dec. 193

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Anthony JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-18-0996

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.

Opinion filed March 31, 2021

Rehearing denied May 3, 2021

James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Stephen L. Gentry, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Sarah L. Simpson, and Brad Dickey, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Anthony Jones was convicted, after a jury trial, of first degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Robert Blackman. Defendant was convicted under an accountability theory, while the actual shooter was acquitted by a separate jury. Defendant, who was 19 years old at the time of the offense, was sentenced to a total of 50 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). On this appeal, defendant raises one claim: that he was unconstitutionally sentenced to a de facto life sentence.

¶ 2 For the following reasons, we vacate defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing in light of People v. Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763, and People v. House , 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, 436 Ill.Dec. 355, 142 N.E.3d 756.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In this appeal, defendant does not challenge either the sufficiency of the evidence against him or the admission of any testimony or exhibits at trial. Therefore, we summarize the facts established at trial.

¶ 5 The evidence at trial established that defendant and his codefendant, Jerome Moore, were attempting to rob a house where drugs were sold. On October 5, 2011, at 11:45 p.m., defendant and codefendant approached the front porch of the house where a group of men were seated. Defendant asked to buy marijuana, and two men then entered the house. Defendant and codefendant then drew weapons from the front of their pants and pointed them at the men remaining on the porch. When one of the men returned to the doorway with the drugs, he observed defendant with his gun drawn, yelled that they were being robbed, slammed the door, and ran to the back of the house. Defendant then entered the house, where Blackman was sitting in the living room with a 12-year old girl, watching television. Defendant grabbed the girl, wrapped his arm around her neck, and pointed a gun at her. Blackman knocked the gun out of defendant's hands, and the girl ran from the room. Blackman knocked defendant down and ran outside, where he and codefendant began struggling for control of codefendant's gun. The gun fired, killing Blackman.

¶ 6 Clinte Smith¹ testified that, after defendant was knocked down, he held defendant's head on the ground with his knee until defendant passed out. Antonio Smith testified that he found defendant unconscious and sitting propped against the living room wall. Antonio Smith then hit the unconscious defendant 30 or 40 times in the head with a gun, while Devontae Dorsey beat defendant with a metal fan and Clinte Smith hit defendant with his knees. While the three men were beating the unconscious defendant, they heard the gunshots fired in front of the house that killed Blackman. Clydell Sistruck also testified that later on, after the shooting, he and the females in the house continued to beat defendant.

¶ 7 Police later recovered cocaine and cannabis from Antonio Smith's bedroom during a search of the house.

¶ 8 Defendant and codefendant were tried in a simultaneous trial to separate juries. Defendant's jury returned a verdict of guilty for the first degree murder of Blackman. Codefendant's jury found him not guilty of first degree murder.

¶ 9 After considering factors in mitigation and aggravation, the trial court sentenced defendant on April 11, 2018, to 35 years, plus an additional 15 years for being armed with a firearm, for a total of 50 years with IDOC. On April 11, 2018, defendant filed a notice of appeal, and this timely appeal followed.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 In this appeal, defendant, age 19 at the time of the offense, claims that his 50-year sentence is excessive and unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

¶ 12 "The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment ‘guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.’ " Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 469, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ). In Miller , 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, the United States Supreme Court found that mandatory life without parole for offenders under 18 years old violated the eighth amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court has since found that the reasoning of " Miller applies to discretionary sentences" as well. People v. Holman , 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, 418 Ill.Dec. 889, 91 N.E.3d 849 ; see People v. Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763 ( Miller applies to juvenile life sentences, whether "mandatory or discretionary"). Our supreme court found that the key issue is not whether the sentence was mandatory or discretionary but whether a certain process was followed, namely, a sentencing hearing where youth and its attendant characteristics were considered. Holman , 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 37-38, 418 Ill.Dec. 889, 91 N.E.3d 849. In Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763, our supreme court clarified that for a juvenile, a de facto life sentence was a sentence that was more than 40 years long. Thus, an over-40-year sentence for an offender under 18 years old, whether mandatory or discretionary, violates the eighth amendment, if the trial court failed to specifically consider "some variant of the Miller factors." Holman , 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 40, 43-44, 418 Ill.Dec. 889, 91 N.E.3d 849.

