People v. Jones

1

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUMAANE AMUNRA JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 360171

Court of Appeals of Michigan

April 11, 2024

UNPUBLISHED

Saginaw Circuit Court LC No. 20-046833-FH

Before: LETICA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by right his jury convictions on two counts of third-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(5). Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12 to serve concurrent terms of 3 to 15 years' imprisonment. We affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant's two children, JJ and RJ, began living with defendant in the summer of 2018. Although defendant's ex-girlfriend and JJ testified that things were good at first, at trial, defendant's ex-girlfriend and the children testified that their situation steadily went downhill, with the children receiving "whoopings."^[1] After a whooping, JJ observed that RJ's back was filled with scars. Both JJ and RJ testified about an incident during which each of them had been made to stand in the hallway while the other was made to take off their clothes^[2] and then were struck with a belt multiple times. Defendant's ex-girlfriend and JJ also testified that defendant slapped and punched JJ, and defendant's ex-girlfriend and both children testified that defendant pinched RJ. RJ testified at trial that she still had a mark on her leg from where defendant had pinched her.

In January 2019, defendant's ex-girlfriend-who had been forbidden from disciplining the children and was instructed to tell defendant when they behaved poorly-took a video of JJ being disrespectful toward her. After she showed the video to defendant, he whooped the children. JJ testified that the incident was like the last incident, in which he and RJ had been whooped in the bedroom, but that they were struck fewer times. Sometime later, defendant's ex-girlfriend went to a gas station, where she called the police and asked them to conduct a wellness check on the children. Officers testified that there were visible bruises on the children, and the officer who interviewed RJ testified that she had scarring on her legs. When a lieutenant questioned defendant about the children's injuries, defendant stated that the children had been acting up and that he had whooped them, but that he had not seen injuries and that the whooping had not been excessive.

Defendant testified at trial that he whooped the children but that he did so only for the purposes of discipline after other methods of discipline did not work. He testified that he had not been trying to injure the children or "put pain on anybody." Despite testifying that he did not think that he hit them "hard" enough "to leave a mark on them," defendant recognized that the children had welts, marks, and injuries after he struck them with a belt. Both defendant and defendant's father testified that that was the method defendant was disciplined with when he was a child. Defendant denied punching JJ or putting his hands around JJ's throat. He stated that he had "popped" the children on their arms or legs but never slapped, punched, pinched, or threatened them. Defendant argued that his ex-girlfriend only called the police after he spent two nights at a strip club and that most of the abuse allegations arose after the children were subjected to the influence of their mother.

The trial court instructed the jury that one charge of child abuse related to JJ and the other related to RJ. It instructed the jury that the prosecutor was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes occurred "between June 25, 2018 and September 24, 2019, within Saginaw County." The court also instructed the jury that the prosecution had introduced evidence of other acts of domestic violence, but the jury was only to consider them when deciding whether defendant committed the offenses for which he was on trial. The jury found defendant guilty as previously described, but acquitted him of a charge of assault by strangulation.

II. VAGUENESS

Defendant argues that the third-degree child abuse statute is unconstitutionally vague because, by failing to define what force is "reasonable," it does not provide fair notice about what conduct is proscribed. Defendant also argues that this lack of definition leads to unlimited discretion on the part of the finder of fact. We disagree with both arguments.

As an initial matter, defendant has not preserved this issue. A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is unpreserved unless the defendant raised the challenge before the trial court. People v Lawhorn, 320 Mich.App. 194, 197 n 1; 907 N.W.2d 832 (2017). Generally, this Court reviews de novo issues regarding the constitutionality of a statute. People v Douglas, 295 Mich.App. 129, 135; 813 N.W.2d 337 (2011). However, this Court reviews unpreserved claims of constitutional error for plain error affecting a party's substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763; 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, and it affects substantial rights if it affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is derived from the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 17, which guarantee that the state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. People v Roberts, 292 Mich.App. 492, 497; 808 N.W.2d 290 (2011). See also Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109; 92 S.Ct. 2294; 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)." 'It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.'" Lawhorn, 320 Mich.App. at 198, quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109. A penal statute is unconstitutionally vague if (1) it does not provide fair notice of the proscribed conduct, (2) it encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, or (3) its coverage is overbroad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms. Roberts, 292 Mich.App. at 497.

A statute does not provide fair notice of the proscribed conduct when persons of ordinary intelligence might speculate about the statute's meaning or differ in their applications. Lawhorn, 320 Mich.App. at 200. Fair notice exists when the statute's meaning can be determined by considering judicial interpretations, common law, dictionaries, treatises, or the common meanings of words. Id. However, the words used in a statute are not required to have a single meaning or define an offense with "mathematical certainty." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if a statute may be vague in theory, it is sufficiently definite when the defendant's conduct falls within that prohibited by the properly construed statute. Id.

We conclude that the third-degree child abuse statute provides fair notice of the conduct prohibited when applied to the facts of defendant's case. The definition of "reasonableness" can easily be determined by considering judicial interpretations and dictionaries.

A person is guilty of child abuse in the third degree if any of the following apply:

(a) The person knowingly or intentionally causes physical harm to a child.

(b) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act that under the circumstances poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to a child, and the act results in physical harm to a child. [MCL 750.136b(5).]

"This section does not prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person permitted by law or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking steps to reasonably discipline a child, including the use of reasonable force." MCL 750.136b(9). In People v Gregg, 206 Mich.App. 208, 212-213; 520 N.W.2d 690 (1994), this Court rejected a similar argument that MCL 750.136b is overly broad because it does not define "reasonable force." We reasoned that the term "reasonable" is easily ascertained by consulting dictionaries. Id. at 213. Accordingly, the meaning of this phrase is easy to ascertain by consulting dictionaries and current caselaw.

Further, defendant's as-applied challenge fails because a defendant's action of beating a child with a belt causing scars clearly falls within the conduct that MCL 750.136b(5) prohibits. See Lawhorn, 320 Mich.App. at 204. Regardless of whether the punches, slaps, and pinches constituted reasonable force, JJ and RJ both testified that defendant struck them with a belt, and multiple witnesses-including the doctor who evaluated the children's injuries in January 2019- testified about the bruises that had resulted. Even setting aside the children's graphic descriptions of their beatings, the force that defendant used fell within the definition of force that was not fair, proper, or moderate.

Defendant's argument that the third-degree child abuse statute's lack of definitions may lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement also lacks merit. A criminal statute is required to provide standards for its enforcement and administration to guard against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. at 203. Scienter requirements alleviate vagueness concerns. Id. MCL 750.136b includes scienter requirements that provide sufficient standards that prevent the statute from being applied in a subjective manner. Id.

III. REASONABLE-FORCE INSTRUCTION

The child abuse statute "does not prohibit a parent from taking steps to reasonably discipline a child, including the use of reasonable force." MCL 750.136b(9). Defendant argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by intending to request an instruction on the definition of "reasonable force," but then failing to do so in timely fashion. During the remand hearing before the trial court, appellate counsel suggested the...