People v. Jones

2016 IL 119391

67 N.E.3d 256

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Derrick JONES, Appellant.

No. 119391.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 20, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Josette M. Skelnik, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and John R. Schleppenbach, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Derrick Jones was convicted of aggravated robbery in the circuit court of Will County and sentenced to an extended-term sentence of 24 years' imprisonment based on a prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency referenced in his presentence investigative report. Defendant appealed his sentence, contending that the use of his prior juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence violated the rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). The appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (3d) 130053, 392 Ill.Dec. 198, 32 N.E.3d 198. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 315 and 612 (Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013); R. 612 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated robbery, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18–5 (West 2010) (repealed by Pub. Act 97–1108 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013))), as a result of an incident that occurred on January 6, 2012. Before defendant's jury trial began, the court asked the parties whether the sentencing range for the aggravated battery charge would be 4 to 30 years. The State agreed, as did defendant's counsel. Defendant's counsel stated that the State had tendered to her a "certified court docket from the ′04 JD case" indicating that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent on multiple counts of residential burglary and that adjudication would make defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence in the present case, with a range of 4 to 30 years.¹ However, defendant's counsel also indicated that she spoke with defendant and defendant denied having an adjudication for residential burglary. The court admonished defendant that he faced a sentencing range of 4 to 30 years, and the case proceeded to trial.

¶ 4 At trial, the evidence presented was limited to the aggravated robbery charge. No evidence regarding defendant's prior juvenile adjudication was introduced. The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, and the case proceeded to sentencing.

¶ 5 A presentencing investigative report (PSI) indicated that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent in 2005 of multiple offenses in case number 04 JD 00276, including three counts of residential burglary. The PSI provided:

"On April 28, 2005, with the then minor, Derrick Jones, having been adjudicated delinquent in the original Petition alleging Assault, and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Supplemental Petitions alleging: Burglary, Criminal Trespass to Land, Knowingly Damage to Property and Residential Burglary, three (3) Counts. Derrick Jones was sentenced to 5 years and 8 months Probation, until his 21st Birthday in the aforementioned offenses, with the first nine (9) months of Probation to be under the directive of Intensive Probation Supervision * * *."

After considering various factors in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence of 24 years' imprisonment. Defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence was subsequently denied.

¶ 6 On direct review, defendant did not challenge his conviction for aggravated robbery but did challenge his extended-term sentence. Defendant first argued that his extended-term sentence violated his sixth amendment right to a jury trial pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Apprendi, because the fact of his juvenile adjudication was neither proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt nor alleged in the indictment. The appellate court rejected his contention, finding that a prior adjudication of delinquency was sufficiently analogous to a prior criminal conviction to fall under the prior-conviction exception in Apprendi. 2015 IL App (3d) 130053, ¶ 38, 392 Ill.Dec. 198, 32 N.E.3d 198. The court reasoned that because due process does not require the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings, the absence of a right to a jury trial does not undermine the reliability of a juvenile proceeding. Id. ¶ 37. It further stated that a juvenile adjudication "reached only where all constitutionally required procedural safeguards are in place, is a no less reliable basis for the enhancement of a sentence than is a standard adult criminal conviction." Id. ¶ 36. Defendant also argued in the alternative that the circuit court improperly relied upon the PSI in determining the fact of his prior juvenile adjudication in contravention of the Supreme Court's ruling in Shepard, contending that a PSI is "particularly unreliable" in determining the fact of a prior adjudication of delinquency, as opposed to a prior criminal conviction. The appellate court also rejected this contention, finding that information in a PSI may be used as the basis for sentence enhancement without running afoul of Shepard and that the PSI unequivocally indicated defendant had been adjudicated delinquent pursuant to a petition alleging three counts of residential burglary, a Class 1 felony. Id. ¶ 47. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Will County. Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 7 We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013); R. 612 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)) and affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, defendant contends that a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication is not the equivalent of a prior conviction for purposes of extended-term sentencing under Apprendi and that such a fact must be alleged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, defendant contends that even if a prior adjudication of delinquency can qualify as a prior conviction for purposes of extended-term sentencing, the information contained in his PSI failed to conclusively establish that he had been adjudicated delinquent of residential burglary. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve these issues for review but argues that an Apprendi violation may be reviewed as plain error where, as here, the violation was prejudicial to him.

¶ 10 It is well settled that the plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 70, 354 Ill.Dec. 484, 958 N.E.2d 227 ; People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167, 178–79, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). Our decision in Herron established two categories of plain error: prejudicial errors, which may have affected the outcome in a closely balanced case, and presumptively prejudicial errors, which must be remedied although they may not have affected the outcome. People v. Nitz, 219 Ill.2d 400, 415, 302 Ill.Dec. 418, 848 N.E.2d 982 (2006). In both instances, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant. Herron, 215 Ill.2d at 187, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467. We have held that potential Apprendi violations fall under the first category of prejudicial errors and have required defendants to prove that they were prejudiced by the error. Nitz, 219 Ill.2d at 415, 302 Ill.Dec. 418, 848 N.E.2d 982. In addressing a plain-error argument, we first consider whether error occurred. In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 70, 354 Ill.Dec. 484, 958 N.E.2d 227. Review of this issue presents a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Hopkins, 201 Ill.2d 26, 36, 265 Ill.Dec. 869, 773 N.E.2d 633 (2002).

¶ 11 A. Apprendi's Prior–Conviction Exception

¶ 12 We first consider defendant's argument based on Apprendi. As noted above, the offense of aggravated robbery is a Class 1 felony. 720 ILCS 5/18–5(b) (West 2010) (repealed by Pub. Act 97–1108 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013)). The standard sentencing range for a Class 1 felony is 4 to 15 years. 730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–30(a) (West 2010). The extended-term sentencing range for a Class 1 felony is 15 to 30 years. Id. Section 5–5–3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) sets forth various factors that the court may consider as a reason to impose an extended-term sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5–5–3.2(b) (West 2010). Relevant here is the factor in subsection (b)(7) of section 5–5–3.2, which governs "[w]hen a defendant who was at least 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is convicted of a felony and has been previously adjudicated a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for an act that if committed by an adult would be a Class X or Class 1 felony when the conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous adjudication, excluding time spent in custody." 730 ILCS 5/5–5–3.2(b)(7) (West 2010). The offense of residential burglary is a Class 1 felony. 720 ILCS 5/19–3(b) (West 2010). Based on the information in the PSI that defendant had been adjudicated delinquent of the offense of residential burglary, section 5–5–3.2(b)(7) of the Code of Corrections authorized the circuit court to impose an...