¶ 13 However, offenders, such as defendant, who are 18 years old or older, cannot raise a facial challenge to their sentences under the eighth amendment and the Miller line of cases. People v. Harris , 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 59-61, 427 Ill.Dec. 833, 120 N.E.3d 900.

¶ 14 As a result, Illinois courts typically consider the sentencing claims of young adults under the proportionate penalties clause rather than the eighth amendment.

E.g. , People v. Minniefield , 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶¶ 37-38, 440 Ill.Dec. 910, 155 N.E.3d 1166 (considering a 19-year-old defendant's as-applied sentencing claim under the proportionate penalties clause rather than the eighth amendment). "This is because federal cases have generally drawn a line at 18 years of age" and "because the [Illinois] proportionate penalties clause offers a broader path to the same types of relief." People v. Franklin , 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51, 446 Ill.Dec. 866, 171 N.E.3d 971 ; see People v. Savage , 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 61, 448 Ill.Dec. 897 178 N.E.3d 221 ; People v. Ross , 2020 IL App (1st) 171202, ¶ 20, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––.

¶ 15 Specifically, the proportionate penalties clause provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art I, § 11. "The purpose of the proportionate penalties clause is to add a limitation on penalties beyond those provided by the eighth amendment and to add the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Minniefield , 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 35, 440 Ill.Dec. 910, 155 N.E.3d 1166 ; see Franklin , 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 55, 446 Ill.Dec. 866, 171 N.E.3d 971 ; Savage , 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 65, 448 Ill.Dec. 897 178 N.E.3d 221. Thus, the proportionate penalties clause goes further than the eighth amendment in offering protection against oppressive penalties. Minniefield , 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 35, 440 Ill.Dec. 910, 155 N.E.3d 1166 ; see also People v. Clemons , 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 39, 360 Ill.Dec. 293, 968 N.E.2d 1046 ; People v. Fernandez , 2014 IL App (1st) 120508, ¶ 63, 384 Ill.Dec. 55, 16 N.E.3d 151 ("the Illinois Constitution places greater restrictions on criminal sentencing than the eighth amendment's prohibition"). "Unlike other constitutional provisions affecting criminal defendants, these two provisions—the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause—are not in lockstep." Franklin , 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 55, 446 Ill.Dec. 866, 171 N.E.3d 971 ; see Savage , 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 65, 448 Ill.Dec. 897, 178 N.E.3d 221.

¶ 16 In this appeal, defendant claims that his 50-year prison term was a de facto life sentence under Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763. The State argues that his claim was forfeited by his alleged failure to raise this claim at sentencing. Defendant was sentenced on April 11, 2018, and the motion to reconsider his sentence was denied immediately after his sentencing, also on April 11, 2018. A year later, Buffer was decided on April 18, 2019. Defendant could not have raised a Buffer claim before Buffer was decided.² Therefore, he has not forfeited his claim.

¶ 17 As this court has stated before, we "do not mean to impugn the abilities or conscientiousness of the judge below." People v. DiCorpo , 2020 IL App (1st) 172082, ¶ 57, 448 Ill.Dec. 744, 177 N.E.3d 1095. Rather, we are aware that the law regarding juvenile and young adult sentencing has been "a rapidly evolving area of the law, and the court below did not have the benefit of our supreme court's more recent cases in this area such as Buffer and People v. Harris , 2018 IL 121932 [427 Ill.Dec. 833, 120 N.E.3d 900], and our own recent cases," such as House , 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, 436 Ill.Dec. 355, 142 N.E.3d 756, and a now-long line of similar cases. DiCorpo , 2020 IL App (1s...