People v. Jones

2023 IL 127810

216 N.E.3d 165

465 Ill.Dec. 914

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Teranza JONES, Appellant.

Docket No. 127810

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed January 20, 2023

Rehearing Denied March 27, 2023

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Catherine K. Hart, Deputy Defender, and Darrel F. Oman and Leo Draws, Assistant Appellate Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Joshua M. Schneider, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Teranza Jones was convicted of unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)) and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed her conviction, arguing that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also argued she was denied a fair trial, as well as the effective assistance of counsel, based upon an instruction given to the jury.

¶ 2 The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the Macon County circuit court's judgment. 2021 IL App (4th) 190751-U, 2021 WL 4344161. For the following reasons, we affirm the appellate court.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was arrested following a traffic stop on January 1, 2019, and subsequently was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The State presented one witness in its case-in-chief, Officer Zachary Wakeland. Officer Wakeland testified that he was a patrol officer with the Decatur Police Department. On January 1, 2019, Officer Wakeland stopped a vehicle driven by defendant. During the stop, Officer Wakeland searched defendant's car and found two rounds of .40-caliber ammunition in the glove compartment underneath the vehicle's owner's manual, in a stack of papers. Officer Wakeland explained that, when an officer finds ammunition or anything to do with firearms, the officer checks to see if the person in possession of that ammunition or firearm has a Firearm Owner's Identification card (FOID card) or if the person is a convicted felon. Officer Wakeland told defendant that she was going to be arrested for possession of the ammunition. Defendant responded that the ammunition belonged to her husband.

¶ 5 The State rested its case following the testimony of Officer Wakeland. At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had not proved the elements necessary for the offense. The trial court denied defendant's motion.

¶ 6 Defendant then testified in her own defense. Defendant acknowledged that she had a prior felony conviction for identity theft from 2002. On the night she was stopped, defendant was leaving her uncle's house and was going around the corner to another house. While her vehicle was being searched, defendant was placed in the back of a police vehicle for approximately an hour. When asked about the .40-caliber ammunition that was found in the vehicle, defendant told the officer that the ammunition belonged to her husband.¹ Defendant explained that she knew it was her husband's ammunition because they shared a vehicle and because her husband had guns and a FOID card. If a bullet was found in her vehicle, defendant's automatic assumption was that it belonged to her husband. Defendant had no idea that the ammunition was there before the officer confronted her with it.

¶ 7 Defendant's husband, Lee Brown, then testified on defendant's behalf. Brown stated that he and defendant had been married for almost 10 years. Brown stated that the vehicle defendant was driving on January 1, 2019, was registered in her name only but that he also used the vehicle. Brown drove the vehicle to and from East St. Louis, where his children lived. Whenever Brown drove to East St. Louis, he took his firearm with him. When Brown transported his firearm, he put the gun in its case in the trunk and put the clip, or the ammunition, in the glove compartment. Brown identified his FOID card, which was introduced into evidence. Brown also identified the two .40-caliber cartridges as his. Brown testified that he was home, sleeping, when defendant was pulled over. Defendant was pulled over to the side of their house, so Brown was awakened by the police lights and went outside. After an officer put defendant into the squad car, Brown told the officer that the bullets were his and that he had a FOID card.

¶ 8 On cross-examination, Brown testified that defendant knew that he transported a firearm in her car. At the close of Brown's testimony, the defense rested.

¶ 9 Following closing arguments, the jury was given its instructions and was sent back to deliberate. Regarding the charges against defendant, the jury was instructed:

"To sustain the charge of unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon, the State must prove the following propositions:

First Proposition: That the defendant knowingly possessed firearm ammunition; and

Second Proposition: That the defendant had previously been convicted of the offense of Identity Theft."

¶ 10 During its deliberation, the jury tendered two questions to the court. Relevant to the instant case, the jury asked for the definition of "knowingly." In discussing the jury's question with the court, the assistant state's attorney noted that there was an Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) defining "knowingly," which was to be given only if the jury asked. That instruction provides:

"[1] A person [(knows) (acts knowingly with regard to) (acts with knowledge of)] the nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct when he is consciously aware that his conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.

[2] A person [(knows) (acts knowingly with regard to) (acts with knowledge of)] the result of his conduct when he is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.

[3] [Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed willfully.]" Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.01B (approved Dec. 8, 2011) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal No. 5.01B).

¶ 11 Upon review of IPI Criminal No. 5.01B, the trial court stated that only paragraph 1 of the instruction would be applicable, because the committee notes to the instruction stated that paragraph 1 is to be given if the offense is defined in terms of prohibited conduct. Paragraph 2 is given if the offense is defined in terms of prohibited result, or both are given if the offense is defined in terms of both conduct and result.

The assistant state's attorney agreed. Defense counsel responded, "I understand what the committee is saying, but I think just giving one, given that last sentence, could—I'd rather give them 1 and 2 personally." When the trial court asked defense counsel how the offense was defined in terms of prohibited conduct, as set forth in paragraph 2, defense counsel responded that defendant would be in possession of the ammunition. Defense counsel then explained that he was "just really worried about that last sentence on number 1, the substantial probability that the fact exists."

¶ 12 The trial court agreed with defense counsel's concerns, stating that its initial reaction to the jury's question was that "knowingly has a plain meaning within a juror or person's common understanding." The trial court noted that the committee comments to the instruction took no position as to whether the instruction should be routinely given in the absence of a specific jury request. The trial court told defense counsel that it could see counsel's concern and that the definition in the instruction did not make matters any easier.

¶ 13 The assistant state's attorney stated:

"the last sentence in paragraph 1 is basically saying knew or should have known which is a recklessness standard in my mind. I've never used this instruction before. I've never had it come up, but I—I know what [defense counsel] is saying is that this recklessness would, I think, be enough to sustain a conviction. And recklessness is a lower standard than actual knowledge in my opinion. *** Frankly, I'm fine with just telling the jury that it's within their common knowledge and not doing an instruction."

Defense counsel agreed that he would "rather just have the jury define it for themselves." The trial court stated that its inclination was the same as the parties, that the jury should just rely on the common understanding of the word, "knowingly." The parties thus agreed that the trial court's response to the jury's question should be, "[t]he word ‘knowingly’ should be given its plain meaning within the jury's common understanding."

¶ 14 Following deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon. Defendant then filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the State did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied defendant's motion.

¶ 15 At defendant's sentencing hearing, both the State and defense counsel asked for the mandatory minimum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years, stating that he wished he could give only probation.

¶ 16 Defendant appealed her conviction. 2021 IL App (4th) 190751-U, 2021 WL 4344161.² Defendant first argued that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶ 28. The appellate court rejected this claim. Id. ¶ 39. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the appellate court concluded that a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

¶ 17 Defendant next argued that she was denied a fair trial and the effective...