People v. Justice

1

2024 IL App (4th) 230575-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TREVOR L. JUSTICE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-23-0575

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District

June 27, 2024

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mason County No. 22CF10 Honorable Michael L. Atterberry, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

HARRIS, JUSTICE.

¶ 1 Held: (1) Defendant failed to establish counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to reinstate his right to a jury trial.

(2) Defendant failed to establish counsel was ineffective for failing to request his restraints be removed during the bench trial.

(3) The trial court's alleged error in refusing to appoint new counsel following a Krankel inquiry (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984)) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Trevor L. Justice, was convicted of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer and driving with a suspended or revoked license. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of five years' imprisonment, and defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 3 On appeal, defendant argues (1) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to reinstate his right to a jury trial, (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to request defendant's restraints be removed during the bench trial, and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to appoint new counsel following a Krankel inquiry (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984)). We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On March 9, 2022, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine (count I) (720 ILCS 646/60(a), (b)(1) (West 2022)), aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (count II) (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2022)), and "driving while license revoked or suspended (6TH for D.U.I.)" (count III) (id. § 6-303(a), (d-3)). The State voluntarily dismissed count I prior to presenting its case at trial. ¶ 6 At a status hearing on September 14, 2022 defense counsel informed the trial court that "after conversations with my client and [the State] in the jury room, [defendant] has advised that he would be waiving his right to [a] jury trial before the court this morning." In examining defendant with respect to his decision, the court asked him if anyone had made any threats or promises in exchange for his waiver, and the following colloquy ensued:

"DEFENDANT: There was an agreement between myself and my defense counsel and the State.

THE COURT: A partial type of agreement?

DEFENDANT: Yes, [Y]our Honor.

THE COURT: That's not revealed yet but that's the only thing that's been discussed, no one said that your arm is going to be twisted or that you will undergo some kind of torture or anything like that?

DEFENDANT: No tape over my mouth, [Y]our Honor.

THE COURT: All right, that's a figure of speech you understand?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay, all right, the court having examined the defendant in open court finds the defendant understands the determination as to whether to waive his right to jury trial is solely his and his alone. The court will find that waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. The court will find in the defendant's opinion it is in his best interest to waive jury at this point in time. So the court will accept your waiver of jury trial in this matter."

The record shows that defendant also signed a written jury waiver form on the same date as the hearing.

¶ 7 Defendant's bench trial was conducted on March 2, 2023. Richard Cowser, the chief of police for the Forest City Police Department, was the only witness to testify. Chief Cowser testified that he was on patrol on March 5, 2022 "in an unmarked Dodge Ram fixated [ sic ] with lights and a siren and municipality police plates." He observed a Ford Thunderbird with no front license plate drive past him. As the vehicle passed him, he saw that the vehicle had a rear license plate, and he ran the plate through the Law Enforcement Automated Data System. Chief Cowser discovered that the license plate on the Thunderbird belonged to a different vehicle. Chief Cowser "initiated a traffic stop by turning on [his] emergency lights and then tried making that traffic stop." The driver of the Thunderbird, later identified as defendant, began to slow down and pull toward the shoulder of the road before "taking off at a higher rate of speed." Chief Cowser activated his sirens and informed dispatch that he was pursuing a vehicle that was refusing to stop. Approximately three minutes after first attempting to stop defendant another police officer, Officer Kenneth McMillion, joined the pursuit. Officer McMillion "did try to say over the radio or over the intercom several times to pull over, gave him instructions to stop." In response to the commands, defendant stuck his hand out of the window and "actually flipped [McMillion] off." Chief Cowser then pulled in front of defendant's vehicle, and Officer McMillion remained behind defendant in an attempt "to sandwich him in." At this point, defendant "actually slammed on his brakes and caused Officer [McMillion] to hit the rear end of his vehicle. Once the vehicle was stopped, we ordered the suspect out of the vehicle at gunpoint." Once defendant was in custody, he identified himself, "gave his date of birth, and stated he did not have a driver's license." Chief Cowser testified that he measured defendant's highest speed during the pursuit at 104 miles per hour in a 50-miles-per-hour speed zone. A certified copy of defendant's driving record was admitted into evidence without objection, showing that his driver's license had been revoked since 2004.

¶ 8 The trial court found defendant guilty of both counts and, on April 28, 2023, sentenced him to concurrent terms of five years' imprisonment.

¶ 9 On May 18, 2023, defendant filed a "Motion for Reinstatement of Jury Trial." He alleged that "he waived his right to [a] jury trial based on his understanding he would be allowed to attend rehab prior to going to trial or accepting any plea." Thus, according to defendant, "he did not understandingly waive his right to [a] jury trial because he was under the impression he would be allowed to go to rehab before the case moved further in return for his jury trial waiver." Defendant also filed a pro se "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim and Motion for New Trial." Defendant argued, in relevant part, that counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) file a timely motion to reinstate his right to a jury trial and (2) request that the trial court conduct a hearing pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 430 (eff. July 1, 2010) to determine the necessity of restraints at trial. Defendant "requested] that he be appointed counsel to represent him in a [Krankel] hearing to present his ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the court."

¶ 10 On May 31, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motions. The court began by examining, with defendant and defense counsel, the factual basis of each of the ineffective-assistance claims raised in defendant's pro se motion. With respect to defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request his restraints be removed during trial, counsel stated that she did not address the issue with the court because it was a bench trial and not a jury trial. The court indicated it was never aware that defendant was in restraints during his trial and, as a result, he suffered no prejudice. Ultimately, the court found defendant's claims of ineffective assistance lacked merit, stating:

"The court doesn't believe that appointing counsel to assist him with the Krankel claim *** would add anything here. The court doesn't believe this rises to the level of-well, *** I'll state it this way, the court believes this *** does not constitute a valid claim of ineffective assistance."

¶ 11 After addressing each of the claims in defendant's pro se motion, the trial court turned to defendant's motion for reinstatement of a jury trial, and the corresponding claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file the motion sooner. The court asked the State about its understanding of the factual basis for defendant's claim, and the State responded as follows:

"[THE STATE]: A couple of things, [Y]our Honor.

First of all, there was a conversation between myself, [defense counsel], and [defendant] in which [defendant] was informed that if he were to find a bed in a residential rehab facility and be accepted into that that the State would consider furlough to go to that and would agree that if he found a bed and was accepted the State would be agreeable to a furlough. [Defendant] was also informed at that time that the State could agree to that if it happened but there was no guarantee because ultimately whether to allow a furlough is in the discretion of the court. The State can agree with anything. The court can deny it.

So [defendant] was informed of all of these matters before he waived his right to jury trial. [Defendant] was also admonished at the time he waived his right to jury trial of the finality and the irrevocability of his waiver to his right to jury trial."

The court then had the following exchange with defendant:

"DEFENDANT: Your Honor, if I may interrupt. I would just say that since that motion you have decided is untimely would be another factor of ineffective assistance of counsel claim [Y]our Honor, because I did request that be raised at a hearing on-I

...